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Abstract 
 
Alongside deploying weapons and sensors what makes a warship distinct is 
survivability, being the measure that enables a warship to survive in a militarily hostile 
environment. The rising cost of warship procurement, coupled with declining defence 
budgets, has led to a reduction in the number of ships in most western navies. 
Moreover, cost cutting is often aimed at aspects which may be difficult to quantify, such 
as survivability, and can lead to potentially inadequate designs. Innovation in both the 
design process and the design of individual ships is, therefore, necessary, especially at 
the crucial early design stages. Computer technology can be utilised to exploit 
architecturally orientated preliminary design approaches which can address innovation 
early in the ship design process and in issues such as survivability. A number of 
survivability assessment tools currently exist; however, most fail to integrate all 
survivability constituents (i.e. susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability), in that 
they are unable to balance between the component aspects of survivability. Some are 
qualitative, therefore less than ideal for requirement specification, others are aimed 
towards the detailed design stages where implementing changes is heavily constrained 
or even impractical. 
Since a ship’s survivability is dependent on layout, the approach adopted in this 
research takes advantage of an architecturally orientated ship design approach 
applicable to early stage design. Such a method is proposed and demonstrated on five 
combatant (including a trimaran configuration) and two auxiliary ship design studies. 
The proposed method combines various tools used by UCL and the UK Ministry of 
Defence, as well as a new approach for recoverability assessment and, therefore, tackles 
difficulties currently associated with the latter (e.g.: lack of data, human performance 
and time dependence) by using weighted performance measures. 
An overall approach for survivability assessment has been applied across the 
range of designs produced and conclusions drawn on their relative merits for overall 
survivability. The approach and implications of the integration of survivability 
assessment in the preliminary ship design stages, as well as the identification of major 
survivability design drivers, are discussed. Through the identification of problematic 
topics, areas for further research are suggested. It is envisaged that this research will 
assist in developing the design process of what are, according to Captain C. Graham, 
USN, “the most complex, diverse and highly integrated of any engineering systems” 
produced today on a regular basis. 
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Nomenclature 
 
3D:  Three-dimensional. 
AAW:  Anti-air Warfare. 
ADMS: Area-defence Missile System. 
AE:  Air Engineer. 
AMR:  Auxiliary Machinery Room. 
AMV:  Advanced Marine Vehicle. 
ANEP:  Allied Naval Engineering Publication. 
ANSWER: UK MOD ASW simulation software. 
AOR:  Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment. 
ASM:  Anti-ship Missile. 
ASuW:  Anti-surface Warfare. 
ASW:  Anti-submarine Warfare. 
ASyW: Asymmetric warfare. 
ATU:  Air Treatment Unit. 
AVCAT: Aviation Carrier Turbine fuel. 
B:  Ship’s maximum beam on design waterline. 
BDCS: Battle Damage Control System. 
BGFRS: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.,  
USA. 
BMT:  British Maritime Technology Defence Services Ltd., Bath, UK. 
BN:  Bayesian Network. 
CAD:  Computer Aided Design. 
CADMID: Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-service and  
Disposal. 
CASD: Computer Aided Ship Design. 
CB:  Block Coefficient. A measure of the fullness of the underwater volume  
of a vessel. 
CBR:  Chemical, Biological and Radiological. 
CCTV: Closed-circuit Television. 
Cdr.:  Commander. 
CER:  Cost Estimating Relationship. 
CFD:  Computational Fluid Dynamics. 
CHENG: Chief Engineer, USN. 
CIWS: Close-in Weapon System. 
CM:  Midship Coefficient. A measure of the fullness of midships of a vessel. 
CNGF: Common New Generation Frigate. Anglo-French-Italian programme of  
the 1990s. 
CO:  Commanding Officer. 
Comms.: Communications. 
CP:  Prismatic Coefficient. A measure of the distribution of the underwater  
volume of a vessel. 
CPO:  Chief Petty Officer. 
CPS:  Collective Protection System. 
CSEE: Combat Systems Effectiveness Exercise. Defensive systems (hard-kill) 
effectiveness estimation method used by UCL as part of its MSc in 
Naval Architecture course. 
CV:  Aircraft Carrier. 
CVF:  Aircraft Carrier, Future (Queen Elizabeth Class). 
CVS:  Aircraft Carrier, ASW (Invincible Class). 
CW:  Waterplane Coefficient. A measure of the fullness of the waterplane of a  
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vessel. 
CWP:  Chilled Water Plant. 
DBB: Design Building Block. Designation used in the UCL DRC DBB design 
approach. 
DC:  Damage Control. 
DCA:  Damage Control Assistant. 
DCFF: Damage Control and Firefighting. 
DD 21: Destroyer for the 21st century (Zumwalt Class Destroyer). 
Dieso:  Diesel fuel, general purpose. 
DINCS: Distributed Intelligent Networked Control System. 
DRC:  Design Research Centre, Marine Research Group, Department of  
Mechanical Engineering, UCL, London, UK. 
Dstl:  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, MOD, Salisbury, UK. 
EB-FSRS: Fire Safety Ranking System. 
ECCM: Electronic Counter-counter Measures. 
ECM:  Electronic Countermeasure. 
EMCON: Electronic Emission Control. 
EMP:  Electro-magnetic Pulse. 
Eqpt:  Equipment. 
ESM:  Electronic Support Measures. 
EW:  Electronic Warfare. 
EVI:  Evacuability Index. Passenger evacuation model. 
FFDC: Firefighting and Damage Control. 
FOC:  First of Class. Term used in UK naval ship procurement. 
FP:  Fire Pump. 
FPP:  Fixed Pitch Propeller. 
FRP:  Fire and Repair Party. 
FRPP:  Fire and Repair Party Post. 
GA:  General Arrangement. 
Genset: Engine-generator. 
GMt:  Transverse Metacentric Height. A measure of stability. 
GNP:  Gross National Product. The value of goods and services produced  
within a country during one year. 
GPEOD: General Purpose Electro Optical Device. 
GPS:  Global Positioning System. 
GRC:  QinetiQ Graphics Research Corporation Ltd., Gosport, UK. 
GT:  Gas Turbine. 
GZ curve: Righting lever curve of a vessel experiencing a heeling force. A measure  
of stability. 
h:  Height of SR/MFR above sea level. 
Helo:  Helicopter. 
HF:  Human Factor. 
HMS:  Her/His Majesty’s Ship. 
HPAC: High Pressure Air Compressor. 
HPM:  Human Performance Matrix. 
HQ:  Headquarters. 
HTS:  High-temperature Superconducting. 
HVAC: Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning. 
HVME: UK MOD software monitoring platforms self-noise. 
IFEP:  Integrated Full Electric Propulsion. 
IMO:  International Maritime Organization. 
IPMS:  Integrated Platform Management System. 
22 
 
IR:  Infra-red. 
IRST:  Infra-red Search and Track. 
JR:  Junior Rate. 
JSS:  Joint Support Ship. 
L:  Ship’s length between perpendiculars. 
LCC:  Life Cycle Cost. 
LCR:  Local Control Room. 
LCS:  Littoral Combat Ship. 
LCU:  Local Control Unit. 
LPCR: Local Power and Control Room. 
LPD:  Landing Platform Dock. 
LPH:  Landing Platform Helicopter. 
Lt.:  Lieutenant. 
Lt. Cdr.: Lieutenant Commander. 
MARS: Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability ships. Designation of UK  
auxiliary programme in procurement since 2010. 
MASS: Multi Ammunition Soft-kill System. 
MBB:  Master Building Block. Designation used in the UCL DRC DBB design  
approach. 
MCR:  Machinery Control Room. 
MDO:  Marine Diesel Oil. 
MEO:  Marine Engineering Officer. 
MFR:  Multi-function Radar. 
MESM: Marine Engineer, Submarines. 
MICA: Missile d’Interception et de Combat Aérien (Interception and Aerial 
Combat Missile). 
MISSION: Maritime Integrated Survivability Simulation. An event simulation tool  
designed to simulate a maritime mission used by the UK MOD. 
MMR: Main Machinery Room. 
MOD:  Ministry of Defence, UK. 
MOT:  Ministry of Transport, NZ. 
MOTISS: Measure of Total Integrated System Survivability. 
MSc:  Master of Science. 
NAAFI: Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes. 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
NBC:  Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical. 
NBCD: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence. 
NBCDO: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence Officer. 
NES:  Naval Engineering Standards. 
ODIN: UK MOD torpedo activation simulation software. 
ONS:  Office for National Statistics, UK Statistics Authority, Cardiff, UK. 
OOVR: Operationally Oriented Vulnerability Requirement. 
PAAMS: Principal Anti Air Missile System. 
P(di):  Probability of the ship being detected and identified. 
P(h):  Probability of the ship being hit by at least one ASM. 
P(k):  Probability of kill. 
P(l):  Probability that the ASM locks on the ship. 
P(susc.): P(di) × P(l) × P(h). 
PDMS: Point-defence Missile System. 
PM:  Performance Measure. 
PMS:  Platform Management System. 
PN:  Portuguese Navy. 
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PO:  Petty Officer. 
PREVENT:  Preliminary Vulnerability Evaluation of Enemy Threats. A vulnerability  
assessment software for concept stage ship designs developed by BMT 
Defence Services. 
RAM:  Radar-absorbent Material. 
RAS:  Replenishment at Sea. 
RASco: Replenishment at Sea control room. 
RCN:  Royal Canadian Navy. 
RCS:  Radar Cross Section. 
REVS: Rapid Evaluation of Vulnerability of Ships. A vulnerability assessment 
code for abovewater threats used by the UK MOD during the 1990s. 
RFA:  Royal Fleet Auxiliary. 
RN:  Royal Navy. 
RNN:  Royal Netherlands Navy. 
RPI:  Retail Price Index. A measure of inflation published by the ONS. 
Rtd.:  Retired. 
S5:  Speed, Seakeeping, Stability, Strength and Style. Descriptive ship design  
term due to Brown and Andrews (1980). 
SAM:  Surface-to-air Missile. 
SCC:  Ship Control Centre. 
SeaRAM: Rolling Airframe Missile. 
SINGRAR: Sistema Integrado para a Gestão de Prioridades de Reparação e 
Afectação de Recursos (Integrated System for Repair Priority 
Management and Resource Assignment). 
SIREX: UK MOD IR signature prediction software. 
SOLAS: Safety of Life at Sea. An IMO international maritime safety treaty. 
SPECTRE: UK MOD RCS prediction software. 
SRD:  System Requirement Document. Generic document used in UK defence  
procurement. 
SR:  Senior Rate. 
SR:  Surveillance Radar. 
SSTDS: Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System. 
SSVUL: Surface Ship Vulnerability Assessment. A vulnerability assessment code  
for underwater threats used by the UK MOD during the 1990s. 
SUBCON: Submarine Concept. An implementation of the architecturally orientated  
DBB approach to preliminary submarine design. 
SURFCON: Surface Ship Concept. An implementation of the architecturally  
orientated DBB approach to preliminary ship design. 
SURVIVE: Surface and Underwater Ship Visual Vulnerability Evaluation. A  
Vulnerability (and recoverability) assessment code developed by QinetiQ 
and used by the UK MOD. 
SWATH: Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull. 
SYLVER: Système de Lancement Vertical (Vertical Launching Systems). 
TEU:  Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit. A unit of cargo capacity. 
ThreeDim: UK MOD AAW and ASuW simulation software. 
TLC:  Through Life Cost. 
TMSS: Total Mine Simulation System. An UK MOD mine activation simulation  
Software. 
UCL:  University College London, London, UK. 
UPC:  Unit Procurement/Production Cost. 
URD:  User Requirement Document. Generic document used in UK defence  
procurement. 
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USN:  United States Navy. 
USS:  United States Ship. 
VCG:  Vertical Centre of Gravity. 
VLS:  Vertical Launching Systems. 
VL:  Vertical Launch. 
VR:  Virtual Reality. 
WA:  Warfare Aviation. 
WEO:  Weapon Engineering Officer. 
WE:  Weapon Engineer. 
WESM: Weapon Engineer, Submarines. 
WLC:  Whole Life Cost. 
wrt:  With respect to. 
WT:  Watertight. 
WTD:  Watertight Door. 
WWII: World War 2. 
XO:  Executive Officer. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
 Survivability is defined by NATO as “the capability of a weapon system to 
continue to carry out its designated mission(s) in a combat environment” (NATO 
2003a), where in the current case the ‘weapon system’ signifies a naval ship. 
Survivability is generally considered to encompass three constituents, susceptibility, 
vulnerability and recoverability (Said 1995). Susceptibility is the measure of a ship 
being detected, identified, targeted and hit; vulnerability addresses the damage caused 
by the incident; while recoverability the extent to which capability can be recovered and 
the time needed to recover it. Each of the three constituents is highly dependent 
(amongst other factors) on the ship configuration which in turn is produced during the 
crucial early ship design stages. However, the driving issues in preliminary ship design 
have traditionally been powering, stability, strength and seakeeping (Brown and 
Andrews 1980). Therefore, survivability related issues have been investigated in detail 
during the later design stages but have been heavily constrained by the major design 
features fixed beforehand. In addition, the lack of an integrated survivability assessment 
and quantification method which can be utilised during the early design stages, 
combined with rising warship procurement costs can make attractive the option of cost 
cutting in this complex and highly critical topic, despite resulting in inadequate ship 
designs due to inappropriate levels of survivability. 
 This thesis investigates and describes an approach to ship design which produces 
an integrated survivability assessment. It focuses on integrating survivability assessment 
(with emphasis on the least mature aspect of recoverability) in preliminary ship design 
and exploits the architecturally orientated Design Building Block approach to 
preliminary ship design. This approach, developed by Andrews (1984; 1986) and 
demonstrated in (Andrews and Dicks 1997) integrates architectural description with the 
traditional numerical synthesis. It was initially implemented for submarines through the 
SUBCON implementation (Andrews et al 1996) and subsequently for surface ships 
through GRC’s SURFCON implementation in Paramarine (Munoz and Forrest 2002), 
described in (Andrews and Pawling 2003). The use of architecturally orientated design 
approaches enables the assessment of survivability at the earliest design stages, which 
are characterised by the expenditure of minimum design resources while having a large 
impact on the final solution in terms of vessel configuration and cost. 
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The feasibility of such an approach to ship survivability is illustrated through the 
development of various ship designs, including combatants and auxiliary ships adopting 
both conventional and unconventional hullform configurations. These designs have 
been analysed using tools such as Paramarine CASD and various survivability 
assessment techniques. 
 
1.2 Research Scope and Aim 
 
 The research on survivability assessment outlined in this thesis focuses on the 
divergent and creative preliminary stages of the ship design process where a large 
variety of alternative ship designs should be investigated by the designers and the 
designs are still able to be modified relatively easily. This research does not address 
aspects which are addressed in the contract design and detailed design stages, where 
high levels of design definition are necessary. 
 The thesis focuses on the application of survivability assessment methods on 
surface warships (including both combatants and auxiliaries) in order to investigate 
battle damage. This research has applicability on all types of surface warships of both 
conventional and novel configurations and could also be of relevance to subsurface 
naval vessels. It is envisaged that the research will encourage innovative ship design 
and increase the confidence of the designer by proposing an assessment and 
quantification method of what is an important aspect of naval ship design. 
 The thesis initially investigates the importance and advantages of preliminary 
ship design and the full integration of architectural considerations in the preliminary 
ship design process. This is done in order to justify the application of survivability 
assessment techniques in the early ship design stages. Current survivability assessment 
techniques and their applicability to integrate total survivability assessment in the 
preliminary design process have been examined. This is followed by the proposition of 
an integrated survivability assessment approach in preliminary ship design, which is 
then demonstrated on a variety of concept ship design studies. This also allows the 
investigation of principal survivability drivers in a given design. 
 The approach adopted for this research was primarily characterised by the 
combination of various bespoke computer tools for survivability assessment and the 
development of numerous design studies. Due to the information sensitivity 
characterising the area of naval ship survivability the developed designs draw on the 
UCL Naval Architecture database (UCL 2010a; UCL 2010b) which is unclassified but 
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essentially representative of UK MOD design practice. In addition, classified tools, as 
well as classified data for weapon systems and ship designs, were not utilised. This 
research is primarily concentrated at seagoing naval combatants but variations in size, 
configuration novelty and role have been investigated to test out the robustness of the 
proposed method of survivability assessment in preliminary ship design. 
 The overall aim of the thesis is summarised as: 
To propose an integrated survivability assessment approach and demonstrate it on a 
range of ship types and hullform configurations. The ship designs used throughout the 
research need to have a level of definition appropriate to preliminary stage design. The 
principal drivers for survivability and their cost-effective incorporation in ship design 
need to be explored. In addition, the advantages of using an architecturally orientated 
preliminary ship design approach, in conjunction with the proposed survivability 
assessment method, should be investigated. It is argued that such preliminary design 
approaches can bring survivability performance issues into appropriate consideration in 
the earliest design stages. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 The thesis is composed of eight main chapters accompanied by separate 
appendices providing additional material relevant to the main chapters. 
 This chapter provides a brief introduction to the research topic as well as the 
scope and aim. 
 The second and third chapters outline the background for the research work. 
Chapter 2, focusing on ship design issues, is split into three main sections. The first 
gives an introduction to ship design, mainly focusing on preliminary warship design. It 
describes the evolution of the preliminary warship design process through the latter part 
of the twentieth century to date and how it has been affected and enhanced by the 
extraordinary developments in computer based tools and methods. The second section 
focuses on the importance of ship cost estimating during the early design stages as a 
measure against which survivability measures can be assessed. The final section 
outlines the main conclusions of this chapter. 
The third chapter focuses on naval ship survivability and is split into four parts. 
In the first two parts, survivability and its relevance are defined in detail and current 
threats faced by navies are examined. The third part gives a detailed account of current 
survivability assessment techniques and their implications in ship design. The final part 
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provides the main conclusions of this chapter while identifying the gaps in current 
survivability assessment approaches. Thus an indication as to the way forward is given. 
 The fourth chapter addresses the gaps identified in survivability assessment 
essentially through a detailed description of the proposed survivability assessment 
method. This chapter consists of four main sections. The first two sections focus on the 
susceptibility and vulnerability assessment parts of the method, each of which are met 
by current established techniques the applicability of which has been proven at 
preliminary stage ship design. The third and largest section describes the development, 
reasoning behind and applicability of the new recoverability assessment approach. The 
development of a new recoverability assessment approach was necessary due to the 
limitations of current approaches, which are mentioned in Chapter 3. Finally, the fourth 
section describes how the three elements of survivability assessment can be combined 
into the proposed total survivability assessment approach. 
 The fifth chapter describes the application of the proposed method to seven ship 
design studies. This chapter is separated into three main parts. The first part gives a 
detailed account of the three frigate variant design studies conducted, the second 
describes the corvette and destroyer design studies developed and the final part explores 
the two replenishment ships which were designed. The choice of ship design is justified 
and the design procedure, as well as the main characteristics and features of the ship 
designs are explained, focusing mainly in features relevant to survivability performance. 
The sixth chapter presents the results from the application of the method 
described in Chapter 4 to the selected ship design studies detailed in Chapter 5. Results 
of all survivability constituents for all ship designs are presented, including various 
sensitivity studies. In addition, cost estimations are presented from a ship costing study 
undertaken in order to explore the cost-effective incorporation of the principal features 
of survivability in the ship designs undertaken. 
 The discussion in the seventh chapter analyses the results (Chapter 6) of 
applying the proposed survivability assessment approach in Chapter 4 to the ship design 
studies in Chapter 5. It is argued that the major survivability drivers for the various ship 
designs have been identified and validate the proposed method. In addition the 
discussion considers whether the proposed approach in Chapter 4 addresses the gaps 
identified in the research background outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, 
consideration is given as to whether the research aims in Chapter 1 were met and 
suitable ways forward for this on-going research are suggested. 
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 The eighth and final chapter summarises the major conclusions that have 
resulted from the research work. 
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Chapter 2: Ship Design Issues 
 
This chapter, consisting of three main sections, provides the ship design related 
background and context for the research. The first section outlines the nature of ship 
design and developments in preliminary ship design approaches through the latter part 
of the twentieth century to date. It specifically focuses on and gives an adequate 
explanation of the importance of preliminary ship design and the utility of 
architecturally orientated processes, such as the Design Building Block approach to 
preliminary ship design. Such design approaches are crucial with regards to the 
proposed survivability assessment approach. The second section focuses on ship costing 
during the preliminary ship design process which could assist in the cost effective 
incorporation of the principal survivability drivers. The final section provides the main 
conclusions of the research review related to issues concerning ship design by 
highlighting the importance of architecturally orientated preliminary ship design 
approaches. 
 
2.1 Ship Design 
 
2.1.1 Background to Naval Ship Design and Procurement 
 
A warship design project is initiated to meet a need (operational, new major 
equipment) (Andrews 1987; Brown 1993) which is set by the customer either in the 
form of a high-level URD or a lower-level SRD (MOD 2001). After a baseline design is 
developed, the initial requirement is produced based on operational research and 
dialogue with designers on what is achievable (Andrews 1992). Achieving a realistic 
and affordable requirement is of vital importance (Heather 1990; Crow 2001) as the 
design process and the end result are largely based on the designer’s interpretation of 
the often crude requirements (Andrews 1986; Brown 1986a). Correct interpretation of 
the requirements can also lead to cost saving (Andrews and Brown 1982; Crow 2001).  
Naval ships have moved from aiming to design the technically best to the cost 
effective and finally to the current cash limited ship (Brown 1986a) as a result of the 
growth in Unit Procurement Cost (UPC) (approximately 9% per annum (Gates 2005)), 
although it should be recognised that this is only about 20% of the Through Life Cost 
(TLC) (Andrews and Brown 1982; Brown and Tupper 1989). This real cost increase is 
attributed to increased capability (which has to be balanced with safety, supportability 
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and sustainability (Knight 2012a; Knight 2012b)), greater complexity and higher 
standards (Brown and Andrews 1980; Brown and Tupper 1989). Coupled with 
declining defence budgets post-cold war (Andrews and Hall 1995) this has led to a 
decrease in the number of warships for most navies (Andrews and Brown 1982; Brown 
and Tupper 1989) despite no reduction in commitments (Collins and Ward 2012), 
leading to the aforementioned requirement of greater capability per ship (Jones and 
Kimber 2012) and greater reliability (Manley 2012). A number of ways to reduce cost, 
which have all affected the design process, have been suggested, such as adoption of 
commercial standards for naval ships (Brown and Andrews 1980; Rattenbury 2004) 
(especially for non-combatants such as auxiliary ships (Cooper et al 2007)), open 
system architecture (Vasilakos et al 2000), flexibility through modularity/cellularity 
(Brown and Andrews 1980; Jones and Kimber 2012) (which, however could lead to a 
heavier ship (Gates and Rusling 1982)), restricting the number of roles intended for a 
new ship design (Brown and Andrews 1980; Collins and Ward 2012), technical 
innovation (Andrews and Brown 1982) and complement reduction (Brown and 
Andrews 1980; Collins and Ward 2012). It should be noted that cost cutting is usually 
focused on UPC rather than TLC (Brown and Andrews 1980) and contentious areas 
such as resistance to damage which can be difficult to quantify (Brown 1986a).  
 
2.1.2 Introduction to Ship Design 
 
Many attempts to describe ship design have been made. Gale (2003) defined it 
as “the activity involved in producing the drawings, specifications and other data 
needed to construct an object (ship)”, emphasising both the scientific and artistic nature 
of design (Gale 2003; Gates 2005). This approach is in agreement with Andrews (1986) 
remark that ship design cannot be described as a purely scientific/engineering field as it 
involves the arrangement of spaces and equipment, giving it an architectural element. 
Andrews (1981) also states that what differentiates design from other human activities 
is synthesis (“putting the pieces together in a new way” (Jones 1970)), therefore again 
stressing the fundamental creative aspect of design (Gale 2003) which is growing in 
importance given the increased information currently available to naval architects due to 
technology advances (Jasionowski 2012). Archer (1979) took a further step and 
classified design as a separate culture to humanities and sciences, (Figure 1 of (Archer 
1979)). It is therefore understandable that the personal characteristics of the designer 
largely influence the ship design process (Andrews 1986; Gale 2003). 
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According to Rawson and Tupper (2001) ship design is the raison d'être of naval 
architecture. Ship design is an iterative process, where evolving the requirement and 
designer judgments are part of the process to arrive to a solution (Gale 2003; Gates 
2005). This iterative process has been illustrated by the design spiral (Andrews 1986; 
Rawson and Tupper 2001) which is frequently used by naval architects to depict the 
ship design process. The first design spiral was produced by Evans (1959) and since 
then a large number of design spirals have been produced (a chronological set is shown 
in (Andrews et al 2009)). A typical design spiral attempts to show the way in which a 
naval architect deals with each topic in sequence and iteratively, until an optimum 
solution is reached (Evans 1959; Gale 2003). However, such a representation of the 
design process has been criticised by a number of authors. Design spirals depict ship 
design as a set of sequential processes (Watson 1998; Gale 2003), rather it is 
characterised as looping, nonlinear and discontinuous, therefore not as simplistic as a 
spiral (Brown 1986a; Andrews et al 2012b); spirals look at steps and not the design 
process itself (Andrews 1998); spirals are not ship type dependant (Watson 1998). 
Warships have been cited as “the most complex, diverse and highly integrated of 
any engineering systems” produced today on a regular basis (Graham 1982) for a 
variety of reasons. For example, they are designed for multiple roles (Brown 1986a; 
Brown and Tupper 1989), it is difficult to quantify many aspects of their performance 
(Brown and Tupper 1989), they are distinctively large and complex (Andrews et al 
1997), they operate in a hostile environment (Gates 2005), they must provide a 
hospitable environment for the crew (Gates 2005) and they consist of a number of high 
risk areas (Heather 1990). Heather (1990) suggested that the main high risk areas in 
warship design are: development of complex weapon items and software (which are 
often delivered late or fail to perform), bottom-up weight estimates for novel designs, 
auxiliary power generation requirements and layout of key spaces. The extent of design 
complication and risk increases with degree of novelty. Andrews (1986) categorised 
different types of design processes based on ship novelty: type-ship variation, evolution, 
historical, synthesis, radical configuration (e.g. SWATH), radical technology (requiring 
prototypes). A designer has to address a variety of often conflicting aims, always under 
a tight budget (Brown and Tupper 1989) and almost always without the assurance of a 
prototype (due to size and complexity, cost, and time factors) (Andrews 2011) which 
further complicates the task. 
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The phases of the warship design process, gradually moving from ship-level to 
system-level (Heather 1990), can be summarised as follows for UK MOD practice 
(Andrews 1992) (for commercial practice refer to (Watson and Gilfillan 1976)): 
1. Concept; 
2. Feasibility; 
3. Design Definition; 
4. Build Contract Definition; 
5. Detailed Ship Design. 
The first phase, where the designer attempts to understand the customers’ needs and 
convert them into a technical solution (Brown 1986a; Gale 2003), has been further 
broken down for major programmes into: concept exploration, concept studies and 
concept design (Andrews 1993; Andrews et al 2012a). In the concept phase, the 
designer explores a number of alternatives and selects the most promising in terms of 
size, cost and capability (Brown 1986a; Andrews and Pawling 2007). The time and 
resources spent during concept or preliminary design are only a fraction of those spent 
during the entire project (Andrews 1987). However, most major decisions are taken and 
trade off studies carried out early in the design process and will determine the final 
solution (Brown and Andrews 1980; Andrews and Pawling 2009), therefore, 
committing the largest part of the future costs (Andrews 2011). The cost of applying 
corrections to a problematic design at the later design stages, or even construction stages 
is disproportionally high (Goossens 1992), and costs can only be reduced by 
withdrawing equipment rather than considering alternative designs (Andrews and 
Brown 1982). (Although Knight (2012a; 2012b) commented that in some cases 
regarding certain shipyards “the onerous change process imposes more effort to modify 
a 3D model than making the change directly on the inbuilt product”). The importance of 
concept design is enhanced by the fact that realistically novelty can only be introduced 
here (Brown 1986a). It is clear that the early stages of design are the most critical, and 
this can be summarised by “the often quoted truism that 90% of the major design 
decisions have been made when less than 10% of the design effort has been expended” 
(Andrews et al 2006). 
 
2.1.3 Traditional Preliminary Ship Design 
 
 Traditionally, naval architects have focused on the areas of speed, seakeeping, 
stability and strength, otherwise known as S4 (Brown and Andrews 1980). These were 
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regarded as the driving issues in preliminary ship design; in contrast, style related issues 
were examined at later stages (Andrews 1984) (contributing towards the relative 
formalisation and maturity in disciplines such as marine hydrodynamics and marine 
structures compared to marine design (Andrews 2012)). In general, the process was 
perceived as one with discreet sequential steps and feedbacks, similar to design spirals 
(Andrews and Dicks 1997; Andrews et al 2006); this sequential process is depicted in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Summary Representation of Current Sequential Synthesis (Andrews 
1986) 
 
Initial sizing (or generative process), relied extensively on existing ship data and 
scaling ratios to get first estimates of weight and space requirements and costs (Brown 
and Andrews 1980) before the first iteration commenced (Andrews 1981; Cooper et al 
2007). Figure 2.2 illustrates a simplified initial sizing process showing the assumptions 
and sources for each step.  
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Figure 2.2: A Simplified Model of Initial Ship Sizing (Andrews 1986) 
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Initial sizing was followed by parametric/form selection and finally the 
development of the ship’s layout was considered (Andrews 1986). This traditional 
preliminary design process limited the use of computers to the first two numerically 
based steps, initial sizing and parametric selection (Andrews et al 2006). 
 This process has been criticised for various reasons as it does not represent a 
fully integrated design process, limiting creativity and innovation. The fact that the 
process is essentially sequential means that the layout/architecture of the design (the last 
step in the sequence) has to be developed within a predefined hullform (Andrews 1981; 
Andrews et al 2006) therefore limiting the designers creative input (Andrews 1986). 
Issues such as bulkhead locations are governed by damage stability and structural 
continuity requirements (Brown 1987) further constraining the architectural evolution 
(Andrews 2003). Topics such as crewing, ship operations, personnel evolutions can 
only be examined at later stages in the design process (within the constraints previously 
observed) where alterations to the design are lengthy and costly (Andrews et al 2008). 
Another area of risk characterising the traditional approach is that, since the initial 
sizing step is purely numerical it relies on the availability of existing ship data (Gates 
2005; UCL 2010a; UCL 2010b) and the ability of the designer to produce pragmatic 
scaling ratios (Cooper et al 2007). Add to this, the parametric selection stage is 
disconnected from the architecturally driven aspects of a ship (Andrews 1986). Andrews 
(1986) concludes that traditional synthesis is progressive, not comprehensive or 
integrative and comments that, given the forward momentum in design development, 
the feedback loops in Figure 2.1 are optimistic, thereby limiting the iterative nature of 
preliminary ship design to just getting a numeric balance rather than for exploration of 
the design space. 
 It is worth noting that, traditionally ships and their components are described by 
means of a weight breakdown (Garzke and Kerr 1985; MOD 2010). The UK MOD 
(2010) convention for warship weight groups, similar to that used in the UCL MSc Ship 
Design Project (UCL 2010a) is as follows: hull and superstructure, propulsion, 
electrical, control and communication, ancillary systems, outfit and furnishings, 
armament and variable load. This type of ship description, although offering the 
prospect of comparing a new ship design to existing ships (Andrews and Dicks 1997) 
has a number of limitations. It is mainly aimed towards the ship construction industry 
(Garzke and Kerr 1985; Andrews and Pawling 2009), thus discouraging 
novel/unconventional concepts (Andrews and Dicks 1997) and it is not appropriate in 
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investigating the overall effect on the ship of adding or removing a certain capability 
(Andrews and Dicks 1997) 
 It is evident that insisting on the traditional approach to preliminary ship design 
inhibits innovation and evolution, which means most new designs are based closely on 
existing ships (Andrews 1981). However, with the rapid development in computer 
graphics over recent years (radically altering design processes (Andrews 2011)) it is 
possible to generate a fully integrative ship design synthesis, where architectural factors 
can influence major decision making from the start of the process (Andrews 1986; 
Andrews et al 2006). Innovation in both ship designs and the design process itself is 
seen to be the way of meeting the challenge of increased capability with decreasing 
resources (Brown 1993).  
 
2.1.4 Architecturally Orientated Preliminary Ship Design 
 
 The architecture of a warship is an area often disregarded by naval architects in 
favour of topics such as hydrodynamics and structures (Brown 1993; Andrews et al 
2006). However, Brown (1987) defined a warship as an “assembly of multifunctional 
interacting spaces located within an envelope set by hydrodynamic and other 
considerations, partition arrangement governed by structural continuity and containment 
of damage, more than onshore buildings” thereby placing architecture at the centre of 
the equation. Andrews (1986) took a further step by suggesting that certain ship types 
should be designed by arranging the layout such as to optimise the ship’s primary 
function, followed by wrapping an efficient hullform around this layout. This is 
enhanced by the fact that most warship types are rarely driven by hydrodynamic or 
structural aspects (Brown 1987), especially during the early design stages (Chalmers 
1993a). The importance of a ship’s architecture is highlighted by the fact that it affects 
vital features such as operational effectiveness, survivability, economy, crew efficiency 
and comfort and ease of production (Andrews and Brown 1982; Brown 1987) and all 
that in its highly constrained, dynamic environment (Brown 1993). However it is 
difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular layout due to the multiple and 
conflicting requirements that exist for warships and the interactive nature of ship 
architecture (e.g.: upperdeck arrangement is affected by the machinery disposition via 
uptakes and downtakes) (Andrews and Brown 1982; Brown 1993). The above led 
Purvis (1974) to the conclusion that warships are not weight or space limited, but 
architecture limited. 
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 Since warships are predominantly architecturally driven, it has been suggested 
that a configurationally orientated preliminary design process would reveal design 
drivers and risk areas (Andrews 2003). Also, this would increase the scope for creativity 
and enable the designer to contribute in the divergent and imaginative early stage design 
process; therefore, leading to innovative solutions (Andrews 1981) and better deal with 
complexity (Andrews 2003). In addition, the adoption of such a preliminary design 
process could lead to an increase in the number of alternatives considered, aiding 
decision making at the crucial early design stages, therefore decreasing the risk of errors 
in expensive and infrequent projects and assisting trade-offs and cost estimation 
(Andrews 1986). By integrating the three traditional stages of the design process, i.e. 
initial sizing, parametric selection and development of the general arrangement, a more 
complete solution will be presented (Andrews 2003). Since the hullform will not be set 
during the layout evolution stage (Andrews 1986) the dimensions of the ship can be 
treated as flexible and dependant on an efficient architecture (Andrews et al 2006), 
rather than assuming that an increase in ship size is always penalising, as is the case 
with numeric sizing (Andrews 1981) such as shown in Figure 2.2. By positioning 
warship architecture at the centre of the preliminary design process, certain design 
features and interactions can then be explored, which were not possible with the 
traditional one-dimensional numerically based design process (Andrews 1981; Andrews 
et al 2012a). For example, a designer can better integrate the combat system (Andrews 
1992) and take into account issues such as zoning, vulnerability, modularity, access 
philosophy, habitability and space margins (Andrews 1986). This leads to the 
conclusion that design options can be compared on the basis of operational performance 
rather than merely cost (Andrews 1986), although questions have been raised as to how 
to evaluate characteristics such as survivability and habitability (Garzke and Kerr 1985). 
Finally, an early configurational representation of a design would enhance the dialogue 
between the parties involved, particularly with the requirements owner (Gale 2003). 
 However, space is not only dependant on principal dimensions but also on 
location and shape (Brown 1987). Therefore, in order to successfully implement a new 
fully integrated, more creative and flexible architecturally driven design philosophy, it 
is essential to take advantage of powerful CAD (Andrews 1981). During recent decades, 
developments in computer techniques were rapid and impressive, revolutionising the 
early ship design process (Munoz and Forrest 2002; Andrews 2011). This has led 
designers to be able to produce a large number of alternative designs in a relatively 
short time with less errors, reducing costs, (Gale 2003) and explore and assess the 
39 
 
alternative layout arrangements, confidently making important decisions even at the 
earliest stages of the design process (Crow 2001). When such CAD tools are combined 
with numerical/analytical naval architectural tools, a fuller integration in the preliminary 
design phase can be achieved (Andrews 2003). The designer can carry out a variety of 
tasks which were usually carried out at later design stages (Cooper et al 2007), such as 
estimating cost and weight (Andrews and Brown 1982), assessing vulnerability and 
structural continuity (Andrews 1993; Crow 2001), investigating personnel and freight 
flow (using simulation techniques) (Andrews and Pawling 2009) and investigating 
congested areas by 3D modelling (Gale 2003). Pegg et al (2012) discuss the challenges 
related to integrating the various early ship design simulation tools now available in a 
single design and simulation environment; in particular they examine strength, 
hydrodynamic, shock and blast, signatures, operational and cathodic protection 
simulation models. Such techniques could partially address Garzke and Kerr’s (1985) 
remark on the difficulty of evaluating and optimising certain ship characteristics. It has 
also been suggested that advances in computer techniques have decreased the need for 
physical mock-ups (Gale 2003) which are expensive and time consuming to build and 
modify. It is then clear that the impressive software developments of the last years have 
made preliminary design more creative and innovative (Andrews and Pawling 2003), 
producing designs which are more complete and descriptive, therefore aiding decision 
making (Andrews 1993), when the design is still sufficiently flexible to more easily 
apply changes (Andrews et al 2008). 
 Andrews’ (1981) proposal to integrate ship architecture with the traditional 
numerical techniques was followed by the demonstration of ‘creative synthesis’ 
(Andrews 1984) which was presented in a paper entitled ‘An Integrated Approach to 
Ship Synthesis’ (Andrews 1986). A hull form generator was used to produce a frigate 
hull and output deck plans on which compartments were positioned. After auditing, 
space and weight data were extracted and reiterated. This way, the initial sizing step was 
not carried out in the traditional purely numerical manner, but it was incorporated with 
layout considerations (“disposition of the principal spaces”), therefore producing a 
much more comprehensive solution. Figure 2.3 shows a revised initial sizing process, 
which this time takes into account spatial factors, while Figure 2.4 is a description of 
fully integrated design synthesis in contrast to the sequential traditional synthesis shown 
in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.3: A Schematic Modification of the above Initial Ship Synthesis with Spatial 
Totals which are Laid Out Graphically before Reiterating (Andrews 1986) 
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Figure 2.4: A Summary Representation of a more ‘Holistic’ Approach to a Fully 
Integrated Ship Synthesis (Andrews 1986) 
 
However, the initial hullform and, therefore, deck plans, had to be developed 
under default hull coefficient values due to the limited capabilities of computers during 
the 1980s (Andrews 1986), restricting the demonstration of applicability of the method 
only to frigates and leaving out unconventional hullforms (Andrews 1998). From this 
work, a new approach, namely the Design Building Block approach (Andrews and 
Dicks 1997) was developed and implemented, taking advantage of the impressive CAD 
developments previously described, first for submarines (Andrews et al 1996) and later 
for surface ships (Andrews and Pawling 2003). This is discussed further in Section 
2.1.5. 
 In order to appropriately position a ship’s principal compartments and build up 
its architecture, Andrews (1984; 1986) proposed the method of ‘circles of influence’. 
Figure 2.5 shows how this method could be used in order to accomplish full integrated 
synthesis and come up with a three dimensional representation of a frigate, around 
which an efficient hullform could be wrapped (Andrews 1986; Andrews 2003). 
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a) Combining 
of two sets of 
circles of 
influence 
from 
preferences in 
compartment 
juxtaposition 
 
b) A 
diagrammatic 
indication of 
a network 
representa-
tion of the 
compartment 
relationships 
for a full 
synthesis 
 
 
c) A 
diagrammatic 
suggestion as 
to how a full 
synthesis 
suggested 
above might 
be 
accomplished 
Figure 2.5: Circles of Influence leading to Full Synthesis (Andrews 1986) 
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There are many obvious compartment relations around which ‘circles of 
influence’ could be built, such as dining spaces should be close to stores and in a 
position with low vertical accelerations (Brown 1987). Also, some compartments are 
more important or constrained than others (such as machinery spaces, Operations Room 
and accommodation spaces (Andrews 1986)) so they should occupy central roles in the 
‘circles of influence’. An efficient layout, locating related spaces adjacently, would also 
lead to minimising the extent of main passageways (Brown 1986a). Further work on 
‘circles of influence’ and more detailed diagrams were produced by Dicks (2000). 
 It was previously mentioned that the weight breakdown description of traditional 
ships led to numerous limitations. Therefore, it was suggested that this was another area 
for reconsideration in order to achieve more creative ship design. The broad objectives 
of a warship have been determined as: ‘to float, to move, to fight’ (Brown and Tupper 
1989), and these three categories “represent a ship in material and cost terms” (Andrews 
1987). Therefore, it would make sense to apply a functional breakdown using these 
three groups (Float, Move, Fight) at top level with the addition of an Infrastructure 
group as argued by Andrews et al (1996). Many advantages of a functional descriptive 
breakdown have been reported: the impact of adding or removing a particular capability 
on the whole ship could be assessed  (Andrews 2003) (therefore leading to more cost-
effective solutions and improving communication with the customer (Garzke and Kerr 
1985)); new ship designs would no longer be solely based on assumptions from existing 
ships and thus would encourage innovation (Andrews 2003); a more meaningful cost 
description of the ship could be achieved (Andrews and Pawling 2003) (if resources 
devoted to Infrastructure are not taken into account, Fight accounts for approximately 
70% of the UPC of a typical combatant, followed by Move and Float (Andrews and 
Brown 1982)). 
 
2.1.5 The Design Building Block Approach to Preliminary Ship Design 
 
It was previously mentioned that the research carried out during the 1980s 
concerning full integration of ship synthesis (Andrews 1986) led to the DBB approach, 
which is described in (Andrews and Dicks 1997). Since then, numerous types of ships 
have been designed using this approach to preliminary ship design, the work being 
carried out in the UCL DRC which was established in 2000 as part of the Marine 
Research Group of UCL (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/mecheng/research/marine). This CAD 
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focused group makes use of the GRC’s (QinetiQ 2012) Paramarine Preliminary Ship 
Design Software in order to investigate innovative preliminary design. 
The basic idea behind the DBB approach is for the designer to separate the 
ship’s functions and sub-functions into discrete elements (Design Building Blocks) and 
position them appropriately, putting architectural factors in the centre of the process, in 
contrast to the traditional sequential design process (Andrews and Dicks 1997). This 
method allows a more thorough exploration of alternative designs to meet the particular 
requirement, as well as encouraging novel solutions (Andrews and Pawling 2009). This 
is because it is not type ship based and removes the limitations of the traditional 
numerical sizing process, which leads to conventional configurations (Andrews and 
Dicks 1997). An outline of the DBB approach is given by Andrews and Dicks (1997) 
and Andrews and Pawling (2003) (see Figure 2.6):- 
- “A need for a new conceptual design is conceived and an idea of the likely 
design style to meet that broad requirement is suggested; 
- Drawing on novel ideas or historical data a series of building blocks are defined 
in a computer system. Each building block contains geometric and technical 
attributes regarding the functions of that building block; 
- A design space is generated and the Design Building Blocks are configured as 
desired or required within the design space; 
- Overall naval architectural balance and principal performance aspects of the 
design are investigated using simple and flexible algorithms and, if necessary, 
using analysis programs external to the main system; 
- The configuration is then manipulated until the designer is satisfied; 
- Decomposition of the Design Building Blocks to greater levels of detail is 
undertaken, as necessary to increase confidence in the design solution.” 
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Figure 2.6: Building Block Design approach applied to Surface Ships (Andrews and 
Dicks 1997) 
 
The DBB approach is characterised as: ‘open/glass box’, allowing the designer 
to input their experience and creativity, therefore, increasing their contribution and 
responsibility (Andrews 2006); ‘soft’, so that the process can be updated and improves 
(e.g. changing algorithms); and it allows margins (see Appendix 1) to be appropriately 
assessed in the course of the process rather than using historical values at global or just 
main weight and space group level (Andrews and Dicks 1997).  
The DBB design phases are summarised in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Building Block Design Steps (Andrews and Dicks 1997) 
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As the design is evolved, the level of detail increases and at each stage the 
design is assessed in order to result to an appropriately balanced ship (Andrews and 
Pawling 2003). This is done by the design tool reporting the design state to the designer 
(after auditing the configuration to check if it is balanced in weight, space, stability and 
powering). The designer then has to judge what changes are needed to achieve a 
necessary level of balance (Andrews and Pawling 2003).  
Since this is an architecturally orientated approach, changes can be implemented 
to the ship configuration at the early stages of design, thereby giving the ship designer 
the opportunity to investigate many aspects of the design while its configuration is still 
amenable to change (Andrews and Pawling 2006b). Such aspects include: distributed 
system details, margin philosophy, access, combat system integration (Andrews 1998), 
human factors, ‘-ilities’ (Andrews and Pawling 2009), topside design (Andrews and 
Dicks 1997), through life costing, health and safety issues, environmental issues 
(Andrews and Pawling 2009). Many can be considered while also accounting for the 
traditional naval architectural areas of powering, hydrodynamics and structures 
(Andrews and Pawling 2006b). Therefore, a more detailed yet adjustable description of 
the design is possible at the earliest stages of design where potential conflicts can be 
addressed and decisions made (e.g. structural continuity (Andrews and Dicks 1997), 
weight and space balance, powering and stability performance, personnel flow 
(Andrews 2004)). It is worth noting that Andrews and Dicks (1997) designed to the 
same requirement a frigate following both the conventional and the DBB process. The 
DBB approach designed ship met all the requirements whereas the conventionally 
designed one did not. This example showed that further iterations were needed after the 
end of a conventional preliminary design, which were very likely to lead to a larger ship 
downstream with resultant programme consequences. 
 The above procedure to preliminary ship design was developed and 
implemented following the rapid developments in computer capability, initially for 
submarines (through the SUBCON implementation (Andrews et al 1996)) and 
subsequently for surface ships through GRC’s SURFCON implementation (Munoz and 
Forrest 2002). By implementing the DBB approach through the SURFCON module in 
Paramarine, the DBB approach is now a well-established commercial preliminary ship 
design module (Andrews and Pawling 2003). This way, SURFCON can draw on all the 
naval architectural analytical tools (such as stability, powering, seakeeping, 
vulnerability, manoeuvring and structural analysis) available in Paramarine (Andrews 
and Pawling 2003). Consequently, a fully integrated preliminary design process, 
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architecturally centred and combined with traditional naval architectural numerical 
analysis techniques to achieve balance (Andrews et al 2008) is now possible through 
SURFCON and has been shown to be applicable to a wide range of conventional and 
unconventional ships (Andrews and Pawling 2003). The three dimensional nature of 
SURFCON can be used to adequately investigate for naval vessels those configuration 
related factors previously mentioned, as well as other issues, such as design for 
production, adaptability, sustainability, ease of access and spatial margins. 
In SURFCON, each DBB is a placeholder (folder) representing a particular 
function and containing all relevant information, e.g.: numerical, constraint, parametric, 
geometric and descriptive data (Andrews and Pawling 2003). As the design evolves, 
Paramarine uses the above data to update the graphical display and perform the relevant 
calculations. The cumulative characteristics of each DBB listed above are brought 
together in a Master Building Block (MBB) which provides the numerical description 
of the design. The MBB contains data such as the overall ship requirements, ship 
characteristics and overall margins. These characteristics are constantly being audited 
by Paramarine’s analytical tools and the designer then uses the data given to judge what 
steps are necessary to achieve balance. A screenshot of Paramarine is reproduced in 
Figure 2.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: SURFCON Representation Showing the Three Panes for Tree Structure, 
Graphics (Design Building Blocks) and Tabular Interfaces, with the Results of Stability 
and Resistance Analyses Also Visible (Andrews and Pawling 2008) 
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 In view of the fact that one of the central elements of the DBB approach is to 
separate the ship’s functions, it is only natural for SURFCON to describe a ship by 
means of the functional breakdown described in Section 2.1.4 (i.e. Float, Move, Fight, 
Infrastructure) (Andrews and Pawling 2003). The four top level groups gradually lead to 
lower level, more detailed groups. It has been recognised that the Fight and Move 
groups tend to drive a design to a great extent, whereas Float and Infrastructure are 
largely dependent groups (Andrews and Dicks 1997). This is because of the directly 
defined requirements and constrained nature of the Fight and Move groups. However, 
advancements such as IFEP and VLS could increase the adaptability of the two design 
driving groups (Andrews and Dicks 1997). 
 Since its conception and realisation through SURFCON, the DBB approach has 
been used for a range of projects in UCL, such as a trimaran Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) (Andrews and Pawling 2006a), a Joint Support Ship (JSS) (Andrews and Pawling 
2007), personnel flow simulation (Andrews 2006; Andrews et al 2008), implications of 
all electric ships on their configuration (Andrews et al 2004), and several others listed in 
(Andrews and Pawling 2006b; Andrews and Pawling 2009). For the ship design 
projects, the DBB’s were sized using the algorithms provided in the UCL MSc Ship 
Design Exercise (UCL 2010a; UCL 2010b). This UCL work has proved the 
applicability of the approach and realised its advantages, which are outlined in the 
above references. These are seen to be: identifying design drivers and interactions; 
producing believable concepts for unconventional designs; rapidly producing and 
comparing alternative designs; exploring different configurations; assessing designs in a 
variety of ways at the early design stages; identifying areas of uncertainty; and 
providing increased confidence for concept development. 
 Appendix 2 is a summary of the literature regarding the major design drivers of 
various presently common naval ship types. Combatants, with both conventional and 
unconventional hull configurations, and replenishment ships are investigated. 
 
2.2 Ship Costing 
 
 It is well established that ship costing is a vital part of the (concept) ship design 
process (UCL 2010b) with optimal cost effectiveness being a key objective of ship 
designers (Rawson 1973). Cost estimates are required in order for governments to 
justify and allocate funding and project management teams “to avoid budget overruns 
and its consequences” (Rudius 2012; Gerdemann et al 2012). Dirksen (1996) observed 
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that defence inflation over the last century has been as much as 9% above inflation. This 
has occurred due to military competition and the associated requirement for increased 
capability (Dirksen 1996) which has been realised by the technological developments 
(accompanied by increased complexity and maintenance) in weapons and other 
equipment (Rawson 1973). Since defence inflation in recent decades for Western 
Powers has not been complemented by a corresponding increase in defence budgets (as 
a percentage of GNP), the only two realistic solutions have been to reduce vessel 
numbers or design smaller and cheaper warships; further cost reductions would imply 
reduce capability per ship (Dirksen 1996). This is because, as Dirksen (1996) advised, 
warship capabilities are set by various characteristics in terms of speed, seakeeping, 
structure, stability, style and stealth, which are the major cost drivers. Carreyette (1977), 
from a merchant ship stance, included further variables, such as managerial, financial, 
political and temporal variables, which impact on ship cost. However, Knight (2012a; 
2012b) separated warship cost into costs associated with people (design, project 
management and procurement, construction/fabrication/integration) and equipment 
(major equipment and steel, commodity items). His definition focuses solely on the 
UPC. NATO (2009) identified that Whole Life Cost (WLC) (or Life Cycle Cost (LCC)) 
estimation is critical, being one of the criteria (along with operational need and 
government constraints) assisting the decision making process regarding cost 
effectiveness and choice between alternatives. 
NATO (2003b) defined LCC as representing “all the costs that will be borne 
during the life of a System (Main System and Support System) to acquire, operate, 
support it and eventually dispose of it”. In addition, Rawson (1973) suggested that 
project LCC should:- 
- “Expose the costs known to be significant; 
- Retain relevance to the elements of effectiveness; 
- Be forecastable; 
- Embrace the whole system affected by the project.” 
UCL (2010a; 2010b) for MSc level ship design studies, considers warship WLC as 
being the sum of FOC costs, UPC, TLC and disposal costs, for an entire class. FOC 
costs include office setup, design, drawings and recruitment costs and administrative 
costs (UCL 2010b). UPC is the individual ship (including its weapons, machinery and 
maritime equipment) construction cost (i.e. material, labour costs and overheads for 
shipbuilding) (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010b). TLC adds on the costs to run each ship 
through its operational life (i.e. daily operating costs plus maintenance costs) (UCL 
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2010b). Rawson (1973) identified the main TLC drivers as complement, operations and 
maintenance and repair. Complement costs include basic pay, earning related national 
income contributions, pensions and gratuities, additional special service pay and 
training costs for trade and rank; operations costs include fuel (the consumption of 
which is a function of the operating profile and propulsion and electric power 
generation configuration) and spares and consumables (e.g.: propulsion equipment, 
auxiliaries, ordnance, paint and NBCD equipment); maintenance and repair costs 
include docking and refits (Dirksen 1996). The above definitions are illustrated in 
Figure 2.9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Unit Procurement Cost, Through Life Cost and Whole Life Cost 
Breakdown (UCL 2010b) 
 
An alternative LCC breakdown is presented in Figure 2.10. It includes typical 
cost percentages of each LCC element. 
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SSI: Shipbuilders Supplied Items 
ASI: Admiralty Supplied Items 
 
Figure 2.10: Breakdown of Warship Cost and Typical Example of the Breakdown in 
Life Cycle Cost for a Warship (Brown and Andrews 1980) 
 
Dirksen (1996) updated an illustration presented in (Brown and Andrews 1980), 
giving typical cost percentages of each UPC element. This is shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Typical Warship UPC Breakdowns (Dirksen 1996) 
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Finally, Rawson (1973) illustrated the (undiscounted) LCC of a typical frigate, 
built at a procurement cost of £12M in 1971 prices. This is reproduced below. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Life Costs of a 3,000 Tonne frigate (Rawson 1973) 
 
 Traditionally, more attention has been paid to UPC, rather than TLC and WLC. 
The main reasons being the greater political significance of UPC (due to its short term 
impact) (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010a), the larger uncertainties involved in TLC 
estimation (since future costs, spanning across multiple decades, have to be considered), 
the greater effort required for TLC analysis and the ability to postpone TLC elements, 
through for example, reduced operation (Dirksen 1996). However, it is agreed that only 
through the investigation of the WLC would the cost of ownership be realistically 
assessed (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010a). Moreover, selection between alternative designs 
would be more efficient through WLC consideration (where UPC increases could be 
accepted provided related TLC reductions could be demonstrated) (Dirksen 1996) and 
through the mere consideration of minimising UPC, difficulties in the maintenance and 
modernisation of the ship can result (Rawson 1973).  
 NATO (2009) defined the LCCing as “the discipline or process of collecting, 
interpreting and analysing data and applying quantitative tools and techniques to predict 
the future resources that will be required in any life cycle stage of a system of interest”. 
It is generally agreed that such an approach should be carried out throughout the 
operational life of a system (NATO 2009). However, it is also established that “the 
greatest opportunity to reduce life cycle costs usually occurs during the early stages of a 
programme” (NATO 2009) (i.e. the concept design stage) since “by the time that that a 
warship has been designed most of its upkeep characteristics and therefore its life costs 
have irrecoverably been committed” (Rawson 1973). This is summarised in illustrations 
found in (Andrews 1993; NATO 2009), the latter of which is replicated below. 
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Figure 2.13: The Greatest Opportunity to Reduce Life Cycle Costs Usually Occurs 
During the Early Stages of a Programme (NATO 2009) 
 
The application of LCC estimation techniques early in the design process would 
enable the investigation of trade-offs (UCL 2010a), the effect of varying the principal 
characteristics while the design is still flexible (Carreyette 1977), the evaluation of 
alternative solutions, the evaluation of cost reduction opportunities, the evaluation of 
areas of financial risk and uncertainty (NATO 2009). For example, Havron et al (2012) 
presented a case study where the propulsion system of the RN MARS Tanker was 
selected taking WLC into consideration, which identified that major drivers are fuel 
consumption and maintenance costs. 
 Being data driven, the methods used to assess the WLC of a system largely 
depend on the availability and quality of data (NATO 2009). An illustration reproduced 
in Figure 2.14 shows various cost estimating methods and their applicability throughout 
the programme life cycle. Further detail on these and other methods can be found in 
(NATO 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Cost Estimating Methods (NATO 2009) 
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Dirksen (1996) identified two broad costing techniques, bottom-up approaches 
(which “require estimates of labour hours and materials for each element and sub-
element of work which are then accumulated to obtain the total cost estimate” and are 
used at later design stages) and top-down or parametric approaches (which “use 
historical data from previous designs to estimate costs of new projects” and are used 
during the early design stages with less product definition). NATO (2009) lists the 
following techniques as relevant during the concept stage: Bayesian, parametric, 
analogous, expert opinion and rule of thumb techniques. Of these, parametric costing 
methods are most widely utilised during the concept ship design stages; with a 
definition of such techniques suggested by NATO (2007) as: “the parametric method 
estimates costs based upon various characteristics or measurable attributes of the 
system, hardware and software being estimated. It depends upon the existence of a 
causal relationship between system costs and these parameters. Such relationships, 
known as CERs (Cost Estimating Relationships), are typically estimated from historical 
data using statistical techniques. If such a relationship can be established, the CER will 
capture the relationship in mathematical terms relating cost as the dependent variable to 
one or more independent variables. Examples would be estimating costs as a function of 
such parameters as equipment weight, vehicle payload or maximum speed, number of 
units to be produced or number of software lines of code to be written. The CER 
describes how a product’s physical, performance and programmatic characteristics 
affect its cost and schedule”. Similar definitions have been given by Gerdemann et al 
(2012) and UCL (2010a). Advantages of parametric costing methods include the output 
of sensible estimates despite the many unknowns (including systems and equipment) 
and limited information at that design stage (UCL 2010a; NATO 2007) and the ability 
to perform rapid sensitivity analysis (Gerdemann et al 2012). Disadvantages are seen to 
be the inability to capture and reflect low level design variations and the large amount 
of data required to derive the complex relationships (NATO 2007; Gerdemann et al 
2012). Other parametric costing methods have been published. Carreyette (1977) 
proposed a parametric method based on historic data for assessing merchant ship initial 
build cost in the early design stages and investigating how changes in dimensions, 
weights, powering and carrying capacity might affect this cost. UCL (2010a; 2010b) 
describes a parametric method (largely based on the work done by Dirksen (1996)) for 
the estimation of WLC and all of its elements during the preliminary ship design stage, 
mainly applicable to naval ships. For UPC estimation, cost data are generally calculated 
through cost/tonne relationships for both material and labour (UCL 2010b). This costing 
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model has been used during various projects, including by Bradbeer and Andrews 
(2012a). 
 Presentation of costing data is also a vital area of LCCing, in order to realise the 
full advantages presented by chosen methods since they have significant impact on 
decision making and selection of alternative designs. Two common graphical 
presentations are reproduced in Figure 2.15. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Example of a Baseline Life Cycle Cost Spend Profile (left) and a Life 
Cycle Cost Allocation (right) (NATO 2009) 
 
A similar spend profile was used by Rawson (1973), reproduced in Figure 2.12. 
 The relationship between the level of assumptions required for the cost 
estimation of a project and the project life cycle stage is illustrated in Figure 2.16. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: The Relationship Between Data Maturity and Level of Assumptions to be 
Applied (NATO 2009) 
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It is evident that numerous assumptions have to be made when conducting 
costing analysis (often by means of parametric techniques) during the early design 
stages, given limited design definition. This then leads to the conclusion that LCCing is 
far from being an exact science (NATO 2009). Necessary assumptions include:- 
- FOC costs as a proportion of UPC (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010a); 
- Shipyard selection (Dirksen 1996); 
- Material and labour costs (UCL 2010b; Gerdemann et al 2012) (noting that 
shipbuilding remains labour intensive compared to most other heavy engineering 
(Usher and Dorey 1982)); 
- Shipyard purchasing overhead factors (Dirksen 1996; Gerdemann et al 2012); 
- Learning curves (UCL 2010b; Collins and Ward 2012) (however two warships 
of same class are rarely identical leading to difficulties in establishing 
appropriate learning curves (Usher and Dorey 1982)); 
- Degree of modularity (UCL 2010b; Gougoulidis 2012); 
- Extent of external sub-contractor involvement (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010b); 
- When estimating UPC, factors such as the variance of wages are usually not 
considered, leading to the assumption that the ship is constructed in a day 
(Carreyette 1977); 
- Inflation and discounting factors (making future cost predictions questionable) 
(Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010b); 
- Fuel inflation (which could affect support, reliability, availability and 
maintainability of future vessels) (UCL 2010b; Collins and Ward 2012); 
- Frequency of refits (especially extent of update and effect of obsolescence) 
(UCL 2010b); 
- Cost margins for design and industrial uncertainty (Dirksen 1996; UCL 2010a). 
When this extensive list of assumptions is coupled with the difficulties associated with 
obtaining (often limited) appropriate historical cost data (Dirksen 1996; Rudius 2012) 
and the reluctance of parties to publish data that they perceive as confidential 
(Carreyette 1977) in order to derive the parametric relationships, ship costing during the 
preliminary design stage presents a major challenge. Especially since the quality of the 
cost estimates depends on the quality of this data (Gerdemann et al 2012). In addition, 
many variables (such as labour and material costs) are influenced by factors out of the 
shipbuilders (and ship operators) control, such as inflation, interest rates and relative 
currency strengths (Usher and Dorey 1982). All of the above factors generate large 
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uncertainties in cost estimates. These uncertainties should be quantified in order to 
assess project cost risk (Rudius 2012). 
 Despite these problems, ship costing during the early design phases has always 
been essential, the more so given the increased defence inflation without a 
commensurate increase in defence budgets. Such costing techniques would enable the 
investigation of factors such as quality vs. quantity, personnel reduction, innovative 
design, adoption of commercial standards and life extension programmes (Dirksen 
1996). 
 
2.3 Conclusions on Ship Design Issues 
 
 The recent developments in warship costs accompanied by the declining defence 
budgets can be countered through innovation in the ship design process and in 
individual ship’s design evolutions. Innovations are best explored in the early design 
stages, where the resources expended are relatively minimal, but most major decisions 
are taken. Recent progress in computer technology can be utilised to explore such 
innovations. Since most modern warships are architecturally constrained, practitioners 
have used computers to develop architecturally orientated preliminary design methods 
(e.g.: the UCL DBB approach). This has aided early stage decision making, increased 
designer confidence, eased the identification of design drivers and risks and provided 
the ability to compare alternative designs regarding their operational performance. All 
these can be investigated while ship configuration is still amenable to change and leads 
to increasing the detailing of early stage ship designs. 
Cost cutting is mainly aimed towards aspects which are difficult to quantify, 
such as survivability. This could lead to unfeasible designs given the increased 
complexity of modern naval operations, mainly focused in littoral waters, where a wide 
range of threats are possible. A number of survivability assessment tools currently exist 
and are outlined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Background to Survivability 
 
This chapter, consisting of four main sections, provides the survivability related 
background and context for the research. The first two sections of this chapter outline 
survivability by giving detailed definitions, highlighting the importance of survivability 
in naval ship design and operations and summarising current threats faced by navies. 
The third section, comprising the bulk of this chapter, identifies and details current 
survivability assessment techniques and their applicability in preliminary naval ship 
design. The final section provides the main conclusions of the research review related to 
survivability. The gaps in current survivability assessment techniques are identified, as 
is the importance of combining such methods with architecturally orientated design 
approaches in the preliminary ship design process. Thus an indication as to the way 
forward is given. 
 
3.1 Introduction to Survivability 
 
 NATO has adopted the following survivability definitions (NATO 2003a):- 
- “Survivability is the capability of a weapon system to continue to carry out its 
designated mission(s) in a combat environment. Survivability is a function of 
both susceptibility and vulnerability. 
- Susceptibility is the combination of factors that determine the probability of hit 
by a given threat (such factors include the susceptibility to detection, 
classification, targeting, attack, being hit, …). 
- Vulnerability is the extent of degradation of a system after having been 
subjected to combat threat(s), that is, the degree of mission impairment as a 
result of sustaining finite levels of damage caused by weapon hits.” 
The above is summarised in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Survivability is a Subject, Which Depends on the Interrelation of Many 
Subjects. Not Only Design but Also Operational Effects Can play an Important Role in 
Ship Survivability (NATO 2003a) 
 
However, the above definitions refer to a weapon system rather than a ship and 
fail to consider recoverability separately from vulnerability (as is often the case with 
many authors). For this reason, an extensive list of definitions (including illustrations) 
of survivability and its constituents, from several authors, is given in Appendix 3. 
 It is a commonly accepted fact that the main operational difference between 
commercial and naval ships is that the latter will be deliberately placed in harm’s way 
and should therefore be able to survive much harsher conditions than those normally 
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imposed by the marine environment. In order to survive such conditions, the inherent 
survivability due to a ship’s construction needs to be complemented by additional 
survivability features (Belcher 2008). These requirements (such as signature 
management and structural design) constitute the main distinction between commercial 
and naval ship design. Such requirements not only increase the complexity of naval 
ships (Hudson et al 1996) but are also difficult to quantify (Cooper et al 2007). 
Since the collection and analysis of wartime data is one of the most important 
methods of studying ship behaviour due to conflict, there are a number of published 
documents which present such data and statistics, mainly from WWII, but also from the 
Falklands and Persian Gulf conflicts for both naval (Korotkin 1960; Brown and Brown 
1986; Brown 1997; Barton 2009; Manley 2012) and commercial ships (Ling 1985). 
There have been a number of recent incidents (e.g.: USS Belknap – 1975, near fatal 
damage in collision with CV-67; Falklands Conflict – 1982 where six RN ships sunk 
and twelve damaged; USS Stark – 1986, struck by two Exocets in the Persian Gulf) 
which have raised questions about modern combatant survivability (Carter 1988; 
Manley 2012). This perceived vulnerability of modern warships can be attributed to a 
number of causes. For example, the lack of armour of modern combatants (when 
compared to their WWII equivalents) and the increase in complicated and sensitive 
sensors and electronic equipment (shift from enhanced armour to sensor capability), the 
increasing diversity of threats faced by such ships, the reduced manning levels, 
(Papanikolaou and Boulougouris 1998), the declining defence budgets leading to 
smaller fleets (Robb et al 2010) and the adoption of commercial standards and 
equipment in warships (Martin 1998; Rattenbury 2004). The above have led 
Papanikolaou and Boulougouris (1998) to stress the need for a new naval ship design 
philosophy aiming at enhanced survivability. 
 The need for a new design philosophy is further justified by the fact that the 
successful incorporation of survivability design features is one of the prime aims of the 
designer (Brown and Tupper 1989) and influences the combat system effectiveness of 
the overall warship to a great extent (Sajdak and Karni 2006). The recognised 
importance of survivability in recent years has led to the inclusion of the subject in ship 
rules (such as the Rules for Classification and Construction of Germanischer Lloyd 
(Petersen 2006)) and the publication of several documents together with the 
implementation of survivability management strategies by major navies, in order to 
guide designers (Said 1995; Reese et al 1998; Robb et al 2010). However, such 
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documents usually invoke feature-based rather than performance based specifications 
for survivability. 
 The absence of performance based specifications and the difficulties in 
quantifying overall survivability means that survivability features are harder to justify, 
therefore presenting a seemingly attractive area for cost cutting (Brown 1986b; Reese et 
al 1998). Thornton et al (2007) have also criticised the way in which survivability is 
costed and incorporated. They suggests that in many cases (e.g.: shock protection) it is 
the existence of a laid down level of survivability and not the level of protection 
required that has then caused the increase in cost. Aspects in the ship capability, such as 
defensive weapons, electronic warfare, TLC and manning are usually not taken into 
account in the cost of survivability (Thornton et al 2007). Martin (2007) argues that 
many survivability features serve more than one role, and therefore their contribution to 
assessing their impact on the cost of survivability is difficult. Also, survivability 
features such as reducing radar susceptible microgeometry by placing equipment behind 
bulwarks or below decks leads to cost benefits by better protecting the equipment and 
easier maintenance (Friedman 1991; Thornton et al 2007). Knight (2012a; 2012b) 
remarked that “of all the drivers in the design of warships, it is survivability which is 
often quoted as having the greatest impact upon the cost”; however, he also concluded 
that “simple survivability measures can be implemented cost effectively” and that 
omission of certain such measures “may have no effect on cost or may indeed have the 
opposite effect”. In addition, the UK National Warship Survivability Committee (2008) 
concluded that since there is not a good understanding regarding the cost of 
survivability, these costs have traditionally been (possibly wrongly after experience 
from the Type 45 Destroyer procurement process) assumed to be unrealistically high. 
Another limitation of the current procurement process is that procuring warships on the 
basis of functional requirements and therefore, seemingly to pass risk to industry, which 
may not have a good understanding of survivability, will probably lead to increased 
UPC (since industry deals with risk by applying contingency costs) and to degrade 
capability (Thornton et al 2007; National Warship Survivability Committee 2008). The 
National Warship Survivability Committee (2008) recommended that the MOD should 
“retain the risk associated with survivability requirements” and that the MOD and the 
warship prime contractor should attempt to better understand survivability related costs 
and explore alternative survivability procurement processes. 
 It is increasingly acknowledged that the required survivability level should be 
specified during the development of the operational requirements (Phillips 1998) with 
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survivability analysis commencing at the early design stages (Randles 2009). However, 
rather than the traditional feature based specification, the requirements should be set in 
terms of specific threats and outcomes defined by the customer, given validated analysis 
tools (Reese et al 1998; Doerry 2007). This would make survivability an integral part of 
the design process (Ball and Calvano 1994) and therefore assist in achieving a balance 
between the three survivability components and other design features (Brown 1990; 
Phillips 1998). Also, by setting operationally orientated requirements, the operator 
could be better informed about the capabilities of the ship (Reese et al 1998). 
 Balancing ship features across the three survivability components is seen to be 
of vital importance (Turner et al 2006; Harney 2010). After all, it is extremely 
impractical to design an insusceptible or invulnerable ship (MOD 2001). Logically, it 
could be argued that such a balance should not only be sought in a single ship design, 
but also across the fleet (MOD 2001; Harney 2010). It is argued that by considering the 
three together a more cost effective solution will be obtained (Sajdak and Karni 2006; 
Thornton et al 2006). In order to exploit these perceived advantages, a new separate 
design discipline, Total Ship Survivability, was developed in the early 1990s by the 
USN (Said 1995). 
 Robb et al (2010) investigated the cost of various survivability features for a 
5,000te surface combatant. As is the case with most design features, survivability 
features are much cheaper if considered and implemented at the earliest design stages; if 
left for the later stages they are not only more expensive, but sometimes impossible to 
add on (Brown 1986b; Robb et al 2010). Early consideration also allows a more 
effective integration of such elements with other ship systems (Belcher 2008; Said 
1995). In addition, survivability has an impact on initial sizing (Andrews 1987) and 
layout determination (Brown 1993; Andrews et al 2004), therefore further justifying the 
need to consider it at early stages. 
Various commonly accepted survivability enhancement design rules, relevant to 
the early ship design stages, have been established from past experience and from 
survivability analyses. These include: 
- Reducing microgeometry, shaping the hull, superstructure and certain 
equipment, and avoiding certain shapes for RCS reduction; 
- Cooling the exhaust by mixing it with cooler ambient air and hiding or masking 
hot metal parts for IR signature reduction; 
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- Mounting engines high up in the ship, avoiding underwater exhausts and 
eliminating gearboxes (through the adoption of IFEP) for noise signature 
reduction; 
- Including degaussing systems (and non-magnetic materials) for magnetic 
signature reduction; 
- Incorporating layered defence systems including soft-kill and hard-kill; 
- Hardening through the inclusion of shock resistant mounts (which also reduce 
the noise signature); 
- Adding armour to selected systems and critical compartments; 
- Locating critical equipment and compartments low in the ship to protect from 
abovewater weapons; 
- Protecting critical spaces by placing them inboard, shielded by less critical 
spaces or side passageways; 
- Employing concentration, separation and duplication of systems; 
- Increasing the number of WT blast, fire and smoke resistant bulkheads and 
doors for damage containment as well as improved damage stability; 
- Separating the ship into semiautonomous zones; 
- Including sufficient damage detection and suppression equipment and systems 
(e.g.: NBCD stores and firepumps); 
- Adopting a suitable access philosophy for improved crew evolutions; 
- Providing with adequate spare parts to repair damage. 
The above survivability reduction features, in addition to other such features more 
relevant to the later design stages, are described in greater detail in Appendix 4. 
Moreover, the above characteristics were largely incorporated in the ship design studies 
carried out during this research, reported in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2 Threats 
 
 The threat faced by warships has traditionally been considered to continually 
increase in magnitude, variety and complexity (Brown and Tupper 1989). The main 
reason for this is the rapid improvements in weapon technology (Barnett 1998). 
Warships are threatened by air, surface and underwater weapons with multiple 
sophisticated guidance methods (Papanikolaou and Boulougouris 1998). This is 
enhanced by the recent shift of maritime operations from blue water to green water 
(Surko 1994; Harney 2010). 
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While operating in blue waters, submarines (torpedoes and missiles), aircrafts 
(bombs and missiles) and surface ships (missiles and guns) constituted the main threats, 
operating in the littoral, warships may encounter all of the above as well as coastal guns, 
mines, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters and small patrol boats (Barnett 1998). In 
addition, operations closer to the shoreline decrease reaction times (Barnett 1998; 
Harney 2010), which (when coupled with the degraded performance of ship sensors in 
such environments (Braid et al 2009)) may lead to unsophisticated weapons prevailing 
against more sophisticated and expensive ones, therefore increasing susceptibility and 
vulnerability (Barnett 1998; Phillips 1998). The trend towards littoral operations has led 
to the development of a new type of warship, the LCS, with high speed and adaptability 
as its main characteristics, to exploit rapid reaction and reduce exposure to threats 
(Andrews and Pawling 2006a). 
Asymmetric threats are also present close to the shorelines; such threats are 
characterised by their short range (where stealth does not play an important role) and 
short duration (where weapon system recoverability is of secondary importance) 
(Belcher 2008). 
 However, naval ships are not only threatened by enemy and terrorist actions but 
also accidental threats such as fire, collision and grounding (Brown 1986b). During the 
late 80s, approximately ten large and medium fires occurred every year in RN ships, 
half of which started in machinery rooms therefore leading to significant damage to 
expensive equipment. Other potential accidents include collisions and groundings which 
could lead to sinking (Brown 1986b).  
Threat types are generally categorised in two groups, abovewater (e.g.: missiles, 
bombs, shells and bullets) and underwater (e.g.: torpedoes, mines and depth charges) 
(Begg et al 1990). It is also useful to categorise each threat in terms of their effects, e.g.: 
flooding, fire, magazine explosion, structural failure, shock, impact, blast (Brown 
1986b). These are discussed in greater detail in Appendix 4.2. 
Modern combatants face a variety of threats, ranging from massive missile 
attacks to terrorist attacks with unsophisticated weapons (Dicker 1986) leading to a 
layered defence strategy (Brown 1997). It is clear that such ships should be designed 
against a number of threat scenarios, where adversary, weapon type, delivery method 
and weapon effects should be clearly identified (Belcher 2008). Figure 3.2 summarises 
some of the major threats and weapon effects encountered by naval ships.  
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Figure 3.2: Anti-shipping Threat Weapons and Effects (Said 1995) 
 
 Appendix 4 is a summary of the literature regarding each of the three 
survivability constituents and how they affect ship design and current naval operations. 
 
3.3 Survivability Assessment 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
 “Survivability assessment is the systematic description, delineation, 
quantification, and statistical characterisation of the survivability of a ship” (NATO 
2003a). In the past, the evaluation of most ship characteristics including survivability 
was difficult (Garzke and Kerr 1985). In recent decades (following on from the 
Falklands conflict), considerable progress has been made regarding survivability 
assessment methods; techniques such as simulation and virtual demonstrators are seen 
to potentially have a large impact in future ship design (Papanikolaou and Boulougouris 
1998). Various current survivability assessment methods can be used to audit a design, 
suggest improvements, improve communication between designers, builders and 
operators and justify survivability enhancement measures (Heywood and Lear 2006; 
Robb et al 2010). Turner et al (2006) and Randles (2009) suggest that survivability 
assessment should not merely be an audit function, but should be carried out from the 
outset of the design process. By integrating such techniques in the design process 
survivability assessment becomes another input in this iterative process (MOD 2001; 
Holmberg and Kotiranta 2012) (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Traditional Design Spiral and the New Approach With Fully Integrated 
Survivability Assessment (Holmberg and Kotiranta 2012) 
 
Effective use of survivability assessment methods would enable designers to 
find a balance between the contributing components of survivability, assess weight and 
cost implications (Brown and Tupper 1989) and assess the comparison of different, 
competing, ship designs (Brown 1987). It has been suggested that survivability goals for 
individual ships should be established and met, therefore, departing from traditional 
rule-based ship design (Martin 1998). This has been made possible due to recent 
computer developments and it was identified during the early 1990s that requirements 
concerning percentages of remaining capability following specific threats would soon 
be definable (Brown 1993). High level Survivability statements could be included in the 
URD and detailed requirements (e.g. vulnerability probabilities after a given incident), 
in the SRD (MOD 2001). Therefore, scenarios, required survivability levels and 
survivability level definitions would need to be clearly identified. However, including 
survivability in the requirements of a naval ship introduces further constraints 
(Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2004) to what is already a very complicated process 
(Papanikolaou and Boulougouris 1998). To deal with this Papanikolaou and 
Boulougouris (1998; 2004) regard the existence of methodologies quantifying the 
survivability of a ship early in the design process essential. Robb et al (2010), in Figures 
10 and 11 of their publication, show the difficulty and indicate associated likely costs of 
implementing survivability measures throughout a ship’s lifecycle.  
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Confirmation that a ship has met its (measurable) survivability requirements 
could include (MOD 2001): 
- “Analysis of the design (e.g.: using quantitative methodologies); 
- Material state assessment (e.g.: survey of completed vessel); 
- Trials (e.g.: FOC shock trials, signature measurements).” 
However, none is that definitive for what is a complex aspect of a complex system of 
systems. 
 
3.3.2 Susceptibility Assessment 
 
A number of susceptibility assessment methods currently exist in order to 
simulate the large variety of threats faced by modern naval ships. In addition, they can 
be used throughout the ship design process given that susceptibility enhancement 
techniques are largely independent of the level of design detail (and can be added even 
after construction through, for example, RAM, infrared signature suppression devices 
and low emission paints (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2012)); therefore, such tools 
specifically aimed at preliminary design are unnecessary. However, most susceptibility 
assessment tools rely on classified information (such as weapon performance data) and 
therefore, such tools (and their mechanisms) are not readily available to the public. A 
limited amount of information on current tools is presented below. 
Numerical models and computer programmes are used to estimate complex 
shape RCS (Foxwell 1990a). MOD signature estimation software include SPECTRE 
(for RCS prediction), ODIN and TMSS (for torpedo and mine activation respectively), 
SIREX (for IR signature prediction) and HVME (used to monitor platforms self-noise 
and take reduction measures) (Turner et al 2006; Martin 2007). Similar software can be 
used in order to produce lengthwise hit probability distribution, since hit location 
depends on the ship characteristics (signatures) and threat characteristics (homing 
method) (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2004). Turner et al (2006) accounted for the 
combination of SPECTRE with SURVIVE (a vulnerability assessment tool which will 
be described further on) to give likely ASM hit locations, and presented a case study 
involving a Leander class frigate. Similarly, SIREX can be employed when considering 
threats with IR homing devices (Martin 2007). However, factors such as environmental 
conditions, ship motions and manoeuvring and variations in weapon performance even 
out the hit probability distribution, making such methods questionable in general 
vulnerability analysis (MOD 2001). An alternative would be to assume a basic 
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mathematical distribution, such as a linear or normal distribution, thereby connecting 
susceptibility to vulnerability (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2012) and 
recoverability. Furthermore, Liwang et al (2012) presented a probabilistic risk 
assessment method combined with numerical simulation for an example transit of a 
naval ship through a minefield. Simulated parameters with corresponding statistical data 
included environmental factors, threat, ship and sensor characteristics and organisation 
and decision making (Liwang et al 2012). 
Defensive systems (hard-kill) effectiveness can be estimated through the CSEE 
which is utilised by UCL as part of its MSc in Naval Architecture course (McDonald 
2010). The CSEE is able to calculate probabilities of layered defence success against 
missile attack scenarios; however it is very simplified and relies on various 
assumptions. Budgets, scenarios and unclassified weapons data (such as range, 
maximum burst time for CIWS, firing rates, reaction times, kill assessment times, 
velocities and single shot kill probabilities) are given in order to determine reaction 
times and success probabilities (McDonald 2010). Furthermore, MOD uses the 
ThreeDim code for hard-kill performance which relies on data from signature models, 
sensor models and weapon system performance models (Thornton et al 2006). Since the 
1980s a Monte-Carlo simulation package for the engagement of ASMs by defensive 
missile systems had been developed for MOD use (Adams 1988). 
 Barnett (1998) attempted to assess susceptibility through an operational risk 
management method. Different scenarios and hazards (weapons) were identified and 
applied to various ships at different time periods. The hazards were assessed in terms of 
likelihood and consequence and placed in a matrix to convert them to risks (see Figure 
3.4). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The Process of Placing the Hazards Within the Matrix Converts Them Into 
Risks (Barnett 1998) 
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However, the drawback of this method compared to the ones detailed above is 
its purely qualitative nature. 
 
3.3.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Extensive development of vulnerability assessment methods has been carried out 
during the last decades in order to assess designs (Begg et al 1990) against different 
weapons and appraise probabilities of preserving capability (Brown and Tupper 1989). 
Nowadays, multiple vulnerability assessment models have been developed; Figure 3.5 
lists various software used by a range of navies. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Vulnerability Assessment Models by Navy (Ashe et al 2006) 
 
During the 1990s, the main vulnerability assessment tools employed by the 
MOD were the REVS code for abovewater threats and the SSVUL code for underwater 
attack (Tozer 1993; Turner et al 2006). REVS included algorithms to model primary 
weapon effects (blast, fragmentation, kinetic) caused by missiles and shells. The ship 
was described by a geometrical model including system and equipment distribution; the 
ship’s systems were modelled by dependency tree diagrams; and the weapons were 
described by means of warhead mass, velocity, direction, fusing and fragment detail 
(Tozer 1993). This system definition method allowed the breakdown of top level 
functions (Float, Move and Fight) into more detailed systems such as full power, 
minimum power, AAW and ASW (Schofield 2006). Hit grids were then superimposed 
on the geometrical model, compartments affected, and by what level, were established, 
and through system fault trees, vulnerability probabilities were obtained. Typically 200-
300 compartments with 600-800 equipment items were modelled per ship (Tozer 1993). 
Figure 3.6 shows examples of Tozer’s (1993) output. 
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Representation of a 
REVS model. 
 
System functionality 
and equipment 
dependency. 
 
Representation of a 
REVS model with 
weapon hit grid 
superimposed. 
 
REVS prediction 
blast damage. 
 
REVS prediction of 
AAW system 
vulnerability to a 
missile attack (all 
failure mechanisms). 
Figure 3.6: REVS Vulnerability Assessment Code (Tozer 1993) 
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SSVUL operated under similar principles, but different weapon effect 
algorithms were used to model under water weapons, such as torpedoes and mines 
causing shock and whipping. Damage probabilities were then calculated through the 
Monte-Carlo technique (Tozer 1993). 
During the late 1990s, REVS and SSVUL were combined into QinetiQ’s 
SURVIVE software (Martin 1998; Turner et al 2006). SURVIVE is currently the 
principal vulnerability assessment code of the UK MOD simulating above and 
underwater weapons and their effects (such as kinetic energy, blast, fragmentation, 
shaped charge jets, shock, hull girder whipping) using a single ship model. It can 
simulate cumulative damage caused by multiple hits and can model novel hullforms, 
such as trimarans (Martin 1998). The ship’s structural features, its systems and the 
weapon threats are defined in a similar manner to its predecessors. Probabilities of 
retaining a particular system/capability for a given weapon threat constitute the final 
output. The algorithms used to predict the various weapon effects have been validated 
through small and full scale tests (Schofield et al 2012). Typical SURVIVE equipment 
layout views are shown in Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: SURVIVE Equipment Layout (Turner et al 2006) 
 
 
Figure 3.8: SURVIVE Type 23 Frigate Model in External and Transparent Views 
(Schofield 2006) 
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Figure 3.9: Systems Onboard a Frigate Concept (QinetiQ 2005a) 
 
As previously discussed, vulnerability assessment has usually been carried out at 
the detailed design stages, as an audit function, and design corrections (such as altering 
bulkhead positions to improve blast response) were often too expensive to be 
implemented.  Furthermore, the designer lacked confidence regarding the achievement 
of vulnerability reduction levels until the final design stages (Heywood and Lear 2006). 
Therefore, the need for software able to carry out such analysis at all design stages, 
including preliminary design, was identified (Pugh 2006). 
The PREVENT software, developed by BMT Defence Services, is designed for 
use at concept stage, with limited ship definition (Heywood and Lear 2006; Jones and 
Kimber 2012). PREVENT models the effects of various abovewater and underwater 
weapons (such as blast, fragments and shock). The ship’s structure is modelled and 
system components are located throughout the vessel; the ship is visualised in two-
dimensional slices and the systems are, again, defined by means of tree structures. 
Figure 3.10 shows the vulnerability of the propulsion power generation system, for a 
separated layout (the percentages represent the vulnerability of the system when hit at 
that cell). 
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Figure 3.10: Example of the PREVENT Tool (Heywood and Lear 2006) 
 
A version of SURVIVE, specifically aimed at early design stages, SURVIVE 
Lite, has also been developed (Pugh 2006; Turner et al 2006). Unlike PREVENT, 
SURVIVE Lite does not model the ship in two-dimensional slices, but in three 
dimensions, identically to SURVIVE. SURVIVE Lite inputs include the ships main 
structure and top level systems (e.g.: propulsion, steering and weapon systems), while 
lower level systems such as chilled water and high pressure air are neglected. 
Furthermore, weapon information does not have to be detailed; for example, generic 
fragmentation patterns are sufficient. Weapon hit locations are provided in the form of 
three-dimensional underwater or two-dimensional abovewater grid positions. The 
development of SURVIVE Lite, being fully compatible with SURVIVE, has allowed 
vulnerability to be managed throughout the design process (Pugh 2006). See Figure 
3.11 and Figure 3.12 for a sample attack grid and SURVIVE Lite analysis output. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Sample Concept Attack Configuration (Pugh 2006) 
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Figure 3.12: SURVIVE Lite Rapid Analysis Output (Pugh 2006) 
 
There have been efforts to link SURVIVE Lite to concept design tools such as 
SURFCON (Section 2.1.5) in order to avoid the need and lengthy procedure of 
remodelling the design; however, such links are still at an immature stage (Coote 2010). 
Increasing levels of design detail also increase vulnerability estimation accuracy 
(Reese et al 1998) (increased detail leads to additional modes of failure). In addition, 
Coote (2010) reported the difficulties in simulating the zoning effects of concept level 
ship designs in vulnerability assessment tools aimed at such designs, due to the 
incomplete system models. Van Oers et al (2012) criticise the neglecting of detailed 
system architectures and the routing of connections in concept stage design and present 
a method which automatically produces alternative ship system routings, given the main 
component positions, which can be incorporated in vulnerability assessment software. 
The above problem can also be addressed by the utilisation of vulnerability margins 
(MOD 2001; Pugh 2006), saving computation time on the generation of connection 
routings, which will possibly be altered as the design evolves. Furthermore, it is easier 
and cheaper to implement vulnerability reduction measures on connectivity items rather 
than altering system layout later in the design process (Heywood and Lear 2006). 
 Further to the above tools, methods of estimating specific areas of naval ship 
vulnerability have been published. For example, Ren et al (2008) presented a method to 
estimate the residual strength of a damaged warship; Bradbeer and Andrews (2012a; 
2012b) presented a comparative simulation study on the underwater shock response of 
different structural styles. However, the clear disadvantage of such methods is the fact 
that they focus on a very specific part of the problem, neglecting, for example, system 
vulnerability. 
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3.3.4 Recoverability Assessment 
 
Most assessment methods consider primary weapon effects (e.g.: equipment 
damage due to blast and shock), rather than secondary, time dependant effects such as 
fire and flood (Brown and Tupper 1989). Modelling and measuring recoverability 
performance is considerably more demanding, not only due to the dynamic nature, but 
also due to the critical reliance on human performance that is out of the designer’s 
control (Brown and Tupper 1989; Thornton et al 2006). Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 
(2012) defined recoverability as “mainly an operational aspect relying mainly on the 
sufficient training of the crew although it may still pose several requirements to the 
designer”. Knight (2012a; 2012b) described recoverability as a “critical balance 
between systems and features implemented by the designers, and damage control 
practices and procedure implemented by the ships staff”. Databases on fire spread, 
flooding and crew actions are weak, limiting modelling capability, therefore, further 
research is seen to be required (Reese et al 1998). Methods such as the Delphi Method, 
which relies on expert advice, could be employed when sparse data is available 
(Harmathy 1982). Jones and Kimber’s (2012) comment describing a concept design that 
“the level of design information produced did not support a recoverability assessment” 
thus implied that a greater level of design definition was required than that appropriate 
for preliminary designs. The MOD (2001) suggests that an interim solution would be to 
incorporate recoverability by modelling the vulnerability of the whole DC system, 
without, however, considering progressive damage. It is generally agreed that 
recoverability analysis is still at its infancy (Thornton et al 2006; Schofield et al 2012) 
in contrast to vulnerability analysis. 
The majority of the literature concerning secondary effects focuses on the 
hazards of fires. Not only is it the most frequent hazard on ships (Azzi et al 2011), 
information can also be read across from buildings and infrastructure. A number of 
references concerning the spread of fire from compartments have been published, e.g.: 
(Thomas 1967; Walton and Thomas 1995), which present both statistical and physical 
models. Some literature on flooding has also been published, such as Jasionowski et al 
(2007) who propose a quantitative measure for ship vulnerability to flooding. However, 
fire and flood modelling techniques only assess a specific part of recoverability and 
therefore, cannot be considered as total recoverability tools. In addition, it is 
questionable if such tools (especially fire modelling techniques) are applicable to the 
preliminary ship design stages with a low level of design definition (where material 
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types, locations of doors and portholes and detailed access arrangements are not yet 
detailed). 
Safety and risk analysis techniques have been used to evaluate the characteristics 
of infrastructure, and could relatively straightforwardly be applied to naval ships. 
However, they would be limited in assisting the designer (possibly as a checklist) as to 
what safety features (e.g. fire mitigation systems, DC equipment) to include in the ship. 
Relying on expert judgment these techniques are subjective, qualitative and fail to 
evaluate recoverability as a whole. Furthermore, they fail to investigate how the layout 
of a ship would affect its recoverability. Some examples are given below. 
Chow (2002) proposed a 15-point EB-FSRS for assessing the fire safety 
provisions in high-rise buildings. The proposed ranking system is reproduced in Figure 
3.13. 
 
 
BD:     Buildings Department 
FRC:   Fire Resistance Construction 
FSI:     Fire Services Installation 
FLD:   Fire Load Density 
Figure 3.13: Proposed EB-FSRS for Old High-rise Buildings (Chow 2002) 
 
77 
 
The EB-FSRS was proposed to quantify how far the fire safety provisions in 
existing buildings deviate from recent fire codes (based on their score) and to design 
suitable fire safety management schemes for individual buildings (Chow 2002).  
Harms-Ringdahl (2003) developed the method of Safety Function Analysis in 
order to model, evaluate and propose improvements to safety characteristics at industrial 
installations. Safety functions were defined as functions that can reduce the probability 
and/or consequences of accidents and other unwanted events in a system. The method 
consists of hazard identification, safety function analysis (based on expert judgment) 
and examination of results (Harms-Ringdahl 2003).  
 Developments in computer technology led to simulation software for fire spread, 
flooding, personnel flow and DC training, which are subject to the limitations 
mentioned above (i.e. they are specialised in a very specific part of recoverability and 
are not particularly suitable for designs with a low level definition of detail). A further 
limitation of simulations is the relatively lengthy computation times required for 
accurate results. Some current simulation techniques are summarised below. 
A fire simulation tool example is the LUCIFER software, which was specifically 
developed for the French nuclear powered aircraft carrier (Le Garsmeur and d’Anselme 
1998). In addition, Patil and Kar (2012) describe the use of the fire simulation software, 
Fire Dynamic Simulator, in order to examine the smoke effects on alternative escape 
routes in passenger ships. Moreover, Gillespie (2004) combined the same fire 
simulation tool with the SURFCON concept design tool (see Section 2.1.5) in an 
attempt to study smoke, heat and fire progression in a naval ship defined at a 
preliminary design stage level of detail. However, items such as doors, hatches, interior 
accommodation passageways and HVAC/cable routings, normally not modelled in the 
early ship design stages, had to be included. 
 An example of ship personnel flow simulation software is MaritimeEXODUS. A 
collaborative project was carried out between UCL and the University of Greenwich in 
an attempt to use the software, in conjunction with Paramarine, to assess HF 
performance of naval ship design. A number of references regarding the project have 
been published, such as (Andrews et al 2008; Casarosa 2011; Deere 2012). In order to 
evaluate a ship layout using the two above software, a number of evaluation scenarios 
and Performance Measures (PMs) were developed. PMs helped in simplifying and 
collecting the relevant information for HF performance assessment. PM scores were 
normalised to allow meaningful comparison, and weighted according to their 
importance. A combination of a particular evaluation scenario and a set of PMs resulted 
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in a HPM, used to compare the human performance capabilities of competing vessels. 
Alternatively, a specific standard could be defined in order to evaluate a ship against 
that standard rather than comparing it to a competing design. Figure 3.14 lists various 
PMs. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Example List of Performance Measures (Deere et al 2009) 
 
Similarities between this method and fire ranking system methods exist; 
however, a major difference is that rather than relying on expert opinion, scenario 
simulation output results were used as PMs. However, weightings are likely to be based 
on expert opinion and therefore need to be sensitivity tested. The project was aimed at 
preliminary stage ship design, nevertheless, personnel movement studies require 
additional design detail, such as connectivity between spaces, which are not normally 
modelled at this stage (Andrews and Pawling 2009). 
 Azzi et al (2011) examines the integration of fire simulation (Fire Dynamic 
Simulator software) and evacuation modelling (EVI evacuation model) in order to 
assess passenger ship safety performance during fire scenarios. Vassalos (2012) also 
combined EVI with fire growth software. In addition, he describes a flooding 
survivability analysis case study of the cruise ship ‘Project Genesis’ using evacuation 
and dynamic flooding simulation software such as PROTEUS3. The ship model used 
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(Figure 3.15) consisted of 717 compartments and 1,160 openings, clearly suggesting 
that the amount of detail required is not relevant in concept stage design.  
 
 
Figure 3.15: Flooding Analysis Model for Project Genesis (Vassalos 2012) 
 
FIREPROOF was a project funded by the European Commission aimed at 
developing a risk-based design framework for on-board fire safety (Fireproof 2013; 
Mermiris et al 2012). The method includes probabilistic models for ignition, numerical 
(CFD) models for the growth and impact of fires, evacuation simulation methods and 
probabilistic descriptions of the reliability and effectiveness of fire detection and 
suppression systems. Mermeris et al (2012) comment that the use of CFD and 
evacuation simulations are necessary when historical data and analytical tools are not 
available, leading to “a cumbersome process considering the substantial number of 
simulations and the extended processing  time that is needed for deriving the necessary 
fatality rates”. Figure 3.16 shows the level of detail necessary for fire and evacuation 
analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Generic Drawings for Fire Analysis (Left) and Preparation for Fire and 
Evacuation Simulation (Right) (Mermiris et al 2012) 
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The aim of the above work is to develop tools to examine safety performance of 
ships against fire and flooding which account for 90% of mercantile ship serious 
accidents (Mermeris et al 2012), especially ones incorporating innovative layouts, for 
which current prescriptive rule-based design is inadequate (Azzi et al 2011; Vassalos 
2012). 
 Simulation programmes are also used by various navies for DC training 
purposes. For example, the DC-Train tool is the current USN DC simulator, capable of 
modelling a wide range of scenarios, including fire, flood, smoke, equipment failures 
and personnel modelling (Grois et al 1998; Bulitko and Wilkins 1999). DC is 
exceptionally challenging and stressful and since real-life training is impractical, such 
simulators (which are also installed on board for afloat training) are aimed at improving 
crew performance. However, such DC simulation techniques are only effective on ship 
designs with full design definition, if not already constructed. Moreover, the plethora of 
probable DC scenarios would overcomplicate a DC simulation tool, therefore, 
questioning its relevance in early stage ship design. An example scenario, aimed at 
mercantile ships, was developed by Garre et al (2010) who compared an integrated 
bridge layout to a traditional one, by modelling a ship-to-ship collision. Nevertheless, it 
is accepted that such simulation methods can assess human performance. 
The use of VR technology for DC simulation has been recognised as an 
important future development since the 1990s (Mayfield and Morrissey 1998). Fire, 
smoke and flood scenarios could be incorporated in VR using CFD, and other relevant 
models. In addition, through three-dimensional walkthrough, the effect of damage on 
compartment appearance and smoke on reduced visibility can be demonstrated. During 
design VR techniques can be used to assist survivability related decisions and during 
crew familiarisation of the ship, to look at DC approaches (Mayfield and Morrissey 
1998). 
UK MOD has considered extending survivability modelling to include 
recoverability, with work being carried out to include this aspect into the SURVIVE 
software (Bain 2006; Turner et al 2006). The software’s algorithms have been updated 
to model secondary damage effects (such as fire and flood); the starting point is the 
output of SURVIVE’s vulnerability analysis, which is then passed on to modules 
modelling crew numbers, movements, locations and skills, DCFF procedures and 
equipment layout and availability, post-damage automatic system reconfiguration and 
spares and external assistance, all of which have been included in the software (QinetiQ 
2005a; Bain 2006). The software is relevant for use on various infrastructures (QinetiQ 
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2005b; Schofield 2006); however, it is limited to models with a level of detail not 
associated to preliminary stage design. Figure 3.17 depicts the node network (for crew 
movements) within SURVIVE, Figure 3.18 shows locations of DCFF equipment and 
Figure 3.19 and Figure 3.20 illustrate SURVIVE views of equipment, systems and 
functions pre and post-damage respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Node Network Within SURVIVE (Bain 2006) 
 
 
Figure 3.18: SURVIVE view showing locations of DCFF equipment (Bain 2006) 
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Figure 3.19: Equipment Systems and Functions Pre-damage (Bain 2006) 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Equipment Systems and Functions Post-damage (Bain 2006) 
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SURVIVE’s fire and smoke spread modelling module is relatively complex and 
includes heat release rates, compartment and plate temperatures and smoke densities 
over time (Sharp 2011), therefore, requiring a lengthy setup procedure. In order to 
counter this, fast and simple ‘Fast Fire’ algorithms were included in SURVIVE Lite, 
requiring greatly reduced design detail. The algorithms do not rely on fluid dynamic 
models or crew tracking information, but function by considering the initial size of the 
fire, the position of zone boundaries and the presence of fixed fire fighting systems. Fast 
Fire methods have been developed for small, medium and large fires; it is assumed that 
for ignitions after ship hits by weapons with warheads less than 30kg, the small fire 
algorithm should be used, and for larger warheads, the medium fire algorithm (Sharp 
2011). Although this level of simulation would be appropriate for concept stage designs, 
the accuracy of the results is uncertain, given the disregarding of numerous variables. In 
addition, the fast fire method cannot simulate fire spread; it simply outputs the 
vulnerability percentage of an item given that it was exposed to a fire. 
Departing from detailed simulations of specific events, Kang et al (2012) 
proposed an early design ship safety assessment model for mercantile ships, consisting 
of hierarchical elements such as function (e.g.: manoeuvrability), system (e.g.: 
propulsion, steering and navigation) and sub-system (e.g.: engines, navigation radars 
and steering control panels, with more sub-systems being included at later design 
stages). By mapping the location of the above items, assuming several damage 
scenarios to various sections of the ship and assuming flooding times of these sections 
versus the time required to stop flooding, the ship safety is assessed (Kang et al 2012). 
The above process could be applied to naval ships by including the various fight 
capabilities as functions, using vulnerability assessment software to identify the 
damaged sub-systems after a given encounter and using equipment repair times to 
assess the recoverability of the ship functions. It also has the advantage of accounting 
for the ship architecture; however, further development would be required to account 
for factors such as access to damaged areas. 
 
3.3.5 Total Survivability Assessment 
 
Work has been carried out in order to integrate the three survivability 
constituents and obtain a single, meaningful, estimation of warship survivability. When 
defining survivability quantification, Ball and Calvano (1994) presented the relationship 
of various probability measures shown in Figure 3.21. 
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Figure 3.21: The Relationship of Various Measures of Probability (Ball and Calvano 
1994) 
 
The following relationship was adopted: 
 
Ps = 1 – (Ph*Pk/h) (1) 
 
Ps: Probability of ship survivability; 
Ph: Probability of ship susceptibility; 
Pk/h: Probability of ship vulnerability (including recoverability considerations). 
Beyond proposing an approach to survivability on this basis, Ball and Calvano (1994) 
did not present any detail on how this should be populated. In addition, recoverability 
was neglected. 
 Sajdak and Karni (2006) presented a derivation of fundamental statistics 
regarding integrated survivability measurement. They identified the following three 
steps:- 
- Susceptibility analysis: signature analysis for threat detection, tracking, targeting 
and homing in examination, and assessment of countermeasures, environmental 
conditions and tactics to get probability that the threat will impact the ship. 
- System vulnerability analysis: examination of damage mechanisms, residual 
strength, system functionality after damage. 
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- System recoverability analysis: assessment of systems’ ability to regain (through 
reconfiguration, repair and replacement) lost capability. 
The standard survivability equation such as that by Ball and Calvano (1994) was 
criticised since statistical independence between the three constituents is assumed and 
time is not well defined (Sajdak and Karni 2006; Thornton et al 2006). A relationship in 
the form of: 
 
 P[survivability] = f(susceptibility, vulnerability, recoverability) (2) 
 
was suggested, eventually leading to the derivation of the MOTISS equation presented 
by Sajdak and Karni (2006). However, as before, no detail on how this equation should 
be populated was presented. 
Papanikolaou and Boulougouris (1998) introduced a method aiming to transform 
current deterministic standards into rational probabilistic approach criteria for naval and 
commercial ship damage stability. Performance analysis was based on a sequence 
including detection (function of threat sensors, range, signatures and environmental 
conditions), classification, target acquisition, launch of attack, ships response to jam, 
deceive or destroy enemy weapon. Probability of hit at a specific location was 
calculated, followed by probable damages and damage extent given a hit at that location 
and finally, probability of ship’s survival given the hit point and extent. The developed 
survivability performance analysis flowchart is reproduced in Figure 3.22.  
 
 
LEP: Linear Error Probability. 
Figure 3.22: Survivability Performance Analysis Flowchart (Papanikolaou and 
Boulougouris 1998) 
 
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004) subsequently developed a damage 
stability optimisation method, using genetic algorithms as the optimisation process, for 
early ship design; outputs included survivability index, weight, shaft line length and 
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mobility. Successively, numerical simulation tools in order to examine the ship’s 
behaviour after flooding were incorporated (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2012). 
However, the above methods are limited to survivability against damage stability and do 
not look at, for example, system survivability. 
Richards et al (2008) looked at the survivability assessment of aerospace 
platforms. They proposed six susceptibility and eleven vulnerability design principles 
(Figure 3.23) which assist in the concept generation of survivable systems. 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Baseline Set of Survivability Design Principles (Richards et al 2008) 
 
Systems are analysed by mapping survivability features into the design principal 
categories to produce matrices giving a qualitative survivability description. The authors 
recognised that the next step would be to provide a quantitative implementation of the 
design principles through simulation in order to compare the survivability performance 
of competing designs (Richards et al 2008). 
In an effort to integrate all survivability constituents, the MOD has produced the 
MISSION programme (White and Allwood 2011; Parry 2012; Parry and White 2012). 
Schofield et al (2012) defined MISSION as a discreet event Monte-Carlo model of a 
maritime mission. Apart from modelling the survivability elements and their 
interactions (by incorporating software previously mentioned, such as ThreeDim (AAW 
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and ASuW), ANSWER and ODIN (ASW and torpedoes) and TMSS (mine warfare) for 
susceptibility; and SURVIVE for vulnerability and recoverability), MISSION has the 
ability of modelling the mission objectives, the ships within the context of and the 
interdependencies within the blue force and the threat environment (i.e. red force). This 
is because it operates on a maritime mission level with given task groups, objectives and 
attacks over a period of time, therefore, being able to be used as a war-gamming tool 
(Thornton et al 2006; Martin 2007). In fact, the main output of MISSION is the 
Probability of Mission Success (White and Allwood 2011; Parry 2012; Parry and White 
2012). The framework of the programme is given by Thornton et al (2006) and 
reproduced in Figure 3.24. 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Top-level View of Survivability Analysis (including feedback loops as 
green arrows) (Thornton et al 2006) 
 
MISSION can thus be summarised as “an event simulation tool designed to 
simulate a maritime mission” (White and Allwood 2011; Parry 2012; Parry and White 
2012) as opposed to a tool designed to integrate survivability assessment in the 
preliminary ship design process; also, being relatively complex, it requires a large 
number of input detail. Further information on MISSION is presented in Section 7.6.7. 
 
3.3.6 Survivability Requirement Specification 
 
Recent developments in survivability assessment methods have led many to 
believe that performance-based, rather than prescriptive, feature-based, requirements 
could be set for a ship design project. In addition, survivability assessment should 
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commence during the early ship design stages in order to influence the ship layout 
(Randles 2009). Since the early 1990s it was identified that, theoretically, it would be 
possible to specify in the requirements, statements in the form of probability of 
retaining a specific percentage of a given capability after a specified threat encounter 
(Brown 1990). The specified threat scenario is shown in Figure 3.25. 
 
 
Figure 3.25: The Scenario Expressed in Tasks and Threat (NATO 2003a) 
 
It was also clear that recoverability related requirements were the most complex 
to set (Reese et al 1998). This departure from the traditional approach and the move 
towards survivability requirements was clear during the CNGF project. The CNGF, 
which was assessed on REVS and SSVUL, was the first concept ship that included 
specific vulnerability targets, on major systems (Martin 1998). Percentage system 
vulnerability targets were also set for recent RN designs (the Type 45 Destroyer, Queen 
Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carrier (Thornton et al 2007) and Type 26 Frigate (Schofield et 
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al 2012)). For these projects SURVIVE was used throughout the design development to 
assess vulnerability and optimise reduction measures (Thornton et al 2007; Schofield et 
al 2012). Similarly, RCS targets were set and SPECTRE was used to confirm that they 
had been met (Thornton et al 2007). The significance of such assessment methods 
becomes clear when considering that full prototypes are not possible for ships, therefore 
requirements and targets must be met from the start (Thornton et al 2007). Similar 
vulnerability performance requirements were first implemented in the USN during the 
development of what was then the DD 21 (Reese et al 1998). Reese et al (1998) 
presented a possible format (replicated in Figure 3.26) for probabilistic Operationally 
Oriented Vulnerability Requirement (OOVR) specification. 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Probabilistic Approach to Specifying OOVRs for a Surface Ship (Reese et 
al 1998) 
 
Furthermore, the MOD (2001) suggested that vulnerability requirements should 
be in the form of function versus threat weapon tables, such as the one reproduced in 
Figure 3.27, containing required minimum probabilities. 
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Figure 3.27: Example Threat / Function Table (MOD 2001) 
 
3.4 Conclusions on Background to Survivability 
 
A number of survivability assessment tools currently exist; however, most are 
either aimed at a single survivability constituent (or even at a specific aspect of a single 
survivability constituent), being unable to balance between survivability reduction 
features (e.g.: SPECTRE and SURVIVE) and/or are qualitative therefore inadequate for 
quantifying requirement specification (e.g.: safety and risk analysis) and/or are aimed 
towards detailed designs where implementing changes is impractical (e.g.: personnel 
flow and fire simulation tools), as outlined in Section 3.3.  
Therefore, the need for a simple and rapid method for fully integrating and 
quantifying naval ship survivability has been identified. Since survivability is layout 
sensitive, it is proposed that the method should take advantage of architecturally 
orientated ship design processes, integrating survivability in the iterative design process. 
It should also be applied to early stage designs where there is minimum detail, which is 
amenable to change. The proposed method will combine a number of tools used by 
UCL and the MOD, as well as a new approach to quantify recoverability. This approach 
will attempt to overcome the difficulties of recoverability modelling (such as the lack of 
data, human performance and time dependence) by using weighted performance 
measures. The quantification of a certain aspect of warship performance would also 
simplify the design of “the most complex, diverse and highly integrated of any 
engineering systems” produced today (Graham 1982). 
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Chapter 4: Survivability Assessment Method Development 
 
 This chapter gives a detailed description of the survivability assessment method 
that was developed. It includes a combination of various existing and new tools. A 
summary of the proposed method was published by Piperakis et al (2012), which is 
reproduced in Appendix 5. This chapter outlines the assessment of each of the three 
linked survivability aspects in turn – with particular emphasis on the last 
(recoverability) before the overall survivability assessment method is outlined in 
Section 4.4. 
 
4.1 Susceptibility Assessment 
 
 It is evident that a number of susceptibility (and vulnerability) assessment 
methods currently exist. Moreover, susceptibility assessment techniques can be used 
throughout the ship design process. Therefore, the development of a new susceptibility 
assessment method was judged unnecessary. However, before deciding on which 
susceptibility tools to utilise, a representative threat scenario should be developed. In 
order for the survivability assessment method to be valid, it should work with a range of 
different scenarios. However, in order to demonstrate the proposed approach, it was 
decided that a clear single threat scenario should be adopted. The scenario selected was 
that of a naval ship being attacked by radar homing (at 15GHz), sea-skimming ASMs. 
The above scenario is demonstrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Threat Scenario (McDonald 2010) 
 
The ship being attacked would attempt to defend itself using both its soft-kill 
systems (chaff decoys) and hard-kill systems (CIWS, PDMS, ADMS). These are the 
main defence strategies against ASMs as described by (Longworth 1983). This threat 
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scenario was selected as ASMs are seen to be a principal threat faced by modern 
warships (Longworth 1983; Surko 1994). In addition, since the survivability assessment 
method would have to function with a variety of threat scenarios, it is thought that the 
above scenario can relatively easily be altered in order to represent different attack 
situations. 
Three probabilities were calculated for the susceptibility part of the survivability 
assessment method. The probability of the ship being detected and identified, P(di), the 
probability that the missile locks on the ship, P(l), and the probability of the ship being 
hit by at least one ASM, P(h). These probabilities correspond to the four necessary steps 
in order for a ship to avoid being hit, as identified by Belcher (2008), and spelt out in 
Appendix 4.1. It was decided that P(di) would be taken to be unity for simplification 
purposes, given that it depends more on operational circumstances rather than the ship 
design itself, on which this method focuses. 
In order to calculate P(l), it was decided to utilise the SPECTRE software (the 
current UK MOD RCS prediction tool (Turner et al 2006; Martin 2007), described in 
Section 3.3.2) and easy access to SPECTRE was provided by the sponsor of this 
research, UK MOD Dstl (https://www.dstl.gov.uk/). The ship designs to which the 
method was applied were sent to Dstl, who then ran them on SPECTRE in order to 
obtain RCS results. Given that if the RCS of the decoys launched by the ship (soft-kill) 
is equal to that of the ship, there is a 50% chance of the ASM locking onto the ship 
(Papanikolaou and Boulougouris 1998), P(l) values were obtained by assuming a 
simplistic (and unclassified) linear relationship (see Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Relationship Between the Probability That the Missile Locks on the Ship, 
P(l), Against the Ratio of (Ship RCS)/(Chaff RCS) 
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Namely, 
 
If (RCS ship) < (2×RCS chaff), P(l) = 0.5×((RCS ship)÷(RCS chaff)), (3) 
 
If (RCS ship) ≥ (2×RCS chaff), P(l) = 1          (4)
  
While the chaff RCS should normally exceed that of the vessel being defended, it was 
assumed that all ship designs studied employed the same decoys. The chaff RCS was 
assumed to be 2,000m2 between 10-20GHz (Friedman 2006), although even higher 
values were given in that reference and by Cherming (2006; 2011). The average ship 
RCS, around 360o, at an elevation of 0o and frequency of 15GHz was used in the P(l) 
equations (Equations 3 and 4). This was done as the threat selected is sea-skimming and 
a specific orientation of the ship to the threat was not assumed, therefore avoiding 
unnecessary complexities in the threat scenario. However, SPECTRE is capable of 
outputting ship RCS data at different elevation angles and specific azimuth angles. 
P(h) was then calculated through the CSEE method (McDonald 2010). The 
CSEE, operated by UCL as part of its MSc in Naval Architecture course, has been used 
to estimate defensive system (hard-kill) effectiveness of an LPD against threat 
scenarios. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the CSEE is able to calculate probabilities of 
layered defence success against missile attack scenarios; however it is relatively simple 
and relies on various assumptions. Unclassified but representative weapons data (such 
as range, maximum burst time for CIWS, firing rates, reaction times, kill assessment 
times, velocities and single shot kill probabilities) are specified to determine combat 
system reaction times and success probabilities (McDonald 2010). McDonald (2010) 
also gives other key assumptions:- 
- Ship movement/manoeuvring ignored; 
- 100% reliable/available systems; 
- Constant (i.e.: range, RCS, speed, manoeuvrability, environment independent) 
kill probabilities (of incoming missile by a given defensive system) assumed; 
- Investigates single ships rather than task groups; 
- Incoming missile profiles are given; 
- Environmental conditions are ignored; 
- Constant missile velocities assumed (a typical defensive missile velocity profile 
is likely to follow something similar to that illustrated in Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Typical Missile Velocity V. Time Profile (Adams 1988) 
 
Given the above data and assumptions, event (combat system reaction) timelines 
can be generated, in order to calculate P(h). In addition, although the tool was originally 
intended for LPD type ships, it can easily be applied to other naval ships, such as 
combatants. The final susceptibility results were obtained by multiplying P(di), P(l) and 
P(h) for each ship design investigated. This product gives the probability that a ship was 
successfully detected, identified, targeted and hit by an adversary. This probability 
could be normalised with respect to the corresponding value for a baseline ship design, 
or used as an absolute value. 
 It is important to note that, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, the factors affecting the 
lengthwise hit probability on a ship are not limited to ship and threat characteristics. 
Factors such as environmental conditions, ship motions and manoeuvring and variations 
in weapon performance play an important role. Therefore, using RCS prediction 
software to obtain lengthwise hit probabilities is questionable (MOD 2001). 
Consequently, the lengthwise hit probability distribution was assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with a mean equal to half of the ship’s overall length and a standard 
deviation equal to a sixth of the ship’s overall length. This type of lengthwise 
distribution was advised by the Maritime Integrated Survivability team (part of the 
Maritime Systems Engineering Group in Naval Systems Department) of Dstl, who also 
use it in their own susceptibility analyses (in the MISSION programme) (Thornton et al 
2012). 
 
4.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
 
 As with susceptibility assessment, various vulnerability assessment tools 
currently exist, aimed at both concept and subsequent design stages. It was therefore 
decided that the development of a new vulnerability assessment tool was not necessary. 
Adding vulnerability reduction features on a warship is highly sensitive (in terms of 
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design difficulty, time and cost) to the level of design detail. Since the developed 
survivability assessment method is aimed at preliminary ship design, it was decided that 
QinetiQ’s SURVIVE Lite (Pugh 2006; Turner et al 2006) software, outlined in Section 
3.3.3, was appropriate for these studies. This also had the advantage that SURVIVE Lite 
is currently the principal concept stage vulnerability assessment code of the UK MOD 
and can simulate a large variety of threat types, including ASMs which are examined. 
It was decided that a limited amount of major ship systems/capabilities should 
be initially modelled; more specifically the Move and Fight related systems of the 
functional breakdown described in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.1.5. However, before deciding 
on those systems, the ship types on which the method would be applied to had to be 
determined. It was concluded that the method would first be applied on combatants, 
focusing particularly on frigate type ships, as they are the most common type of warship 
for most navies with blue water aspirations (Andrews et al 2004). Consequently, the 
systems of the ships to be investigated were:- 
- Move system; 
- Medium calibre naval gun system; 
- ASM system; 
- Aft SAM system; 
- Fwd SAM system; 
- Helicopter system. 
Furthermore it was decided that the survivability assessment method should also 
be applied to replenishment ship designs. For this ship type, discussions with Dstl staff 
led to the decision that the following major systems/capabilities would be investigated 
(Thornton and Day 2012):- 
- Move system; 
- Ability to RAS AVCAT; 
- Ability to RAS dieso; 
- Ability to RAS dry stores; 
- Ability to RAS ordnance; 
- Aviation support; 
- CIWS. 
As noted in Section 3.3.3, in preliminary design only major system components 
are considered, while items such as cables and pipes connecting system components are 
yet to be specified beyond gross weight. SURVIVE Lite is intended of operating at this 
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level of definition. System tree diagrams and system architecture illustrations from 
SURVIVE Lite are shown in Appendix 7. 
It was decided that SURVIVE Lite’s ASM hit grids (described in Section 3.3.3) 
should be separately applied to each WT section of each ship (for both port and 
starboard sides, and then averaged), as depicted in Figure 4.4 which illustrates Frigate 
Variant 1, detailed in Section 5.1.1. Vulnerability results (i.e. percentage vulnerabilities 
of the modelled equipment, compartments and systems) were obtained for a hit at each 
WT section. These results were multiplied by the probability that the given WT section 
was hit (computed through the lengthwise hit probability distribution described in 
Section 4.1). (The sum of the probabilities that each WT section of a ship design is hit is 
equal to 1, i.e. it is given that the ship is definitely hit (susceptibility = 1) which is a 
requirement for vulnerability analysis). Finally, by taking the sum of these results, the 
total system vulnerability for each system was obtained. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: SURVIVE Lite Hit Grid (Frigate Variant 1, port side attack) 
 
In order to keep the number of simulations and data processing to a reasonable 
minimum amount, only broadside attacks at an elevation of 0o were simulated. 
However, SURVIVE Lite is capable of modelling missile hits at various azimuth and 
elevation angles. 
The major ship systems modelled, listed above, do not have equal significance 
to one another and are highly dependent on the operational scenario undertaken by the 
ship. Therefore, weighting schemes had to be applied to the modelled systems. For the 
combatant designs, the weighting scheme adopted was that advised by Portuguese Navy 
officer, 1st Lt. Pedro Fonseca (2011) who was an UCL MSc student at the time and had 
been a frigate damage control officer in his recent seagoing appointment. The proposed 
weighting scheme is in accordance with the warship objective hierarchy ‘to float, to 
move, to fight’ (Brown and Tupper 1989) and is shown in Table 4.1. Specifically, the 
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Float group was allocated the maximum weighting of ten (this will be further detailed in 
Section 4.3.4 and Table 4.7), the Move group was allocated a weighting of nine, and the 
sum of the weightings of the systems in the Fight group was eight. Subsequently 
sensitivity testing on this weighting scheme was carried out and is presented in Section 
6.4.1. The values of all weighting schemes applied throughout this project were between 
0-10, zero corresponding to an insignificant entity, while ten, to one of maximum 
importance. 
 
Table 4.1: Combatant System Weighting Scheme 
MOVE Move system 9 = 9 
 
 
FIGHT 
Medium calibre naval gun system 2  
 
 
 
= 8 
ASM system 2 
Aft SAM system 1 
Fwd SAM system 1 
Helicopter system 2 
 
For the replenishment ship designs, the weighting scheme was advised by RN 
officer (rtd.), Lt. Cdr. Tim Day (2012) who had been a CVS NBCD officer, and was the 
Dstl Maritime Integrated Survivability Team Leader at the time. The proposed 
weighting scheme is shown in Table 4.2. From Table 4.2 (and Table 4.9 in Section 
4.3.4) it is evident that the ‘to float, to move, to fight’ hierarchy was not utilised by Lt. 
Cdr. Day for the allocation of the system weightings (as was for the combatants by 1st 
Lt. Fonseca). On this occasion, the allocation was based on the hierarchy of capabilities 
for a replenishment ship as perceived by Lt. Cdr. Day. 
 
Table 4.2: Replenishment Ship System Weighting Scheme 
MOVE Move system 10 = 10 
 
 
FIGHT 
Ability to RAS AVCAT 10  
 
 
 
 
= 39 
Ability to RAS dieso 10 
Ability to RAS dry stores 6 
Ability to RAS ordnance 8 
Aviation support 2 
CIWS 3 
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The final vulnerability results were obtained by normalising the individual 
modelled system vulnerabilities with respect to the corresponding system vulnerabilities 
of a baseline ship design. The above weighting schemes were applied to these 
normalised values, and the sum taken. This procedure led to a single figure for a ship’s 
vulnerability, similarly to the ship’s susceptibility (as outlined in Section 4.1). However, 
unlike susceptibility, this single value has no meaning (and cannot even be derived) 
unless a ship design is compared to at least one, or more, other ship designs. Therefore 
this procedure is strictly comparative and does not output an absolute vulnerability 
value; rather, it outputs a vulnerability value which has been normalised with respect to 
a baseline ship design. However, the individual ship system vulnerabilities are absolute 
vulnerabilities before normalising against other systems and weighting. 
In addition to the move system and major Fight systems and their components, 
ATU and ventilation compartments, firepumps, NBCD stores, FRP section bases, 
workshops, naval stores, spare gear stores and HQ1 and HQ2 were also modelled in 
SURVIVE Lite. These items were modelled in order to obtain vulnerability data of 
components necessary for recoverability, which was then used in the recoverability 
section of the proposed approach (see Section 4.3). 
Finally, the Fast Fire algorithm of SURVIVE Lite (Sharp 2011), which is 
relevant to preliminary stage ship design, was employed in order to determine further 
system and component damage due to secondary weapon effects. Although it was 
suggested that the medium fire algorithm should be used for warheads above 30kg 
(Sharp 2011), the Maritime Integrated Survivability team of Dstl suggested using the 
small fire algorithm (Thornton et al 2011). Damage due to flooding was not considered 
since only abovewater threats were examined, although SURVIVE Lite has the 
capability to model flooding damage to systems and components, and, therefore, the 
proposed approach could easily include modelling underwater threats. 
 
4.3 Recoverability Assessment 
 
 As is evident from Section 3.3.4 modelling recoverability is the most demanding 
area of survivability assessment for a number of reasons such as the limited ability to 
model secondary damage and crew actions, the inadequate data available and the 
difficulty of incorporating crew readiness and skill levels. A number of recoverability 
assessment techniques exist, however, many, such as safety and risk analysis methods, 
are qualitative. Thus, they are not quantifiable but rather are subjective since they 
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usually rely on expert judgment and, furthermore, do not take specific ship architectural 
features into account and so are considered to be of limited design use. They could 
possibly, however, be useful when deciding on what DC equipment to have on board 
and what procedures to follow. Numerous other methods are focused on a particular 
aspect of recoverability, such as fire spread or DC crew evolutions/personnel 
movement. This means that they rely on simulations and are therefore more appropriate 
to relatively detailed ship definitions. A tool aimed specifically to preliminary ship 
designs does not seem to exist; neither does one which specifically investigates how 
ship configuration/layout/architecture would affect overall naval ship recoverability 
(since recoverability is seen to be more heavily reliant on operational/human factors 
rather than design factors). For these reasons, it was decided that a new recoverability 
assessment method should be developed, to investigate such issues at early stage design. 
By applying the proposed recoverability method to early stage design, where 
there is minimum detail, changes in ship layout could be relatively easily investigated. It 
was decided that simulations were probably not appropriate for the level of ship 
definition in the ship design studies produced. However, assessment of recoverability 
requires temporal metrics, such as the time taken to repair systems, which could be 
obtained from simulation. An alternative analytical method was thus required to 
generate this data. It was determined that the new recoverability assessment approach 
would work on the basis of developing a number of Performance Measures (PMs) 
together with an appropriate weighting scheme which might overcome the difficulties in 
recoverability modelling (e.g.: lack of data, human performance and time dependence). 
The PM method was inspired by work such as (Chow 2002) and (Casarosa 2011) (see 
Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14). PMs relevant to recoverability were derived from existing 
work, such as the two references above and other literature on naval ship recoverability 
(see Appendix 4.3), as well as from interviewing 1st Lt. Fonseca, knowledgeable in the 
area of (frigate) damage control. Values for those PMs were obtained using the 
Paramarine and SURVIVE Lite tools. 
 
4.3.1 Category 1 Performance Measures 
 
The PMs developed were split into three categories. As before, the weighting 
schemes of all PMs were derived with the assistance of 1st Lt. Fonseca (2011) for the 
combatant design studies, and Lt. Cdr. (rtd.) Day (2012) for the AOR design studies, to 
ensure consistency. The three PM categories and their associated weighting schemes are 
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presented in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Sensitivity testing on this weighting 
scheme was carried out and is presented in Section 6.6.1. Note that the larger the value 
of a specific PM is, the worst its performance and that some PMs have units while 
others are dimensionless. 
The first category, which is detailed in Table 4.3, consists of PMs related to 
immediate effects on DCFF, upon which the Float objective at the top of the warship 
hierarchy depends. 
 
Table 4.3: Immediate DCFF Performance Measures (Category 1) 
 
PM Software 
Weighting 
Combatant AOR 
1.1 Average distance between FRPP and 
damaged WT section (m) 
Paramarine 
7 4 
1.2 Average number of WTD operated per FRP Paramarine 4 4 
1.3 Number of internal decks in damaged WT 
section 
Paramarine 
6 5 
1.4 Average total width of alternative 
passageways (inverse) (m) 
Paramarine 
7 2 
1.5 ATU and Ventilation (of damaged zone) 
(man-hours) 
SURVIVE Lite 
8 9 
1.6 Firepump (of damaged zone) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 2 1 
1.7 Overall firepump system (man-hours/no of 
equipment) 
SURVIVE Lite 
8 10 
1.8 NBCD stores - aft FRP section base SURVIVE Lite 1 1 
1.9 NBCD stores - fwd FRP section base SURVIVE Lite 1 1 
1.10 Remaining NBCD stores SURVIVE Lite 2 1 
1.11 Power (of damaged zone) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 2 1 
1.12 Overall power system  (man-hours/no of 
equipment) 
SURVIVE Lite 
8 10 
1.13 SCC (HQ1) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 6 6 
1.14 Bridge (HQ2) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 2 4 
1.15 Ops. Room (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 6 10 
1.16 Aft FRPP SURVIVE Lite 10 5 
1.17 Fwd FRPP SURVIVE Lite 10 5 
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PMs 1.1-1.4 in Table 4.3 are related to the ease of access of the damaged part of 
the ship from the FRP section bases, i.e. they are human factor PMs. Values for those 
PMs were taken directly from the CAD software used for the ship design studies, 
Paramarine. PMs 1.1 and 1.2 are directly related to the time needed to reach the 
damaged WT section of the ship. For PM 1.4, which can be interpreted as the number of 
alternative routes between the FRP section bases and the damaged portion of the ship, 
the inverse is taken, in order to remain consistent with the point made above, i.e. the 
larger the value of a specific PM, the worst its performance in survivability terms. The 
term ‘average’ is contained in the description of PMs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 (Table 4.3) as it 
was decided that each ship design would include two FRP section bases; therefore, the 
corresponding values for the two bases were averaged. PM 1.3 is related to the ease of 
(vertical) access and personnel evolutions within the damaged section in order to deal 
with the damage and remove casualties. In addition, the larger the number of decks in 
the hit WT section, the greater extent of a resultant fire. 
Values for the remaining PMs in Table 4.3 (as well as the ones in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5), all of which have the indication ‘SURVIVE Lite’ in the software column, 
were obtained by means of the following procedure: First, the output from the 
SURVIVE Lite models indicated if the specified item had been affected by a specific 
hit. All unaffected items were given a value of zero. The affected items, i.e. all items 
with vulnerability greater that 0% (with the exception of PMs 1.8-1.10 and 1.16-1.17) 
were given a PM value based on the assumed number of man-hours to repair that 
specific equipment. Values for the number of man-hours necessary to repair each 
equipment item are detailed in Section 4.3.5. PMs 1.8-1.10 (stores) and 1.16-1.17 
(humans) were assumed to be unrecoverable and were, therefore, given a value of 0 if 
unaffected by a hit, and 1 if affected. Although SURVIVE Lite was used to indicate 
what equipment items had been affected by a given threat, no vulnerability percentages 
were used in the recoverability assessment method. This is because, in order to carry out 
recoverability assessment, vulnerability (and susceptibility) needed to be taken as unity. 
Therefore, even if SURVIVE Lite outputted a vulnerability value of 0.1% for a specific 
item, it was assumed that, for recoverability assessment purposes, that item had been 
definitively hit, i.e. vulnerability = 1. 
PMs 1.5-1.7 are related to the propagation and suppression of fire and smoke 
after a ship has been damaged. PM 1.5 looks at the state of the ventilation system of a 
ship after attack, upon which smoke spread and containment are heavily reliant. The 
indication ‘of damaged zone’ is included in the description of PM 1.5, as it was decided 
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that each zone of each ship designed should have an independent non-cross-connected 
ventilation system. Therefore, the smoke hazards in a particular zone of the ship should 
be directly dependent on the state of the ventilation system of that zone after attack. 
PMs 1.6 and 1.7 examine the state of the fire fighting systems of a ship after attack. As 
with the ventilation system, each zone of each ship designed had an independent 
firemain system, however, the firemain systems were assumed to be cross-connected. 
This justifies the existence of two PMs for fire suppression, one for the damaged zone 
and one for the overall ship. Although a firemain system contains a number of 
connectivity items (in addition to the actual firepumps) those were not modelled due to 
the level of design detail in the concept ship design studies. As explained previously, 
this is a common simplification step in survivability analysis of concept stage ship 
designs (see Section 3.3.3). Therefore, the whole firemain system of a ship was 
represented exclusively by its firepumps. In PM 1.7, the number of man-hours required 
to repair the affected firepumps was divided by the total number of firepumps in that 
ship design. Thus, the more firepumps there are on the ship (increasing redundancy), the 
smaller the value of the PM. This was done as the firepumps were assumed to be cross-
connected in parallel rather than in series, i.e. if one firepump is out of action, the ship’s 
whole firemain system remains operational. 
PMs 1.8-1.10 are related to the manual equipment necessary for DCFF, and their 
performance reflects on the state of the NBCD stores after a given attack. Again it was 
decided that each zone of each ship designed should have independent NBCD stores. 
Given that usually there are two FRP section bases on a modern combatant (Figure 
A36), the FRP section bases and the NBCD stores, in the zones where the FRP section 
bases were located, would be positioned appropriately (PMs 1.8 and 1.9). A separate 
PM for the remaining NBCD stores was created (PM 10). Note that for PM 1.10, the 
number of remaining NBCD stores affected by a given hit was divided by the total 
number of remaining NBCD stores to take redundancy into account (as with PM 1.7). 
PMs 1.11 and 1.12 are related to the state of the power generating system of a 
ship after attack. Power is not only required for the ship to attempt to carry on its 
mission even if hit, but also to operate many of the DCFF equipment necessary to deal 
with the internal battle. In addition, complications in the power generation and 
distribution system could lead to hazardous situations while fire fighting. These two 
PMs function in an identical manner to PMs 1.6 and 1.7 respectively, as described 
above. 
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PMs 1.13-1.15 are related to command, control and communication during the 
DCFF process. PM 1.13 is related to the state of the SCC (with which HQ1 is usually 
collocated) after a given attack. Similarly, PM 1.14 is related to the state of the Bridge 
(with which HQ2 is usually collocated) and PM 1.15 to the state of the Operations 
Room, after a given attack. The importance of these three compartments is highlighted 
in Appendix 4.3: in RN ships, overall DC responsibility and priority setting belongs to 
the CO, who is usually at the Operations Room or bridge (Clements and Kneebone 
1985). He is in direct communication with the NBCDO (usually the MEO) located at 
HQ1, and the WEO located in the Operations Room. The NBCDOs responsibilities 
include DC co-ordination (damage state information, resource availability and 
allocation, containment and restoration actions), while the WEOs respectively is combat 
system availability (Clements and Kneebone 1985). In addition to DC, the MEOs 
responsibilities include propulsion and power. The CO, therefore, has to manage and 
balance the internal and external battles. 
Finally, PMs 1.16 and 1.17 are related to the state of the FRPs after a specified 
attack. The FRPs are responsible for dealing with the secondary effects immediately 
following a hit, and containing the damage. Each ship was assumed to include two 
FRPs, as previously indicated, split forward and aft. More FRPs could relatively easily 
be incorporated by increasing the number of PMs. This would be relevant in ship types 
such as LPDs, LPHs and CVs. 
Since the Category 1 PMs (Table 4.3) relate to the immediate actions/effects of 
an ASM hit, secondary damage effects (i.e. fire damage in this case) were not accounted 
for. 
 
4.3.2 Category 2 Performance Measures 
 
The second category of PMs, given in Table 4.4 together with the associated 
weighting scheme, relates to the items necessary for major system recovery (i.e. 
recovery support), once the secondary effects have been dealt with; whereby, ‘major 
system recovery’ refers to the modelled systems listed in Section 4.2 and Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.4: Major System Recovery Performance Measures (Category 2) 
 
PM Software 
Weighting 
Combatant AOR 
2.1 Aft workshops (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 3 5 
2.2 Fwd workshops (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 3 5 
2.3 Naval stores SURVIVE Lite 1 2 
2.4 Aft spare gear stores SURVIVE Lite 7 5 
2.5 Fwd spare gear stores SURVIVE Lite 7 5 
2.6 SCC (updated value) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 6 9 
2.7 Ops. Room (updated value) (man-hours) SURVIVE Lite 7 8 
  
 Values for the above PMs would be obtained in an identical manner as the PMs 
in Table 4.3, with the indication ‘SURVIVE Lite’, under the Software column. That is 
to say, PM 2.3-2.5 (stores) were assumed to be unrecoverable, therefore, given a value 
of 0 if unaffected by a specific hit, and a value of 1 if affected. The remaining PMs were 
valued in terms of man-hours to repair that compartment (if affected) after a given 
attack (Section 4.3.5). Again, SURVIVE Lite was used to indicate which compartments 
have been affected by a specific missile attack. 
 PMs 2.1 and 2.2 attempt to characterize the state of a ship’s workshops after an 
attack. Workshops might be necessary in order to repair major equipment, especially 
ones related to the power generating system of a naval ship, although it is accepted that 
most repair work is currently conducted on site. It was assumed that the ships to be 
designed would include split forward and aft integrated workshops; hence the two 
workshops related PMs (although, this could easily be altered in order to accommodate 
a different number of workshops). 
 PMs 2.3-2.5 are related to the state of the ship’s naval and spare gear stores after 
a given attack. These stores contain equipment, spare parts and raw material which may 
be necessary in order to repair and put back into action an affected major ship system. It 
was assumed that the ships to be designed would include a single naval store and split 
forward and aft spare gear stores, although, once again, this arrangement could be 
altered. 
Finally, PMs 2.6 and 2.7 relate to the condition of the SCC (and, hence, HQ1) 
and the Operations Room after a given attack. As clarified in Section 4.3.1 these two 
compartments are necessary for command, control and communication purposes. The 
NBCDO positioned in the SCC is responsible, amongst other tasks, for coordinating 
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restoration efforts of the major systems damaged after the attack and the proper 
operation of the power and propulsion systems. 
This category of PMs includes fire effects. (Therefore, PMs 2.6 and 2.7 are 
‘updated value’ of PMs 1.13 and 1.15, including secondary effects, as indicated at the 
description of the PMs in Table 4.4). Fire effects are included since these PMs ‘relate to 
the items necessary for major system recovery, after secondary effects have been dealt 
with’. Since no fire spread simulation techniques were incorporated, it was assumed that 
all equipment and compartments (only) within the hit WT section would be affected by 
the resulting fire. Therefore, for Category 2 PM analysis, all items within the hit WT 
section, in addition to all other items affected by the missile hit (outputted by SURVIVE 
Lite) were assumed to be affected. 
 
4.3.3 Category 3 Performance Measures 
 
The third and final PM group (Category 3) is listed in Table 4.5, together with 
the associated weighting scheme. This category includes PMs relevant to the recovery 
of the specific major systems modelled, listed in Section 4.2 (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2). 
The Category 3 PMs were applied to all of those major systems, in a manner that is 
described in Section 4.3.4. 
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Table 4.5: Individual Major System Recovery Performance Measures (Category 3) 
 
PM Software 
Weighting 
Combatant AOR 
3.1 Minimum man-hours for system to 
be functioning 
SURVIVE Lite 
10 10 
3.2 Number of man-hours for system to 
be 100% 
SURVIVE Lite 
3 5 
3.3 Access measure from naval stores SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
1 2 
3.4 Access measure from aft spare gear 
stores 
SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
3 5 
3.5 Access measure from aft 
workshops 
SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
2 5 
3.6 Access measure from fwd spare 
gear stores 
SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
3 5 
3.7 Access measure from fwd 
workshop 
SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
2 5 
3.8 Equipment in damaged section 
measure 
SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine 
8 10 
 
 PMs 3.1 and 3.2 attempt to give a description of the severity of damage to a 
major system of a ship after a specific incident and the time needed to restore it. The 
score of PM 3.1 would be equal to the total number of man-hours required to repair all 
damaged equipment items of a specific major system which are in series (tree diagrams 
of all major system modelled can be found in Appendix 7). Thus, this PM, by taking 
equipment redundancy into consideration, describes the minimum time needed to get an 
affected major system back into action. On the other hand, the value of PM 3.2 is equal 
to the total number of man-hours required to repair every single equipment item of an 
affected major system, whether in series or in parallel. This can be illustrated by 
considering the simplified system tree diagram below. 
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Figure 4.5: Simplified Major Ship System Tree Diagram 
 
Consider that, after a particular incident, all equipment items of System 1 have 
been affected, putting System 1 out of action. The value of PM 3.1 would be equal to 
the sum of the number of man-hours needed to repair eqpt 1, eqpt 3 and either eqpt 2.1 
or eqpt 2.2 (whichever is less); while the value of PM 3.2 would be the number of man-
hours required to repair all four damaged equipment items, therefore, not taking 
redundancy into account. PM 3.2 increases in importance when follow-up attacks are 
expected. 
 PMs 3.3-3.8 endeavour to reflect on the difficulty in accessing equipment which 
has been damaged after a specific attack and, therefore, the effort required to repair 
them. The significance of such factors is clear when considering that most of the repair 
work will generally be carried out on site. The above access measures are then 
quantified by multiplying the criticality of affected equipment items by the number of 
man-hours needed to repair that equipment item having been affected by the specific hit 
(as revealed by SURVIVE Lite). Criticality, in this context, is defined as: 
 
 Criticality = 1 ÷ (number of equipment items (of a 
                                                         specific major system) in parallel) (5) 
 
For example, if there are four propellers in a ship, all providing the same capability, 
each has a criticality of ¼. Alternatively, when considering System 1 in Table 4.5, eqpt 
1 and eqpt 3 each have a criticality of 1, whilst eqpt 2.1 and eqpt 2.2 have a criticality of 
½. This was done in order to denote the diminishing importance of a specific equipment 
item should there be an increasing number of equipment items that can carry out the 
same functions (i.e. redundancy/duplication) and thus, the value of the PM is 
proportionately decreased to commensurate with the damaged equipment’s associated 
redundancy level. However, PMs 3.3-3.7 were only applied to damaged equipment 
requiring personnel to cross the damaged WT section in order to get access from the 
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corresponding store/workshop. In addition PM 3.8 was obtained by multiplying the 
criticality (Equation 5) by the number of man-hours needed to repair each equipment 
item which was affected by the given hit and was located in the damaged WT section in 
question. Hence the software column of Table 4.5 indicates ‘SURVIVE Lite and 
Paramarine’, as Paramarine was required to locate the affected equipment items. For 
example, suppose that System 1 (Figure 4.5) was laid out as illustrated in Figure 4.6 in a 
typical frigate and all naval and spare gear stores and workshops are co-located at the 
compartment shown in green.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Example Architecture of Simplified Major Ship System 1 
 
In this case, given an ASM hit at the WT section shown (and supposing that all 
four equipment items of System 1 have been affected by the hit), the values of PMs 3.3-
3.7 would be identical and equal to the criticality of eqpt 3 (i.e. 1, as previously 
explained) multiplied by the number of man hours needed to repair that equipment item. 
The value of PM 3.8 would be equal to the criticality of eqpt 2.2 (i.e. ½) multiplied by 
the number of man-hours required to repair that equipment item. Although eqpt 1 and 
eqpt 2.1 have also been damaged by the incident, access to them is assumed 
unobstructed, and, therefore, they do not contribute to those, access related, PMs. If 
there were more damaged equipment items of System 1 forward of the hit WT section 
in Figure 4.6, the values of PMs 3.3-3.7 would be the sum of the products of each item’s 
criticality and repair time. Likewise for PM 3.8, should there been more System 1 
equipment items inside the damaged WT section. 
 Secondary (fire) damage effects were included in PM Category 3 analysis in the 
same manner to that for such effects being accounted for in PM Category 2 analysis 
(Section 4.3.2). 
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4.3.4 Recoverability Performance Measures Matrix 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, SURVIVE Lite was run separately to simulate an 
ASM hit at each WT section of each ship designed, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
Therefore, values for all 32 PMs were obtained for a given hit at each WT section. PM 
matrices, such as the one shown in Table 4.6 (for a combatant) were then completed to 
analyse the recoverability of each ship design studied. This procedure is now explained 
in more detail. 
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 Firstly, from columns 1 and 2 it can be observed that the Category 3 PMs were 
applied to all of the (six in the combatant case) major systems modelled. This is because 
those PMs are related to the recovery of the specific major systems modelled (see Table 
4.1 and Table 4.2). The weightings in column 3 are the weightings of each individual 
PM and are detailed in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
Columns 4, 6, 8… represent all of the WT section of each ship design analysed. 
In the cells of these columns, the values of the corresponding PMs (from column 2) 
were entered, (following the procedure detailed in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3) giving values 
for all PMs for a separate hit at each WT section of each ship. The values of each PM at 
each WT section attack scenario were then multiplied by the probability that that WT 
section was hit, and the results entered in the cells of columns 5, 7, 9…. The probability 
that a WT section was hit was computed through the lengthwise hit probability 
distribution described in Section 4.1, where the sum of the probabilities that each WT 
section of a ship design is hit was equalled to unity, i.e. it was assumed that the ship is 
definitely hit (susceptibility = 1) which (together with vulnerability = 1) are 
requirements for the conduction of recoverability analysis. Thus, it can be said that each 
PM was weighted, not only by the importance of that PM (column 3) but also by the 
likelihood of hit at a specific location on the ship affecting that PM. In addition, this 
enabled the comparison of the recoverability performance of ship designs with differing 
numbers of WT bulkheads. 
The next step (column 11) was to compute the sum of columns 5, 7, 9… along 
the entire length of the ship being analysed. Thus, summing the products of the value of 
each PM at each WT section attack scenario and the probability that that WT section 
has been hit, which gave the total ship value of each of the 32 PMs developed. In 
column 12, these total PM values were normalised with respect to the corresponding 
values of a baseline ship design, and in column 13, the normalised PM values were 
weighted given the weightings in column 3 (Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). 
The sum of the normalised and weighted PM values was then computed for each 
PM Category (column 14). For Category 3 PMs, a separate sum was produced for each 
of the major systems modelled, as shown in Table 4.6. These group sums were then 
once again normalised with respect to the corresponding values of the same baseline 
ship (column 15). Finally, these normalised group sums were weighted (column 17) 
with the group weightings (column 16), shown in Table 4.7 for the case of a combatant. 
As before, this weighting scheme was derived with the assistance of 1st Lt. Fonseca. 
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Table 4.7: Recoverability Weighting Scheme for a Combatant 
Group Description PM cat. Group Weighting  
FLOAT Cat. 1 PMs 10       = 10 
Recovery support  Cat. 2 PMs 2  
MOVE Move system 
Cat. 3 PMs 
9 = 9 
FIGHT 
Naval gun system 2  
 
 
 
= 8 
ASM system 2 
Aft SAM system 1 
Fwd SAM system 1 
Helicopter system 2 
 
The weightings used for each PM category is in accordance with the warship 
objective hierarchy ‘to float, to move, to fight’. For this reason, Category 1, which 
consists of PMs related to immediate effects on DCFF, upon which the Float objective 
at the top of the warship hierarchy depends, was given the highest weighting. This was 
followed by the repair and recovery of the Move and then the Fight related major 
systems, (Category 3 PMs) which followed in weighting significance. In order to 
maintain consistency, the weighting scheme adopted for the move and fight groups was 
identical to that used in the vulnerability assessment element of the proposed approach 
(Section 4.2), listed in Table 4.1. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Category 2, 
consisting of PMs supporting system recovery, was considered separately from the three 
main warship objectives as it was seen to have an impact on all three. It is difficult to 
quantify the magnitude of this impact; however, an indication can be given by the 
(subjective) weightings that were assigned to this PM Category by various naval 
officers during the sensitivity tests (see Sections 6.4.1 and 6.6.1) 
 After obtaining all of the entries of column 17 in Table 4.6, the final step was to 
calculate the sum of these entries, thereby evaluating the total recoverability 
performance score of a particular ship design. This procedure led to a single figure for a 
ship design’s recoverability performance (similarly to the ship’s susceptibility 
performance, Section 4.1, and vulnerability performance Section 4.2). However, unlike 
susceptibility (but corresponding to vulnerability performance, Section 4.2), this single 
value has no meaning (and cannot even be derived) unless a ship design is compared to 
at least one other ship design. Therefore, as explained in Section 4.2, this procedure is 
strictly comparative and does not output an absolute recoverability performance value; 
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rather, it outputs a recoverability performance value normalised with respect to a 
baseline ship design. 
 A PM matrix for a replenishment ship design is shown in Table 4.8 with the 
major systems modelled, already listed in Section 4.2 and Table 4.2. Furthermore, the 
group weightings (column 16 of Table 4.8) are also shown in Table 4.9. Note that the 
recoverability weighting scheme of a replenishment ship design was derived with the 
assistance of Lt. Cdr. (rtd.) Day; hence the dissimilar weighting scheme philosophy 
when compared to the recoverability weighting scheme of a combatant (Table 4.7), 
which was derived by a different officer serving in a different navy and for a ship with a 
different role. As in the combatant case, in order to maintain consistency, the weighting 
scheme of the Move and Fight groups is identical to that used in the vulnerability 
assessment element of the method (Section 4.2), listed in Table 4.2. Finally, the 
headings of columns 12 and 15 were changed from ‘normalised with respect to 
baseline’ to ‘normalised with respect to worst performing’. The logic behind this is 
explained in Section 7.2.4. 
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Table 4.9: Recoverability Weighting Scheme for a Replenishment Ship 
Group Description PM cat. Group Weighting  
FLOAT Cat. 1 PMs 10       = 10 
Recovery support  Cat. 2 PMs 3  
MOVE Move system 
Cat. 3 PMs 
10 = 10 
FIGHT 
Ability to RAS AVCAT 10  
 
 
 
 
= 39 
Ability to RAS dieso 10 
Ability to RAS dry stores 6 
Ability to RAS ordnance 8 
Aviation support 2 
CIWS 3 
 
4.3.5 Equipment Categorisation and Repair Data 
 
 The majority of the recoverability PMs, (i.e. PMs 1.5-1.17 in Table 4.3, and all 
PMs in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, which are related to specific equipment/compartments), 
were given values based on the assumed number of man-hours to repair a specific 
equipment or compartment if damaged after a given incident. It is axiomatic that, had an 
equipment/compartment not been affected by a specific attack, the corresponding PM 
would be given a value of zero. Man-hour data for the repair of various equipment 
categories (shown in Table 4.10) were provided by Dstl (Thornton 2011). In addition, 
they are the same values as were employed by QinetiQ in SURVIVE’s recently 
developed recoverability module, with the exception of the 12th category. The fact that 
humans (i.e. personnel) and stores were assumed to be unrecoverable if affected by a 
hit, led the necessity for this 12th repair category. This category applied to PMs 1.8-1.10, 
1.16, 1.17 in Table 4.3 and 2.3-2.5 in Table 4.4, which, as explained in Section 4.3.1, 
were given a value of zero if unaffected and one if affected by a specific attack 
modelled. 
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Table 4.10: Equipment Repair Categories 
 Category Repair time (hrs.) Crew Man-hours 
1 Heavy engineering 4 4 16 
2 Light engineering 2 2 4 
3 Heavy electrical 1 2 2 
4 Light electrical 0.5 1 0.5 
5 Large pumps 5 3 15 
6 Small pumps 4 2 8 
7 Radar aerials 0.5 2 1 
8 Fluid tanks 0.5 2 1 
9 Aircraft 1.5 2 3 
10 Rudder/propeller 3 4 12 
11 Intake/exhaust 1 1 1 
12 Humans and stores infinite infinite infinite 
 
The data in Table 4.10 is remarkably simplified, since there are only 12 repair 
categories covering a very broad spectrum of equipment types, with different 
requirements, from different manufacturers, built under different standards. In addition, 
no reference to severity of damage was made. It is considered that more detailed and 
accurate data should be used, however, repair times are largely based on factors which 
cannot be easily quantified, such as crew skills. Another point worth noting is the fact 
that the categories in Table 4.10 are different to the equipment categories used by 
SURVIVE Lite for vulnerability assessment (QinetiQ 2011b), although both sets were 
developed by the same company and are used in the same software, SURVIVE. 
Table 4.11 details the repair category to which each of the equipment items and 
compartments relevant to Category 1 and 2 PM analysis (PMs 1.5-1.17 in Table 4.3 and 
2.1-2.7 in Table 4.4) was assumed to belong. Also listed are the corresponding 
SURVIVE Lite categories (i.e. the category to which each item was assumed to belong 
when building the SURVIVE Lite ship models for vulnerability assessment). The 
vulnerability and recoverability categorisation of all equipment items and compartments 
from which are comprised the major ship systems modelled (and which were used for 
Category 3 PM analysis in Section 4.3.3), is given in Appendix 6. Moreover, system 
tree diagrams are included in Appendix 7.  
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Table 4.11: Equipment Categorisation 
Relevant PMs 
Equipment / 
compartment 
SURVIVE Lite 
(vulnerability) 
category 
Repair (recoverability) 
category 
1.5. ATU & ventilation 
Light engineering / 
(silo/magazine) 
Light engineering 
1.6, 1.7. Fire pump Pump Small pumps 
1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 
2.3, 2.4, 2.5. 
Stores 
Light engineering / 
(silo/magazine) 
Humans and sores 
1.11, 1.12. Auxiliary engine Diesel generator Heavy engineering 
1.11, 1.12. Cruise engine Diesel generator Heavy engineering 
1.11, 1.12. Genset Diesel generator Heavy engineering 
1.11, 1.12. Boost engine Gas turbine Heavy engineering 
1.11, 1.12. Alternator Gas turbine Heavy engineering 
1.11, 1.12. Intake/exhaust Uptake / down takes Intake/exhaust 
1.13, 2.6. SCC Control console Light electrical×5 
1.14. Bridge Control console Light electrical×7 
1.15, 2.7. Operations Room Control console Light electrical×12 
1.16, 1.17. Humans Human Humans and sores 
2.1, 2.2. Workshops 
Light engineering / 
(silo/magazine) 
Light engineering 
 
 The vulnerability equipment category of power generating equipment is related 
to the power and propulsion systems selected for the ship design studies to which the 
method was applied, detailed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, for the replenishment ship 
designs it was decided not to include boost propulsion prime movers. It is observed that 
the repair categories for the SCC, bridge and Operations Room compartments result in a 
multiplication of the number of man-hours applicable to the light electrical repair 
category (i.e. ½ man-hour, Table 4.10) and 5, 7 and 12 respectively. This arose since it 
was decided that these compartments of the ship designs would contain 5, 7 and 12 
control consoles respectively, and the time needed to repair each, if each were damaged, 
would have been the time given in the light electrical repair category in Table 4.11. 
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4.4 Total Survivability Assessment 
 
 The next step, after finalising the susceptibility and vulnerability assessment 
approaches and developing a new, architecturally-driven recoverability assessment 
approach, was to combine the three constituents in order to create a total survivability 
assessment approach. However, as mentioned in Section 3.3.5, it has been argued that 
the three survivability constituents are not statistically independent (Sajdak and Karni 
2006; Thornton et al 2006). Therefore, relationships such as Equation 1 in Section 3.3.5, 
where survivability is assumed to be directly proportional to the product of its three 
constituents are not thought to be valid. Sajdak and Karni (2006) suggested that total 
survivability should be a function of its three constituents (Equation 2), rather than the 
product. For the above reasons, and after studying work done by Vasudevan and 
Rusling (2007) on the development of a ship design tool based on multi-objective 
optimisation using genetic algorithms, it was decided that the output results of the three 
survivability constituent assessment methods detailed above were considered separately 
and combined (for visualisation and comparison purposes) in the form of star plots (or 
triangle plots in the current case, as only three variables are presently being compared). 
An advantage of this type of presentation of the results is that further spokes, such as 
cost, displacement and power can be added; a limitation, however, is that it can only 
depict characteristics that are currently amenable to quantification (Vasudevan and 
Rusling 2007). There is also the issue of how the diagram would be interpreted, with 
regards to the significance of the enclosed area. Visualisation and comparison methods 
are an area for further development. Each star plot presented by Vasudevan and Rusling 
(2007) represents a single ship design, and each spoke within each star represents a 
design parameter. A sample of star plots, as a form of results visualisation, from 
Vasudevan and Rusling’s (2007) research is shown in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: A Sample of Star Plots From (Vasudevan and Rusling 2007) 
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It was also decided to examine the applicability of PM matrices, such as Table 
4.6, for total survivability assessment. This was done by multiplying the percentage 
values of total ship susceptibility, and vulnerability of each equipment/compartment, 
with each PM. Therefore, unlike the approach adopted in Section 4.3, susceptibility and 
vulnerability were not assumed to be equal to unity. More specifically, all PMs which 
were derived from the Paramarine ship models (i.e., PMs 1.1-1.4, Table 4.3) and those 
PMs related to stores and humans (i.e., PMs 1.8-1.10, 1.16 and 1.17, Table 4.3; PMs 
2.3-2.5, Table 4.4) were not only multiplied by susceptibility values of the 
corresponding WT section (as described in Section 4.3.4), but also by the total ship 
susceptibility percentage. For the remaining Category 1 and 2 PMs, values of which 
were based on repair man-hour data (i.e., PMs 1.5-1.7 and 1.11-1.15, Table 4.3; PMs 
2.1, 2.2, 2.6 and 2.7, Table 4.4), the number of man-hours to repair the relevant item 
were multiplied not only by the susceptibility of the hit WT section (as described in 
Section 4.3.4), but also by the total ship susceptibility and the vulnerability of that item, 
given a hit in that WT section. 
Similarly, for Category 3 PM analysis, Table 4.5, the procedure summarised in 
Section 4.3.3 was followed, however, on this occasion, vulnerability data of the relevant 
equipment/compartments were multiplied by the number of man-hours required to 
repair them in order to obtain the value of each PM for each major system. These PM 
values were then multiplied by the total ship susceptibility, as well as that of the WT 
section in question. Regarding all PMs which account for secondary effects (i.e. 
Category 2 and 3 PMs), the additional vulnerability due to fire effects was included in 
the PM scoring procedure by using the output of SURVIVE Lite’s Fast Fire method 
(Sharp 2011) (see Section 3.3.4). The reason why store and personnel related PMs were 
only multiplied by susceptibility data (without involving vulnerability) was that since 
the time for these items to recover was assumed to be infinite (Table 4.10), 
multiplication of the recovery time by the items’ vulnerability resulted in an infinite 
solution. Therefore, once again, the PMs were given a value of zero if the item remained 
unaffected and unity if it were affected by a given hit. This was then multiplied by the 
total ship susceptibility and the WT section susceptibility, as explained above.  
This proposed procedure involves multiplications of susceptibility, vulnerability 
and recoverability data, which is questionable. However, it was decided to carry out this 
process on several ship designs (see Section 6.7) for comparison purposes, and examine 
emergent advantages and disadvantages which are summarised in Section 7.4.2. 
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Chapter 5: Ship Design Studies 
 
 This chapter gives a description of the ship designs to which the survivability 
assessment method was applied. In total, seven designs were developed. Five were 
combatant type ships and included three frigate variants (one of which adopted a 
trimaran hullform), a corvette and a destroyer. The remaining two design studies were 
AOR type ships with varying internal and external configuration. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, survivability is largely dependent on ship 
architecture. Moreover, the recoverability assessment method developed was aimed at 
looking specifically at how ship layout affects recovery from attack damage. It was 
therefore decided that the ship designs on which the survivability method should be 
applied would be designed by means of an architecturally orientated preliminary ship 
design approach. Further advantages when using a configurationally orientated 
preliminary design process were discussed in Section 2.1.4. It was concluded that the 
Design Building Block approach to preliminary ship design, through its SURFCON 
implementation in the Paramarine CASD software (Section 2.1.5), which has been 
extensively used and proven by the Design Research Centre of the Marine Research 
Group of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at UCL 
(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/mecheng/research/marine), would be the most appropriate 
architecturally orientated preliminary design approach to utilise. The above procedure to 
preliminary ship design was described in (Andrews and Pawling 2003). The method of 
‘circles of influence’ proposed by Andrews (1984; 1986) in order to appropriately 
position a ship’s principal compartments and build up its architecture, Figure 2.5, was 
extensively used, through specific detailed frigate related ‘circles of influence’ diagrams 
which were published by Dicks (2000). 
All ship studies designed in this investigation were designed and sized according 
to the procedures, data and parametric relationships available for the ship design 
projects in the MSc in Naval Architecture at UCL (UCL 2010a, UCL 2010b) and other 
references such as (UCL 2006a; UCL 2006b; Saunders 2008; IAI 2009; Wartsila 2010; 
Vestdavit 2012). In addition all studies were designed with the intent of maximising 
survivability based on relevant literature summarised in Appendix 4. For example, 
concentration and separation of duplicated systems was incorporated and all 
superstructure sides were designed with a 7o tumblehome. 
 GAs of all ships designed are included in Appendix 8. 
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5.1 Frigate Design Studies 
 
Frigate type ships are the most common, blue water capable, type of warship, 
providing a point of reference for most new developments in naval ship design. Three 
general purpose, general ocean going sea control frigates were designed, all of which 
were fitted with an identical weapon fit, listed in Table 5.1. The same table conveys the 
main payload equipment corresponding to the major Fight systems which were assessed 
in the vulnerability and recoverability methods described above. However, it should be 
noted that each Fight system includes further items such as sensors, control rooms and 
power generation units (full system diagrams are shown in Appendix 7). 
 
Table 5.1: Frigate Payload 
Payload Equipment FIGHT Systems 
1 × BAE Systems 155mm gun Medium calibre naval gun system 
2 × 4 Harpoon launchers ASM system 
4 × MBDA MICA PDMS with 32 MICA missiles 
(4 x 8 round VL launchers) 
Aft/fwd SAM system 
1 × Lynx (Kestrel) Helicopter + hangar and single 
spot flight deck for EH-101Merlin 
Helicopter system 
2 × MSI Seahawk 30mm 
2 × Triple barrel torpedo tubes 
4 × Rheinmetall MASS Decoy Launchers 
1 × Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System 
2 × Navigation radars 
1 × Single Face SR STAR Surveillance Radar 
1 × General Purpose Electro Optical Device 
2 × Thales Sirius IRST 
1 × Raytheon AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Shipboard ESM/ 
ECM System 
1 × Spherion hull mounted sonar 
1 × Small ship communications system (1 × 
communications mast + 2 × whip antennae) 
1 × Generic Satellite Communications System 
with 2 antennae 
25 Embarked forces 
Other payload (certain sensors are 
part of the major Fight systems 
above; for full system tree 
diagrams see Appendix 7) 
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In addition, all three frigates had the same performance requirements, listed in 
Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Frigate Performance Requirements Adopted for Design Studies 
Maximum speed 30kts 
Endurance 7,000nm at 15kts 
Stores 30 days 
Stability 
Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) intact and damage criteria 
assessment (MOD 2000) 
Zoning 4 zones with maximum independence 
 
 A summary of the principal particulars of the three frigate variants is given in 
Table 5.3, with GAs in Appendix 8. Note that Variant 3 adopted a trimaran 
configuration. 
 
Table 5.3: Principal Particulars of the Frigate Variants Investigated 
Variant 1 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Parameters 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
132.2m (125.8m) × 16.1m (15.2m) × 9.7m (deep draught 4.0m); deep trim 0.6m, light trim 
0.8m 
CB: 0.487, CP: 0.596, CM: 0.818, CW: 0.755, Circular M: 8.1 
3,890te deep, 3,270te light 
30.5kts 
7,100nm at 15kts, 6,000nm at 18kts 
1 × 31MW GT (boost), 2 × 2.94MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 2.69MW diesels (auxiliary) 
driving two FPPs on 20MW HTS motors  
11 officers, 137 ratings, 25 embarked forces 
Variant 2 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Parameters 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
125.2m (119.0m) × 16.1m (15.3m) × 12.1m (deep draught 4.4m); deep trim 0.4m, light 
trim 0.4m 
CB: 0.487, CP: 0.596, CM: 0.816, CW: 0.761, Circular M: 7.6 
4,060te deep, 3,450te light 
30.4kts 
7,000nm at 15kts, 5,900nm at 18kts 
1 × 31MW GT (boost), 2 × 5.22MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 2.69MW diesels (auxiliary) 
driving two FPPs on 21MW HTS motors  
11 officers, 141 ratings, 25 embarked forces 
Variant 3 
Dimensions 
 
 
Hullform Parameters 
 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
Overall: 150.3m × 29.2m × 12.3m (deep draught 5.2m); deep trim 0.6m, light trim 0.9m 
Main hull: 150.3m (144.2m) × 11.6m (10.4m) × 12.3m (deep draught 5.2m) 
Side hulls: 51.2m (42.4m) × 3.7m (1.7m) × 9.2m (deep draught 2.7m) 
Main hull: CB: 0.532, CP: 0.638, CM: 0.834, CW: 0.831, Cir. M: 9.0 
Side hulls: CB: 0.138, CP: 0.669, CM: 0.207, CW: 0.678, Cir. M: 11.3 
4,330te deep (4,230te + 2 × 50te), 3,820te light 
31.3kts 
7,000nm at 15kts, 5,900nm at 18kts 
1 × 31MW GT (boost), 2 × 2.94MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 2.69MW diesels (auxiliary) 
driving one FPP on a 37MW HTS motor and one pump-jet on a 3.5MW HTS motor 
12 officers, 152 ratings, 25 embarked forces 
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 The complements and accommodation requirements of the frigate design studies 
(breakdowns of which are given in Appendix 9.1) were sized based on current 
combatants’ complement/displacement densities calculated from sources such as 
Saunders (2008). 
 
5.1.1 Baseline Frigate 
 
 The baseline frigate (Frigate Variant 1), shown in Figure 5.1, is a typical modern 
frigate with a one passing deck hull and a continuous superstructure out to ship’s side. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Frigate Variant 1 Ship Design Study 
 
It has previously been argued (Section 2.1.4) that a functional breakdown of a 
naval ship is more relevant to a weight breakdown, which is the current practice. The 
broad objectives of a warship have been determined as: ‘to float, to move, to fight’ 
(Brown and Tupper 1989). Therefore, the functional breakdown should be expressed in 
terms of these three groups (Float, Move, Fight) plus the addition of an Infrastructure 
group as argued by Andrews et al (1996). This functional breakdown was used when 
designing the ships, as illustrated in Figure 5.2 for Frigate Variant 1. 
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Float
 
Move 
 
Fight 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Figure 5.2: Frigate Variant 1 Top Level Functional Breakdown 
 
Furthermore, Frigate Variant 1 is described with respect to its top level weight 
breakdown in Table A8 of Appendix 9.2, and the margin philosophy adopted for this 
design is summarised in Appendix 9.3. 
 The hull of the baseline design is based on that of the Type 22 Frigate and was 
generated using the Quickhull object of Paramarine. The lines plan is shown in Figure 
5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Frigate Variant 1 Lines Plan 
 
The propulsive powering requirements were computed using the inbuilt 
Paramarine powering module (see Appendix 9.4). The machinery that was selected 
consisted of:- 
- 2 × 2.94MW Wartsila 9L26 diesel gensets (cruise); 
- 1 × 31MW Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine, electrical drive (boost); 
- 2 × 2.69MW Wartsila 16V200 diesel gensets (auxiliary). 
The above machinery, driving two FPPs on 20MW HTS motors. Figure 5.4 illustrates 
the arrangement of the selected machinery, auxiliary machinery shown in green 
(Infrastructure functional group), and main machinery in yellow (move functional 
group). This is closely related to the move major system, which was modelled in the 
vulnerability and recoverability assessment approach, without, however, including 
steering control units and rudders. Whole major system architecture and tree diagrams 
are included in Appendix 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Frigate Variant 1 Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
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It is clear that the adoption of IFEP has led to the opportunity of widely 
separating the power generation units (which are in parallel) across the length of the 
frigate, which leads to significant vulnerability reduction, as summarised in Appendix 
4.2. However, this led to the unconventional forward Wartsila 16V200 exhaust 
arrangement, extending through No 2 Deck until it merges with the gas turbine exhaust 
since no superstructure is located above this genset. Another vulnerability reduction 
feature is the fact that short propeller shafts are possible (although this has led to a 
relatively large declination angle). Removal routes for all engines were taken into 
account through the inclusion of soft patches in the passageways and compartments 
above each engine. 
 The hydrostatics of the baseline frigate were also computed using the inbuilt 
Paramarine module. Intact stability was assessed against Defence Standard 02-109 
(NES 109) Stability Standards for Surface Ships (MOD 2000) until all criteria were 
passed. Damage stability (of both deep and light conditions) was assessed against 
Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) damage criteria assessment (MOD 2000). 
Hydrostatics data are given in Appendix 9.5. 
 It should be mentioned that seakeeping, structural and manoeuvring analysis 
were not carried out due to the preliminary nature of the design. 
 Figure 5.5 displays the twelve WT bulkheads (and thirteen WT sections) which 
are comprised in the hull of the baseline frigate. It should be noted that the bulkhead 
locations were set by taking into account zoning, structural, layout and damage stability 
related factors. In order to maintain structural continuity, bulkheads were located at the 
forward and aft superstructure ends, after cut-up, masts, 155mm gun and at every 
location where there is a step in the superstructure. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Frigate Variant 1 WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
The three bulkheads shown in red in Figure 5.5 constitute the main zone 
boundaries. From aft to forward, each zone consisted of 3, 2, 3 and 5 WT sections 
respectively. Each of the four zones contains independent power generation units, CWP, 
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HPAC, FP, ATU and ventilation, NBCD stores, and airlocks for access to and from the 
citadel/weather, as shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Machinery Room Arrangement 
 
ATU and Ventilation Arrangement 
 
NBCD Stores 
 
Airlocks 
 
Figure 5.6: Frigate Variant 1 Zoning Philosophy 
 
Each zones power generation unit, CWP, HPAC and FP is located in its 
machinery room. MMR2, in which the Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine is located 
(Figure 5.4), extends along the length of two adjacent WT sections since, due to the 
GTs size, its alternator was placed in a separate WT section from of the engine. ATU 
and ventilation compartments are located close to areas requiring such services, such as 
machinery rooms and living spaces (Appendix 8). Moreover, they are located at a 
reasonable distance from the waterline. NBCD stores are located in proximity to the 
airlocks. Airlocks 1 and 4 lead to the aft and forward mooring spaces respectively, 
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airlock 2 leads to the hangar and airlock 3 leads the forward weather deck. In addition, 
airlocks 1 and 3 are positioned adjacent to cleansing/decontamination stations. 
 It was also attempted to distribute the major Fight systems (which were 
modelled in the vulnerability and the recoverability assessment method) in accordance 
to the zonal arrangements. Each zone contained the main equipment items of at least 
one of the five major Fight systems (medium calibre naval gun system, ASM system, 
aft SAM system, forward SAM system and helicopter system). This not only led to the 
specialisation of each zone in a specific type of warfare/operations, but also assisted in 
the concentration of items in series of a particular system, therefore decreasing the 
systems vulnerability (Appendix 4.2). This is clearly illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Frigate Variant 1 Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
Due to the conventional nature of the baseline frigate, it was relatively easy to 
achieve the zonal distribution of the major Fight systems. Only the sonobuoy store of 
the helicopter system (the forward-most compartment of that system) was not managed 
to be located in the same zone as the remaining equipment and compartments of that 
system. However, it is important to point out that Figure 5.7 illustrates only the 
equipment items that are solely related to each of the major Fight systems. Items such as 
sensors, power generation units and centralised command and control (e.g.: Operations 
Room) spaces are not included. Whole major system architecture and tree diagrams are 
included in Appendix 7. 
 Being a conventional modern frigate, it was decided that the access philosophy 
adopted for the baseline would be that used in similar existing warships. The hull 
consisted of 4 decks, one of which, No 2 Deck or the DC deck, was a passing deck. The 
DC deck contained a centreline passageway and each WT section included two vertical 
accesses, one at either side of the centreline passageway and at the forward and aft end 
of each WT section respectively. This is summarised in Figure 5.8 below, and detailed 
in the GA, Appendix 8. 
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DC Deck Access 
 
DC Deck Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.8: Frigate Variant 1 Access Philosophy 
 
 It is of significance to examine the location of the compartments and equipment 
related to each of the recoverability related PMs (Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). Some 
of the elements, e.g.: access, WTD (each WT bulkheads has one on the DC deck), ATU 
and ventilation and NBCD stores have been separately examined. However it would be 
useful to study the entirety of each PM Category. Figure 5.9 illustrates the distribution 
of compartments and equipment related to Category 1 PM analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Frigate Variant 1 Category 1 PM Elements 
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PM 1.1 will be calculated along the centreline DC passageway and PM 1.4 
would be based on the width of the passageway, given that there are no alternative 
routes. In addition, the number of internal decks in each WT section is clear from Figure 
5.9 and the value of PM 1.2 is equal to the number of WT bulkheads crossed by each 
FRP. The two FRP section bases are positioned conveniently to a NBCD store. 
Furthermore, each FRP section base is situated at a WT section bordering a main zone 
boundary, for quicker access to the adjacent zone. This way, it can be said that each of 
the two FRPs are responsible for 2 zones. Note that the firepumps have been collocated 
with the power generation units in Figure 5.9, since they are both positioned in the 
machinery rooms, as previously stated. The Operations Room is located deep in the hull 
(No 3 Deck as in the Type 23 Frigate (Manley 2012)) in order to decrease vulnerability 
to abovewater attacks; although this could lead to an increase in underwater incidents. 
The SCC is situated at a distance from the Operations Room so that, in case of an 
emergency, it could be utilised as a secondary Operations Room. Finally, the bridge and 
the Operations Room are located at the same WT section in order to improve access and 
communication between the two spaces in which the CO is mostly stationed. All other 
elements are located with respect to the zoning arrangements as described above. 
 Similarly, Figure 5.10 depicts the arrangement of Category 2 PM analysis (as 
well as access measure of Category 3 PMs) related elements.  
 
 
Figure 5.10: Frigate Variant 1 Category 2 PM Elements 
 
Note the proximity of the aft and forward workshops with the aft and forward 
spare gear stores respectively, one of the many relationships obtained from the ‘circles 
of influence’ diagrams presented by Dicks (2000). In addition, the two groups of 
workshops and spare gears stores were separated as much as reasonably possible, and 
are located convenient to the machinery rooms for easier and quicker access. The choice 
of location of the naval stores was principally based on factors such as trim and 
available (void) space since it is not involved in any complicated architectural 
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relationships. Category 3 PM analysis involves all of the components of each major ship 
system; system architecture illustrations are included in Appendix 7. 
 
5.1.2 Frigate Variants 
 
The baseline frigate (Frigate Variant 1) was intended to represent a typical 
conventional modern frigate type ship. The following two frigate variants would 
therefore depart from the conventional style of the baseline. Frigate Variant 2, Figure 
5.11, is characterised by the adoption of a deeper, two passing deck hull and a minimal 
superstructure, and was influenced by the work done by Begg et al (1990). A similar 
variant was designed by Percival (2010). 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Frigate Variant 2 Ship Design Study 
 
The choice of these features were aimed at the exploration of survivability 
related advantages of such configurations, such as improved DC due to the second 
passing deck, therefore providing unrestricted access over the length of the ship on two 
decks (Begg et al 1990), and lower RCS due to the small superstructure (Begg et al 
1990). In addition, this feature also allowed the location of the flight deck close to 
amidships, which presents some operational advantages, since the optimum location for 
aviation facilities is at amidships where motions are kept to a minimum and the 
helicopters operational effectiveness is enhanced (Lloyd and Hanson 1985; Brown 
1991) (see Appendix 2). 
 For the third and final variant, Frigate Variant 3, Figure 5.12, a trimaran 
configuration was selected, therefore, departing even more from the style of modern 
conventional frigates. 
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Figure 5.12: Frigate Variant 3 Ship Design Study 
 
The intention was to investigate the possible advantages of this unconventional 
hull type. Since trimarans in the naval domain are relatively recent (with only one 
warship design currently in service, the USN’s Independence Class LCS (Naval War 
College 2002)) various UCL designed trimaran warships as well as the UCL ship design 
procedure for trimarans (UCL 2010a) were investigated in order to overcome the 
problems associated with the lack of data. As observed in Figure 5.12 and Appendix 8, 
the trimarans superstructure is relatively minimal (due to the large internal volume of 
the box structure) and was split into two structurally separate blocks, one slightly aft 
and one slightly forward of amidships. Another interesting feature was that, due to the 
requirement of a 3.5m minimum air gap to the underside of the box structure (arising 
from requirements to minimise slamming), as well as due to the narrow beam of the 
main hull which made the incorporation of the main machinery and systems 
challenging, a fifth deck (which however was not a ‘through-deck’) was included in this 
ship design study. 
 Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 describe the two frigate variants in terms of the 
‘Float, Move, Fight, Infrastructure’ top level functional breakdown, similar to Figure 
5.2 for the baseline frigate design. 
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Figure 5.13: Frigate Variant 2 Top Level Functional Breakdown 
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Figure 5.14: Frigate Variant 3 Top Level Functional Breakdown 
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A number of observations can be made with regards to those two frigate 
variants. For example, the relatively small superstructures of both ship designs have 
made possible the location of their flight decks close to amidships. However, they have 
also decreased the distance between sensors (possibly causing interference problems 
and increasing vulnerability), caused a concentration of the fight functional group at 
amidships to a greater extent than the baseline frigate (which could lead to increased 
vulnerability) and introduced difficulties in the arrangement of exhausts and intakes. 
Also noticeable is that the Infrastructure functional group of the trimaran is largely 
concentrated in No 2 Deck, i.e. in the box structure (to a much greater extent than 
Frigate Variants 1 and 2). This arises from the very large overall beam of the trimaran 
and has simplified the architectural design of this frigate by easing the achievement of 
the architectural relationships of the ‘circles of influence’. Furthermore, it has 
minimised the need for a large superstructure or an extra passing deck.  
Frigate Variants 2 and 3 are described in terms of their top level weight 
breakdowns in Table A9 and Table A10 of Appendix 9.2 (similar to Table A8 for the 
baseline frigate design). In addition, the margin philosophy adopted is discussed in 
Appendix 9.3. 
 From the functional breakdown comparison above and the weight breakdown 
comparison in Appendix 9.2 between these three designs, it is evident that radically 
different conclusions can be drawn by investigating a functional (therefore, 
architectural) or a weight breakdown of a ship design. In Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, the 
fact that novel hullform configuration, such as trimarans, are not encouraged when 
merely examining the weight breakdown of a ship design was pointed out (Andrews and 
Dicks 1997; Andrews and Pawling 2009), and has been observed from the three designs 
produced for this survivability investigation. It follows that a new ship design must be 
described architecturally, in terms of its functional breakdown, and also (traditionally) 
in terms of its weight breakdown, in order for one to be able to justify the selected 
design. 
 Similar to the baseline frigate, the hull of Frigate Variant 2 (Figure 5.15) is also 
based on that of the Type 22 Frigate and was generated using the Quickhull object of 
Paramarine. 
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Figure 5.15: Frigate Variant 2 Lines Plan 
 
Furthermore, the propulsive powering requirements for Frigate Variant 2 were 
computed in the same manner as for Frigate Variant 1 (see Appendix 9.4). The 
machinery selected consisted of:- 
- 2 × 5.22MW Wartsila 16V26 diesel gensets (cruise); 
- 1 × 31MW Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine, electrical drive (boost); 
- 2 × 2.69MW Wartsila 16V200 diesel gensets (auxiliary). 
The above machinery driving two FPPs on 21MW HTS motors. The arrangement of the 
above Move related machinery is portrayed in Figure 5.16. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Frigate Variant 2 Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
 
The above arrangement is almost identical to that of Frigate Variant 1 (Figure 
5.4), therefore, presenting the same conclusions regarding the reduced vulnerability due 
to the widely separated power generation units and the short, but declined, propeller 
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shafts (arising from the adoption of IFEP). The wide separation of the engines has once 
again led to the unconventional forward Wartsila 16V200 exhaust arrangement, due to 
the absence of superstructure above it. Unlike in the baseline frigate, the forward 
auxiliary exhaust has to extend through two decks (rather than one), before merging 
with the gas turbine exhaust, due to the deeper, 5-deck, hull of Frigate Variant 2. 
However, the only major difference is the fact that, due to the minimal superstructure of 
Frigate Variant 2, superstructure is absent above the aft auxiliary and both cruise 
gensets. This has led to the implementation of side exhausts for these three engines. The 
side exhausts are located starboard, just aft of the flight deck, consequently, should not 
interfere with helicopter operations. Moreover, since these particular engines exhaust 
closer to the waterline, the ships IR signature would also decrease (Dicker 1986; 
Afanasieff and Mabry 1994), as mentioned in Appendix 4.1. However, this could 
introduce problems related to the insertion of seawater through the exhausts; in addition, 
exhaust stains on the hull would make the ship more visible and would require more 
maintenance. As with the baseline design, removal routes for all engines were taken into 
account through the inclusion of soft patches in the passageways and compartments 
above each engine. 
 The trimaran hull of Frigate Variant 3, the lines plan of which is shown in 
Figure 5.17, was generated by use of a UCL developed algorithm. 
 
Main hull 
 
Side hulls 
 
Figure 5.17: Frigate Variant 3 Lines Plan 
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The propulsive powering requirements were computed using a UCL developed 
program based on the Holtrop & Mennen method (see Appendix 9.4). The machinery 
that was selected consisted of:- 
- 2 × 2.94MW Warstila 9L26 diesel gensets (cruise); 
- 1 × 31MW Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine, electrical drive (boost); 
- 2 × 2.69MW Wartsila 16V200 diesel gensets (auxiliary). 
A major difference in the power and propulsion system between Frigate Variant 3 and 
the first two variants is that, due to the narrow main hull, a double shaft (therefore, two 
motor) arrangement could not be facilitated. However, containing merely a single shaft 
was deemed unacceptable for survivability and availability reasons. Furthermore, the 
side hulls, being even narrower, restricted access and impeded the addition of large 
equipment items, such as of secondary propulsive units, in them. It was, in fact, decided 
to keep the space inside the side hulls void, not only for the reasons mentioned above, 
but also so that one side hull can be ballasted, if the other is damaged (Andrews and 
Zhang 1995; Andrews and Pawling 2008) as summarised in Appendix 2.2.  Therefore, it 
was concluded that a secondary propulsive unit, and more specifically a pump-jet 
(Schottel 2010a), would be included in the forward end of the ship design. The 
machinery listed above, therefore, drove a single FPP on a 37MW HTS motor and a 
single Schottel SPJ 520 Pump-Jet on a 3.5MW HTS motor. Figure 5.18 illustrates the 
arrangement of the above machinery for the trimaran frigate variant. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18: Frigate Variant 3 Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
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The power and propulsion arrangement of Frigate Variant 3 presents the most 
dissimilarities compared to the first two frigate design variants, although still benefiting 
from the widely separated power generation units and relatively short (but declined) 
shaft, therefore, reducing vulnerability, due to the IFEP system. The most noticeable 
difference is the separate forward and aft propulsive units. The large separation of the 
two parallel units should have a profound effect on the vulnerability of the move major 
system. Another main differences between the trimaran and the other two designs is that 
the two Wartsila 9L26 cruise gensets had to be moved one compartment forward, 
therefore, closer to amidships, adjacent to the WT sections containing the gas turbine 
boost engine. This is because, the narrow main hull beam of the trimaran only permitted 
the placement of the two relatively large engines at an amidships compartment due to 
volumetric constraints towards the extremities of the main hull. In addition the 37MW 
HTS motor (the largest motor used in all of the three design variants) could not fit in the 
aft auxiliary machinery compartment (where the aft Wartsila 16V200 was located) 
which was the practice in the first two variants, again due to the limited volume towards 
the ends of the trimarans main hull. The motor was thus moved one WT section 
forward, therefore, increasing the shaft length, but decreasing its declination angle 
value. The overall effect was to concentrate machinery at the amidships part of the ship 
to a greater extent than in the monohull designs. It could be argued that this 
arrangement increased the vulnerability of the power and propulsion related equipment 
(which are in parallel) of the trimaran, but the protection provided by the side hulls to 
attacks from torpedoes and missiles (Andrews and Zhang 1995; Andrews and Pawling 
2008) should more than cancel this effect. 
It is of interest to briefly describe the exhaust arrangements of Frigate Variant 3. 
This ship has the largest overall length (Table 5.3), therefore, the most WT bulkheads 
implying larger zones. Due to the longer zones, the forward Wartsila 16V200 auxiliary 
genset was placed at a large distance from the GT. Again, there is no superstructure 
above the forward auxiliary engine, however, the large distance from the gas turbine 
inhibits the combination of the exhausts of the two engines (which was the principle 
followed during the design of the first two variants) due to the large number of bulkhead 
penetrations required. This led to the solution of an underwater exhaust arrangement. 
The effects of this were to decrease vulnerability of the auxiliary genset (at least to 
abovewater threats) due to its smaller footprint and to reduce the IR signature of the 
ship by eliminating the exhaust plume (Heather 1990; Foxwell 1990a). However, 
underwater exhausts worsen the acoustic signature of ships (Heather 1990) and raise 
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back pressure and corrosion related issues (Dicker 1986; Belcher 2008) as was 
summarised in Appendix 4.1. Other noteworthy aspects of the exhaust arrangements are 
that the cruise engines exhaust to the side of the main hull (between the main and the 
side hulls), and the aft auxiliary engine exhausts at the aft end (also due to the absence 
of superstructure above it). As in Frigate Variant 2, this arrangement should decrease 
the IR signature of the ship due to the close to waterline exhaust (Dicker 1986; 
Afanasieff and Mabry 1994) and the shielding effect of the side hulls regarding the 
cruise engines exhausts. However, it could introduce problems related to the insertion of 
seawater through the exhausts and would increase maintenance requirements due to 
exhaust stains on the hull. Nevertheless, a unique advantage of a trimaran is the ability 
of the side hulls to conceal the exhaust stains, therefore, not affecting the visual 
signature and reducing the need for maintenance. The aft auxiliary exhaust is located 
starboard, well aft of the flight deck, and the cruise engines exhaust plumes are shielded 
by the box structure, therefore, not interfering with helicopter operations. Removal 
routes for all engines were taken into account through the inclusion of soft patches in 
the passageways and compartments above each engine, as was done for the first two 
variants. 
 Similarly to the baseline frigate, the hydrostatics of Frigate Variants 2 and 3 
were computed using the inbuilt Paramarine module. Intact stability was assessed 
against Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) Stability Standards for Surface Ships 
(MOD 2000) until all criteria were passed. Damage stability (of both deep and light 
conditions) was assessed against Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) damage criteria 
assessment (MOD 2000). Hydrostatics data are given in Appendix 9.5. 
 The WT bulkhead arrangements of Frigate Variants 2 and 3 are visible in Figure 
5.19 and Figure 5.20.  
 
 
Figure 5.19: Frigate Variant 2 WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
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Figure 5.20: Frigate Variant 3 WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
The bulkhead locations were decided upon using the same criteria as for the 
baseline frigate. Frigate Variant 2 included the same number of WT bulkheads as the 
baseline (twelve bulkheads, thirteen WT sections), while the longer hull of Frigate 
Variant 3 contained thirteen WT bulkheads and fourteen WT sections. 
 In order to maintain consistency, all frigate variants had the same number of 
zones, i.e. four. The red bulkheads in Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 represent the zone 
boundaries. Frigate Variant 2 is identical to the baseline in that, from aft to forward, 
each zone contains 3, 2, 3 and 5 WT sections. The zones of the trimaran frigate on the 
other hand comprise of 3, 3, 3 and 5 WT sections respectively. Each of the four zones 
contains independent power generation units, CWP, HPAC, FP and ATU and 
ventilation. Due to the relatively small superstructure length of Frigate Variant 2 it 
proved difficult (and unreasonable since the superstructure in its totality is in the same 
zone) to include airlocks and NBCD stores in all four zones, so they were only fitted in 
three zones. Oppositely, Frigate Variant 3 included NBCD stores and airlocks for access 
to and from the citadel/weather in all zones, similarly to Frigate Variant 1. This is 
clearly shown in Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22. 
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Figure 5.21: Frigate Variant 2 Zoning Philosophy 
 
From above, it is evident that the arrangement of the MMRs and AMRs (which 
contain each zones power generation unit, CWP, HPAC and FP) is identical to that of 
the baseline frigate (Figure 5.6). MMR2 extends along the length of two adjacent WT 
sections in order to accommodate the engine and alternator of the large Rolls-Royce 
MT30 marine gas turbine (Figure 5.16); as in the baseline the alternator was placed in a 
separate WT section from of the engine due to size limitations. Another similarity to the 
baseline design is the placement of ATU and ventilation compartments close to spaces 
such as machinery rooms and living spaces (Appendix 8), and NBCD stores in 
proximity to the airlocks. However, NBCD store 1 is situated one WT section forward 
of airlock 1. This arrangement was chosen since the location of the ASM launchers 
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(which will be examined later in this section) did not allow enough space for both 
compartments (Appendix 8). Furthermore, since each FRP section base is situated at a 
WT section bordering a main zone boundary as previously mentioned, and each section 
base should be adjacent to a NBCD store, the location of NBCD store 1 is convenient in 
that positioning the aft FRP section base adjacent to it (as will be later observed) meets 
both requirements. Airlock 1 leads above the aft mooring space, airlock 4 leads inside 
the forward mooring space, airlock 2 leads both to the hangar and the flight deck while 
airlock 3 leads to the forward weather deck. From Figure 5.21 it becomes observable 
why it was illogical to include an airlock (and NBCD store) in the second from aft zone 
given that the entire superstructure was in the third zone. Airlocks 1 and 3 are 
positioned adjacent to cleansing/decontamination stations. 
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Figure 5.22: Frigate Variant 3 Zoning Philosophy 
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In Frigate Variant 3 the two main machinery rooms are adjacent due to the space 
constraints of the narrow main hull beam mentioned above. However, the separation 
between the two auxiliary machinery rooms (containing smaller engines, therefore, able 
to be located at the ships extremities) and main machinery rooms has increased due to 
the presence of more WT sections in the longer trimaran and therefore, compensates for 
the increased vulnerability of the concentrated MMRs. As with the two other frigate 
variants, MMR2, in which the Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine is located (Figure 
5.18), extends along the length of two adjacent WT sections, one containing the engine 
and the other the alternator. Moreover, each machinery room is three decks deep (as 
opposed to the two deck depth of the equivalent compartments in the first two variants) 
in order to accommodate all machinery and equipment (such as power generation units, 
CWP, HPAC and FP) in the narrow hull (and in order to meet the 3.5m minimum air 
gap to the underside of the box structure requirement (Appendix 2.2). For the location 
of ATU and ventilation, a similar philosophy to that for the first two variants was used. 
This led to the positioning of ATU and ventilation 2 and 3 in adjacent WT sections. 
Although this gives an impression of increased vulnerability, it is important to note that 
the separation between the two spaces in the y direction is relatively large, due to them 
being placed at the port and starboard side respectively of the wide box structure 
connecting the three hulls (Appendix 8). However, ATU and ventilation spaces are 
assumed to not be cross-connected, but independent for each zone, as mentioned in 
Section 4.3.1 and PM 1.5, Table 4.3, therefore, their separation distances are of minor 
importance. A similar philosophy has also been used in the adjacency of NBCD stores 
and airlocks. The main point to note is that in the trimaran frigate variant NBCD store 4 
and airlock 4 are separated by two WT bulkheads. This is because each FRP section 
base should be located adjacent to a NBCD store and a main zone boundary, and it was 
decided to locate the forward section base next to NBCD store 4. NBCD store 3 could 
also have been moved forward, by just 1 WT section, to meet the adjacency 
requirements. However, since one of the two cleansing and decontamination stations 
was located next to airlock 3 (the other being at airlock 1), it was decided that the 
location of its corresponding NBCD store was a higher priority. Airlock 1 leads above 
the aft mooring spaces, airlock 2 leads to the hangar and flight deck, airlock 3 leads to 
the forward weather deck and airlock 4 leads inside the forward mooring spaces. 
 Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24 illustrate the arrangement of the main equipment 
items that are related to each of the major Fight systems which were modelled in the 
vulnerability and the recoverability assessment method, for Frigate Variants 2 and 3. As 
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in Figure 5.7 for Frigate Variant 1, items solely related to each Fight system are shown, 
therefore, neglecting items such as sensors, power generation units and centralised 
command and control spaces. 
 
 
Figure 5.23: Frigate Variant 2 Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
It is clear that for Frigate Variant 2 the distribution of the major Fight systems in 
accordance to the zoning arrangements has not been achieved to the same level as in the 
baseline. This is mainly due to the disruptions caused by the large footprint of the 
helicopter system, in combination with the small superstructure which is entirely in the 
same zone. The hangar, sonobuoy store and all helicopter maintenance and store spaces 
are inevitably located in the superstructure (including a below decks hangar with a lift 
arrangement was not considered due to cost implications). The superstructure, being in 
its entirety in the same zone, dictates that all other spaces (flight deck, magazine, 
weapon lift and AVCAT tank) have to be located in a separate, adjacent, zone. 
Therefore, the helicopter system extends over two adjacent zones, forcing the ASM 
system and aft SAM system to be located at the same aft-most zone. Moreover, the 
positioning of the harpoon launchers below decks, (Appendix 8) (to not obstruct 
helicopter operations) has led to the removal of a large portion of No 2 Deck, possibly 
leading to structural problems. The arrangement of the forward SAM system and 
medium calibre naval gun system is identical to that of the baseline, since the forward 
parts of both variants are largely similar. Another difficulty arising from the small 
superstructure configuration is the fact that the hangar (located on the port side 
(Appendix 8)) extends through a WT bulwark, therefore, removing approximately half 
of that WT bulwark above No 2 Deck. This could also lead to structural deficiencies. In 
addition, the positioning of the hangar amidships complicates the arrangement of 
uptakes and downtakes. Despite the above problems and although the specialisation of 
each zone in a specific type of warfare/operations has not satisfactorily been achieved, 
approximately the same level of concentration of equipment in series has been attained 
as in the baseline (see Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.24: Frigate Variant 3 Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
Frigate Variant 3 is the ship design that is capable of linking the major Fight 
system arrangements and the zoning arrangements to the greatest extent, despite that 
fact that it also incorporates a relatively small superstructure. This can easily be 
understood by the fact that the trimaran is the longest and widest (in terms of overall 
beam) of the three variants, therefore, allowing for a better distribution of systems. For 
example, the larger size of the second from aft zone has permitted the location of all 
helicopter system related equipment items in the same zone (with the exception of the 
aft part of the flight deck which extends over the adjacent zone, Appendix 8). (It is of 
interest that in Frigate Variants 1 and 3, the helicopter system is contained in a three 
WT section zone, while in the second variant in a two WT section zone, leading to the 
problems stated above). Additionally, the large overall beam has made possible the 
arrangement of the Harpoon launchers in a port-starboard, rather than forward-aft, 
arrangement, something unfeasible in the monohull variants, Appendix 8. The benefits 
of increased length are also observed through the separation distance between the 
medium calibre naval gun system and forward SAM system, which were located in 
adjacent WT sections in the first two variants. Thus, the trimaran configuration has 
allowed the specialisation of each zone in a specific type of warfare/operations, and 
assisted in the concentration of items in series of a particular system, therefore 
decreasing the systems vulnerability. The above remarks highlight the importance of 
increased ship length (and beam) on weapon system (upperdeck) arrangements and once 
again, the solutions presented by the trimaran configuration to the complications 
relevant in the layout of a combatant are unmistakeable. 
 A major modification between the three frigate design studies was the access 
philosophy adopted for each one. The hull of Frigate Variant 2 consisted of 5 decks, two 
of which, No 2 and No 3 Decks, were access decks. Each access deck contained a 
centreline passageway identical to the one in the baseline. In addition, similarly to the 
baseline, each WT section included two vertical accesses, one at either side of the 
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centreline passageway and at the forward and aft end of each WT section respectively. 
These arrangements are depicted in Figure 5.25, and detailed in the GA, Appendix 8. 
 
DC Decks Access 
 
DC Decks Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.25: Frigate Variant 2 Access Philosophy 
 
It is of interest to observe that the aft end of the passageway on No 3 Deck ends 
one WT section forward of the aft mooring space due to the location of the of the 
harpoon launchers (Figure 5.23). 
Conversely, the trimaran variant contained two side passageways on the DC 
deck (No 2 Deck) in the box structure which converge to a centreline passageway in the 
forward section of the hull. Two side passageways were included as it would have been 
problematic to achieve satisfactory access between spaces with a single passageway for 
a design with such a large beam. Although the hull did include a fifth deck, this was not 
a passing deck. Each WT section included two vertical accesses, one adjacent to each of 
the two side passageways and at the forward and aft end of each WT section 
respectively. Once the side passageways converged, the vertical access arrangements 
were identical to those of the first two variants. This is illustrated in Figure 5.26 and 
detailed in the GA, Appendix 8. 
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DC Deck Access 
 
DC Deck Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.26: Frigate Variant 3 Access Philosophy 
 
An interesting feature of the above access arrangements is the fact that the two 
side passageways are cross-connected in every WT section. This improves 
communication and personnel flow, however, occupies a considerable amount of space. 
Therefore, the access arrangements of the trimaran are not as efficient as those of a 
monohull (for which access between spaces is relatively easy, given the comparatively 
small beam) and contribute to the increased gross volume compared to its monohull 
equivalents. Nonetheless, side passageways do present certain advantages (described in 
Appendix 4.2), such as providing some protection to sensitive compartments and 
equipment located in between them (Begg et al 1990; Harney 2010) and providing a 
means of incorporating redundancy and separation of services by running pipes and 
cables along the side passageways (Brown 1987; Afanasieff and Mabry 1994) . 
 As with Frigate Variant 1 it is of interest to examine the location of all 
compartments and equipment relevant to the recoverability related PMs in Sections 
4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.28 below illustrate the distribution of 
compartments and equipment related to Category 1 PM analysis. 
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Figure 5.27: Frigate Variant 2 Category 1 PM Elements 
 
The arrangement of the relevant compartments in Frigate Variant 2 is similar to 
that in the baseline. The site of the (collocated) power generation units and firepumps is 
identical to the corresponding arrangement in the baseline frigate designs, as is the 
location of the Operations Room, bridge and SCC. Once again, the Operations Room is 
located deep in the hull (No 4 Deck) in order to decrease vulnerability to abovewater 
attacks (although this could lead to an increase in underwater incidents) and the bridge 
and the Operations Room are located at the same WT section in order to improve access 
and communication between the two spaces. In addition the SCC is located at a distance 
from the Operations Room in order to permit its use as a secondary Operations Room in 
emergency. The location of the FRP section bases has already been briefly mentioned. 
They are both situated adjacent to an NBCD store and a main zone boundary. However, 
due to the absence of an NBCD store in one of the zones, the location of the aft FRP 
section base is slightly less efficient than that of the baseline in that it is situated 
relatively far aft. Though, this might be compensated by the fact that, being a shorter 
ship, DC crews would travel shorter distances to reach the affected areas of the ship 
(PM 1.2) and would have a larger choice of alternative routes (PM 1.4) given the second 
access deck. All other elements are located with respect to the zoning arrangements as 
described above. 
 
 
Figure 5.28: Frigate Variant 3 Category 1 PM Elements 
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The main noticeable difference between the trimaran frigate variant and the 
other two ship designs, regarding compartments and equipment items related to 
Category 1 PM analysis, is the location of the Operations Room. Although it is again 
positioned deep in the hull (No 4 Deck) for protection from abovewater attacks, it is not 
located at the same WT section as the bridge as was the case with the first two variants. 
This is clearly due to the arrangement of the machinery (previously detailed) forcing the 
Operations Room one WT section forward of the bridge. As a general conclusion it can 
be said that the architectural design of a trimaran, although simpler (than a monohull) in 
the box structure and upperdeck, is more challenging under the DC deck, due to the 
comparatively narrow beam of the three hulls. Another aspect of the trimaran is that, for 
the FRP section bases to meet both adjacency (with a NBCD store and main zone 
boundary) requirements, they are less efficiently positioned than in the baseline, since 
they are located closer to the extremities of the hull. This arises from constraints caused 
by the relatively small, amidships, superstructure which contains two of the ships 
airlocks (Figure 5.22) to which the other two NBCD stores should be in proximity. The 
inefficient FRP section base locations are worsened by fact that DC crews would travel 
longer distances to reach the affected areas of the ship (PM 1.2) due to the ship’s length 
(although having a larger choice of alternative routes (PM 1.4) given the two side 
passageways might have a balancing effect). All other elements are located using a 
similar reasoning as for the first two variants and with respect to the zoning 
arrangements described above. 
 Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.30 illustrate the distribution of compartments and 
equipment related to Category 2 (and Category 3) PM analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.29: Frigate Variant 2 Category 2 PM Elements 
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Figure 5.30: Frigate Variant 3 Category 2 PM Elements 
 
The arrangement of these spaces in Frigate Variants 2 and 3 are almost identical 
to that of the baseline design. Workshops have been located conveniently to their 
corresponding spare gear stores and to the machinery compartments. The two groups of 
workshops and spare gear stores have been separated as much as possible, with the 
longer trimaran variant presenting clear advantages in that regard. Naval stores have 
been located by taking into account trim and available space. A feature of interest is the 
distribution of the trimarans naval stores in two decks due to insufficient space; another 
effect of the narrow main hull beam of a trimaran configuration. Category 3 PM 
analysis, in addition to the above compartments, involves all of the components of each 
major ship system; system architecture illustrations are included in Appendix 7. 
 
5.2 Corvette and Destroyer Design Studies 
 
It was decided that it would be beneficial to apply the survivability assessment 
method discussed in Chapter 4 to combatants of different sizes to investigate how ship 
size affects survivability. An obstacle associated with comparative studies is the careful 
variation of only one variable at a time. It was therefore decided that the hull 
configuration would be constant (i.e. all ships compared would be monohulls) as would 
be the major move and Fight systems modelled; only ship size would vary. A further 
two combatant design studies were carried out, one smaller combatant (corvette) and 
one larger combatant (destroyer). The two above additional combatant design studies 
were compared to the baseline frigate by applying the survivability assessment method 
outlined in Chapter 4. However, it is clear that combatants of different sizes/types 
contain different combat systems, number of zones and performance capabilities (i.e. 
“interconnected variables” (Bradbeer and Andrews 2012b)). This limitation was 
observed by Bradbeer and Andrews (2012b) who concluded that “the best that can be 
achieved is to design … which are equivalent against one metric and accept that some 
variables cannot be fixed”, therefore, the designs “can only be considered equivalent in 
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limited sense”. This led to the conclusion that in order for the design studies to be 
realistic, certain lower level variations (all connected to the high level variable of ship 
size) would have to be incorporated. Therefore, the way in which each aspect of 
survivability is affected by ship size (including varying zoning) and level of combat 
system and ship performance capabilities (appropriate to the ship type) was 
investigated. 
Two additional general purpose, general ocean going sea control combatants 
were designed. Table 5.4 below lists the payload of the three combatants.  
 
Table 5.4: Corvette, Frigate Variant 1 and Destroyer Payload 
Corvette Payload 
Equipment 
Frigate Variant 1 
Payload Equipment 
Destroyer Payload 
Equipment 
FIGHT 
Systems 
1 × Oto Melara 76mm 
Naval Gun System 1 × BAE Systems 155mm gun 
Medium 
calibre naval 
gun system 
2 × 4 Harpoon launchers ASM system 
4 × MBDA MICA PDMS with 32 MICA 
missiles (4 x 8 round VL launchers) 
6 × PAAMS ADMS 
with 48 Aster missiles 
(SYLVER A50 VLS: 
3 x 8 Aster-15 and 3 x 
8 Aster-30) 
Aft/fwd 
SAM system 
1 × Lynx (Kestrel) 
Helicopter + hangar 
and single spot flight 
deck for Lynx 
1 × Lynx (Kestrel) 
Helicopter + hangar 
and single spot flight 
deck for EH-
101Merlin 
1 × EH-101Merlin 
Helicopter + hangar 
and single spot flight 
deck for EH-
101Merlin 
Helicopter 
system 
2 × MSI Seahawk 30mm 
Other 
payload 
(certain 
sensors are 
part of the 
major Fight 
systems 
above; for 
full system 
tree diagrams 
see 
Appendix 7) 
- 
4 × Oto Melara 
12.7mm 
- 2 × Phalanx CIWS 
2 × Triple barrel torpedo tubes 
4 × Rheinmetall MASS Decoy Launchers 
1 × Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System 
2 × Navigation radars 
1 × Single Face SR STAR Surveillance Radar 2 × MFR Spectar 
1 × General Purpose Electro Optical Device 
2 × Thales Sirius IRST 
1 × Raytheon AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Shipboard ESM/ ECM System 
1 × Spherion hull mounted sonar 
1 × Small ship communications system (1 × 
communications mast + 2 × whip antennae) 
1 × Medium ship 
communications 
system (1 × 
communications mast 
+ 4 × whip antennae) 
1 × Generic Satellite Communications System with 2 antennae 
- 25 Embarked forces 50 Embarked forces 
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The table above conveys the main payload equipment corresponding to the 
major Fight systems which were assessed in the vulnerability and recoverability 
methods described in Chapter 4. The differences in the combat systems, appropriate to 
the ship type, are highlighted. (Each Fight system includes further items such as 
sensors, control rooms and power generation units; full system diagrams are shown in 
Appendix 7). 
The performance requirements of the three combatants are detailed in Table 5.5. 
The variations in issues such as zoning and ship performance capabilities appropriate to 
the ship size and type are visible. 
 
Table 5.5: Corvette, Frigate Variant 1 and Destroyer Performance Requirements 
Adopted for Design Studies 
 Corvette  Frigate Variant 1 Destroyer  
Maximum speed 30kts 
Endurance 3,000nm at 15kt 7,000nm at 15kts 8,000nm at 15kts 
Stores 10 days 30 days 45 days 
Stability 
Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) intact and damage criteria 
assessment (MOD 2000) 
Zoning 
2 zones with 
maximum 
independence 
4 zones with 
maximum 
independence 
5 zones with 
maximum 
independence 
 
In addition, increased accommodation standards from the Corvette to the 
Destroyer will be adopted due to the increasing range and stores endurances, implying a 
longer time for the crew spent at sea. 
A summary of the principal particulars of the three combatants is included in 
Figure 5.31, with GAs in Appendix 8. 
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Figure 5.31: Principal Particulars of the Corvette, Frigate Variant 1 and Destroyer 
Investigated 
Corvette 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Param. 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
 
Accommodation 
90.7m (84.5m) × 13.7m (12.2m) × 8.5m (deep draught 3.9m); deep 
trim 0.5m, light trim 0.5m 
CB: 0.451, CP: 0.615, CM: 0.733, CW: 0.745, Circular M: 7.0 
1,830te deep, 1,640te light 
29.7kts 
3,000nm at 15kts, 2,500nm at 18kts 
1 × 24.05MW GT (boost), 2 × 1.2MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 1.2MW 
diesels (auxiliary) driving one FPP on a 25.5MW HTS motor and 
one pump-jet on a 1MW HTS motor 
10 officers, 64 ratings 
Frigate Variant 1 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Param. 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
132.2m (125.8m) × 16.1m (15.2m) × 9.7m (deep draught 4.0m); 
deep trim 0.6m, light trim 0.8m 
CB: 0.487, CP: 0.596, CM: 0.818, CW: 0.755, Circular M: 8.1 
3,890te deep, 3,270te light 
30.5kts 
7,100nm at 15kts, 6,000nm at 18kts 
1 × 31MW GT (boost), 2 × 2.94MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 2.69MW 
diesels (auxiliary) driving two FPPs on 20MW HTS motors  
11 officers, 137 ratings, 25 embarked forces 
Destroyer 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Param. 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
154.0m (147.5m) × 18.9m (17.7m) × 12.4m (deep draught 4.7m); 
deep trim 0.6m, light trim 0.9m 
CB: 0.489, CP: 0.592, CM: 0.825, CW: 0.757, Circular M: 8.1 
6,250te deep, 5,120te light 
29.7kts 
8,000nm at 15kts, 7,200nm at 18kts 
1 × 31MW GT (boost), 2 × 4.08MW diesels (cruise), 2 × 5.44MW 
diesels (auxiliary) driving two FPPs on 20MW HTS motors 
22 officers, 151 ratings, 50 embarked forces 
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 Correspondingly to the three frigate variants described in Section 5.1, the 
complements and accommodation requirements of the Corvette and Destroyer designs 
were sized based on complement/displacement ratios of similar ships. Complement 
breakdowns are detailed in Appendix 9.1. 
 The two additional combatants represent a typical modern corvette and destroyer 
respectively, each with a one passing deck hull. The Destroyer (Figure 5.33) includes 
the typical five deck hull and a continuous superstructure out to ship’s side, while the 
superstructure of the Corvette (Figure 5.32) is split into two structurally separate blocks 
and its hull consists of four decks. Since the UCL MSc Ship Design Procedure (UCL 
2010a) is aimed primarily at frigate type ships, existing UCL design studies of corvettes 
and destroyers were investigated. 
 
 
Figure 5.32: Corvette Ship Design Study 
 
 
Figure 5.33: Destroyer Ship Design Study 
 
 The two additional combatants are described in terms of their top level ‘Float, 
Move, Fight, Infrastructure’ functional breakdown in Figure 5.34 and Figure 5.35. 
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Float 
 
Move 
 
Fight 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Figure 5.34: Corvette Top Level Functional Breakdown 
 
Float 
 
Move 
 
Fight 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Figure 5.35: Destroyer Top Level Functional Breakdown 
 
156 
 
Since the baseline frigate and the Corvette and Destroyer designs shown above 
all represent typical modern combatants, they present many similarities in the 
arrangement of the four top level functional groups. The main observation worth 
mentioning is the lack of fight related compartments in the lower deck (No 4 Deck) of 
the Corvette hull (Figure 5.34) with the exception of its AVCAT tanks. All other 
combatants contain magazines in their lower decks. This was not possible for the 
Corvette since machinery compartments, stores and liquids occupied the entire length of 
the lower deck due to the ships short overall length. Priority is given to these heavy 
compartments for stability considerations (Begg et al 1990; Heather 1990), as 
mentioned in Appendix 4.2. Magazines were, therefore, forced towards the higher decks 
of this ship design. Although this would improve reloading and stowing operations, it 
would also increase the vulnerability of the magazines, especially to threats such as fire, 
which could have devastating overall effects. Another effect of the Corvettes short 
length, noticeable in the illustrations above, is the decreased separation distances 
between sensors (which could result to problems similar to the ones possible, due to the 
small superstructures, in Frigate Variants 2 and 3, such as interference issues and 
increased vulnerability) and machinery compartments. Additionally, it is clear that 
moving from the smallest combatant to the largest, the footprint of the distribution of 
the Infrastructure functional group in the z axis (i.e. depth) increases, purely because of 
the increasing number of decks in the comfortable amidships area of the hull and 
superstructure. A final observation is the existence of different numbers of machinery 
compartments in each combatant. This is directly related to the zoning philosophy of 
each design study. 
The Corvette and Destroyer designs are described in terms of their top level 
weight breakdowns in Table A11 and Table A12 of Appendix 9.2. The margin 
philosophy adopted is discussed in Appendix 9.3. 
The hulls of both additional combatants were generated in an identical manner 
to that of Frigate Variants 1 and 2, i.e. the Quickhull object of Paramarine was used to 
scale a Type 22 Frigate based hull. The lines plans of the Corvette and Destroyer 
designs are illustrated in Figure 5.36 and Figure 5.37 respectively. The small L/B ratio 
and large transom beam of the Corvette design (typical in many corvettes), primarily in 
order to achieve good stability and adequate internal volume, is clearly visible. 
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Figure 5.36: Corvette Lines Plan 
 
 
Figure 5.37: Destroyer Lines Plan 
 
 The propulsive powering requirements for the Corvette were computed using the 
inbuilt Paramarine powering module (see Appendix 9.4). The machinery that was 
selected consisted of:- 
- 2 × 1.2MW Warstila 6L20 diesel gensets (cruise); 
- 1 × 24.05MW General Electric LM2500 marine gas turbine, electrical drive 
(boost); 
- 2 × 1.2MW Wartsila 6L20 diesel gensets (auxiliary). 
Similarly to the trimaran frigate variant, the small beam of the Corvette obstructed the 
use of a double shaft arrangement. Since a single shaft was unacceptable for 
survivability and availability reasons, a secondary forward propulsive unit, consisting of 
a motor and pump-jet arrangement (Schottel 2010a), was fitted. Therefore, the Corvettes 
machinery drives a single FPP propeller on a 25.5MW HTS motor and a single Schottel 
SPJ 220 Pump-Jet on a 1MW HTS motor. Figure 5.38 illustrates the arrangement of the 
above machinery, auxiliary machinery shown in green (Infrastructure functional group), 
and main machinery in yellow (move functional group). As previously noted, this is 
closely related to the move major system, which was modelled in the vulnerability and 
recoverability assessment approach. Whole major system architecture and tree diagrams 
are included in Appendix 7. 
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Figure 5.38: Corvette Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
 
A number of dissimilarities are observed between the power and propulsion of 
the Corvette and the baseline frigate, such as the placement of both auxiliary engines in 
the same compartment. This was done due to constraints imposed by the short length of 
the Corvette as well as the fact that, having a two zone requirement (Table 5.5), a 
minimum of two machinery compartments (as opposed to the four of the frigate 
variants) was acceptable. Despite the decreased number of machinery compartments, 
the relative footprint of the power and propulsion arrangement is larger than that in the 
baseline frigate, indicative of the tight arrangement inflicted by the short overall length. 
Another noticeable difference is the split forward and aft propulsive units, similar to the 
trimaran arrangement (Figure 5.18), which should strongly impact on the vulnerability 
of the move system. Furthermore, as with all frigate variants, superstructure above the 
forward-most engines is absent. An underwater exhaust arrangement of the forward 
cruise engines (similar to the trimaran) was preferred over the linkage of their exhaust 
with that of the gas turbine. This was the preferred option as it was evaluated inefficient 
to extend the exhaust of the (two) cruise engines through the relatively short (2.7m, as 
opposed to the baselines 3m, deck head height) and unique through deck of the 
Corvette, through which connectivity items (such as pipes and cables) usually traverse. 
The implications of underwater exhausts were previously discussed (Appendix 4.1) and 
include a reduction in the ships IR signature (Heather 1990; Foxwell 1990a), the 
worsening of the ships acoustic signature (Heather 1990) and the danger of confronting 
back pressure and corrosion related issues (Dicker 1986; Belcher 2008). In addition, the 
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gas turbine exhausts through the forward mast (see Appendix 8) and the two auxiliary 
engines exhaust at the forward starboard corner of the aft superstructure, therefore, not 
interfering with helicopter operations. The main similarity between the power and 
propulsion arrangements of the Corvette and baseline frigate is the reduction in 
vulnerability due to the wide separation of the (parallel) power generation units 
(Appendix 4.2) and the relatively short (but declined) shaft, arising from the IFEP 
system selected. However, the choice of this style of arrangement, in combination with 
the short hull of the Corvette, has led to the positioning of the two cruise engines quite 
far forward which could raise issues with their operation under high pitch motions. 
Removal routes for all engines were taken into account through the inclusion of soft 
patches in the passageways and compartments above each engine. 
 The propulsive power requirements of the Destroyer were also estimated 
through the inbuilt Paramarine module (see Appendix 9.4). The machinery selected 
consisted of:- 
- 2 × 4.08MW Wartsila 12V26 diesel gensets (cruise); 
- 1 × 31MW Rolls-Royce MT30 marine gas turbine, electrical drive (boost); 
- 2 × 5.22MW Wartsila 16V26 diesel gensets (auxiliary). 
The above machinery driving two FPPs on 21MW HTS motors. The arrangement of the 
main (yellow) and auxiliary (green) machinery described above is illustrated in Figure 
5.39. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.39: Destroyer Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
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The power and propulsion arrangements of the Destroyer and the baseline 
frigates present many similarities. The main difference is the fact that all power 
generation units are located in separate machinery compartments. This was done in 
order to match the number of engines to the number of zones, since both ship designs 
included five engines, but the Destroyer had a five zone requirement as oppose to the 
four zones of the frigate design. This has led to a better distribution of the (parallel) 
engines along the ship’s length and should, therefore, decrease vulnerability of the 
move system. It is evident that the lengthwise distribution of engines was only possible 
due to the adoption of an IFEP system, as was the use of relatively small shafts. 
However, similarly to the Corvette design, despite the greater length of the Destroyer, 
the increased separation requirements of the power generation units have led to the 
placement of the forward Wartsila 12V26 engine relatively far forward, therefore, 
possible arising concerns with the engines operation under high pitch motions. Another 
difference between the two ship deigns is the underwater exhaust of the forward cruise 
engine, the implications of which have been discussed above and in Appendix 4.1. The 
uptakes of the aft auxiliary and aft cruise engines merge and exhaust through the aft 
mast, as do the uptakes of the gas turbine and the forward auxiliary engine, in the 
forward mast; this is clearer in the GA, Appendix 8. Identically with all ship design 
studies, removal routes for all engines were taken into account through the inclusion of 
soft patches in the passageways and compartments above each engine. 
 The hydrostatics of the Corvette and Destroyer designs were computed using the 
inbuilt Paramarine module. As in the frigate variants, intact stability was assessed 
against Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) Stability Standards for Surface Ships 
(MOD 2000) until all criteria were passed. Damage stability (of both deep and light 
conditions) was assessed against Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) damage criteria 
assessment (MOD 2000). Hydrostatics data are given in Appendix 9.5. 
 The transverse subdivisions of the Corvette and the Destroyer designs are 
illustrated in Figure 5.40 and Figure 5.41, with the WT bulkheads constituting the main 
zone boundaries shown in red. 
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Figure 5.40: Corvette WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
 
Figure 5.41: Destroyer WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
As with the frigate variant designs, bulkheads locations were dictated through 
zoning, structural, layout and damage stability considerations. For structural continuity, 
bulkheads were positioned at the forward and aft superstructure ends, masts, medium 
calibre naval gun and at every location where there is a step in the superstructure. Note 
that in the Corvette design a bulkhead was not included at the after cut-up because of 
the inability of the hull generator to produce a realistic hull, had the after cut-up been 
shifted further forward. However, the selected arrangement, with the after cut-up half 
way between two bulkheads is acceptable and frequently occurring. The Corvette design 
contained eight WT bulkheads (and nine WT sections), four less than the baseline 
frigate; the Destroyer design contained thirteen bulkheads (and fourteen WT sections), 
two more than the baseline frigate. 
 The Corvette encompassed two zones (the aft zone including 5 WT sections and 
the forward zone, 4) and the Destroyer contained five zones (with 3, 2, 3, 2 and 4 WT 
sections respectively). The zone boundary of the Corvette is slightly forward of 
amidships in order for the whole gas turbine (engine and alternator) to be contained in 
the same zone. Each of the zones contains independent power generation units, CWP, 
HPAC, FP, ATU and ventilation, NBCD stores and airlocks for access to and from the 
citadel/weather, as shown in Figure 5.42 and Figure 5.43. 
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Machinery Room Arrangement 
 
ATU and Ventilation Arrangement 
 
NBCD Stores 
 
Airlocks 
 
Figure 5.42: Corvette Zoning Philosophy 
 
A number of differences between the Corvette and baseline frigate zoning 
arrangements arise due to halving the number of zones. For example the Corvette is the 
only ship design to contain only one auxiliary machinery room. Since the requirement 
was that each zone should have an independent power generation unit, two machinery 
compartments would be sufficient for this ship design study. However, since the two 
auxiliary gensets, two cruise gensets and the gas turbine could not fit inside two such 
compartments, a total of three machinery rooms were included, two main and one 
auxiliary. Consequently, the Corvette was the only design to include more than one 
machinery room in one of its zones (aft zone includes two) and more than two engines 
in one of its zones (aft zone contains two diesels and one gas turbine). This possibly 
suggests that a three zone philosophy was more suitable and efficient for the above 
design. As in all other design studies, the gas turbine, although smaller than the Rolls-
Royce MT30 used in the frigates, was split between two WT sections due to its large 
size, Figure 5.38. The AMR and MMR2 each encompassed a CWP, HPAC and FP in 
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order to meet the zonal requirement with a maximum separation distance between the 
equipment. Due to the size of the aft zone, which houses three of the five engines and 
the living spaces of the bulk of the crew, it was decided to split its ATU and ventilation 
compartments into two units, aft and at amidships. Therefore the aft zone contained ⅔ 
of the ships ATU and ventilation capacity, again encouraging a three zone philosophy. 
Each zone contained an airlock, located conveniently to an NBCD store. Airlock 1 led 
to the aft mooring space and airlock 2 to the forward part of the weather deck; both 
airlocks were adjacent to cleansing and decontamination stations for access to the 
weather. 
 
Machinery Room Arrangement 
 
ATU and Ventilation Arrangement 
 
NBCD Stores 
 
Airlocks 
 
Figure 5.43: Destroyer Zoning Philosophy 
 
The Destroyer includes one more of each of the replicated (in accordance to the 
zoning philosophy) equipment items compared to the baseline frigate design (due to the 
presence of an added zone), apart from power generation units. As observed in Figure 
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5.4 and Figure 5.39, both ship designs include five engines, the only difference being 
that the Destroyer contains each engine in a different machinery compartment (and 
zone), therefore, achieving the maximum number of zones possible for the given 
configuration and requirement. Consequently, the main difference between the baseline 
frigate and the Destroyer designs in this regard is the presence of an extra machinery 
room in the Destroyer, each room containing one engine, CWP, HPAC and FP. Once 
again, MMR2 has been extended along two WT sections to accommodate (in separate 
WT sections) the alternator and engine of the large gas turbine. Note that a portion of 
MMR2 is three decks deep due to the adequate volume provided by the large 5-deck 
hull of the Destroyer. The ATU and ventilation units are located in proximity to the 
living spaces and engine rooms, reasonably above the waterline. The airlocks are 
situated close to the NBCD stores, as in all previous design studies. Airlock 1 leads to 
the aft mooring space, airlock 2 to the hangar, airlock 3 above the amidships section of 
the superstructure, airlock 4 to the forward section of the weather deck and airlock 5 to 
the forward mooring space. Cleansing and decontamination stations are located adjacent 
to airlocks 1 and 4. 
 Figure 5.44 and Figure 5.45 illustrate the arrangement of the main equipment of 
the major Fight systems which were modelled in the survivability assessment method. 
As before, items solely related to each Fight system are shown, therefore, neglecting 
sensors, power generation units and centralised command and control. (For full system 
tree diagrams and architectures see Appendix 7). 
 
 
Figure 5.44: Corvette Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
It is obvious that in the case of the Corvette it was not realistically possible to 
link the arrangement of the five major Fight systems to the zoning philosophy, due to 
the presence of only two zones. However, each system (the items of which are in series) 
was attempted to be concentrated as much as possible in a particular area of the ship to 
decrease vulnerability. That is evident from Figure 5.44, as is the overlapping of certain 
Fight systems (to a much greater extent than in the frigate variants) due to the tight 
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arrangements imposed by the short hull. This verifies the strong link between ship 
length and weapons and sensors (upperdeck) layout (Andrews and Brown 1982; Brown 
1987) identified in Appendix 2 and in the description of the major Fight system 
arrangement of the trimaran, Figure 5.24. 
 
 
Figure 5.45: Destroyer Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
The Destroyer, on the other hand, is the only ship design study to have achieved 
full linkage between the distribution of the main equipment of the major Fight systems 
and the zoning arrangement. This was possible due to the equal number of Fight 
systems and zones (once again implying that the maximum number of zones for the 
given configuration and requirement has been reached) and the large overall ship length, 
allowing for a comfortable upperdeck layout. From Figure 5.45 it is clear that none of 
the footprints of any Fight system overlap with another one and all main equipment of 
all Fight systems are within the same zone, therefore achieving the specialisation of 
each zone with a particular type of warfare/operations. 
 The Corvette design study included 4 decks in its hull, with a conventional 
centreline passageway on the DC deck (No 2 Deck), common in such ship types. In 
addition, each WTs section included two vertical accesses, one at either side of the 
centreline passageway and at the forward and aft end of each WT section respectively. 
Therefore, identical access arrangements were observed as for the baseline frigate, the 
only difference being the reduction of the DC deck passageway width from 2m (used in 
all other ship design studies) to 1.5m due to the smaller size of the ship. The above 
arrangements are shown in Figure 5.46. 
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DC Deck Access 
 
DC Deck Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.46: Corvette Access Philosophy 
 
The Destroyer design also includes one through deck (No 2 Deck) although its 
hull consists of 5 decks. Being a conventional destroyer, it was decided to implement a 
double, side, passageway arrangement, Figure 5.47. 
 
DC Deck Access 
 
DC Deck Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.47: Destroyer Access Philosophy 
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The two side passageways converged to a single centreline access strip above all 
machinery compartments (with the exception of the gas turbine compartment) in order 
to facilitate engine removal, and at the narrow forward end of the hull. The WT sections 
with a centreline passageway include two vertical accesses, one at either side of the 
passageway and at the forward and aft end of each WT section respectively; the WT 
sections with side passageways include two vertical accesses, one adjacent to either 
passageway and at the forward and aft end of each section respectively. A cross-
connecting passageway is included at all WT sections with side passageways, therefore, 
improving communication and personnel flow, but occupying a considerable amount of 
space, as in the trimaran frigate design. Advantages of side passageways were examined 
(see Appendix 4.2) and include the protection of sensitive compartments and equipment 
located in between them (Begg et al 1990; Harney 2010) and the ability to run pipes and 
cables along them for the redundancy and separation of services (Brown 1987; 
Afanasieff and Mabry 1994). More detailed access arrangements are presented in the 
GAs, Appendix 8. 
 Figure 5.48, Figure 5.49, Figure 5.50 and Figure 5.51 illustrate the distribution 
of all equipment and compartments relevant to the recoverability PMs (Sections 4.3.1, 
4.3.2 and 4.3.3) employed in the recoverability assessment method previously 
described. The first two illustrations show the arrangement of items related to Category 
1 PM analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.48: Corvette Category 1 PM Elements 
 
As before, the calculation of MPs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 is relatively straightforward 
from the figure above, as is that of PM 1.4, given there is only one route (of smaller 
width than in the frigate variants and Destroyer designs). For the location of items 
related to all other category 1 PMs (which are estimated by use of SURVIVE Lite, as 
explained in Section 4.3.1), a similar philosophy to that for the frigate designs was used; 
i.e. the Operations Room was located deep in the hull for reduced abovewater threat 
vulnerability, conveniently to the bridge for improved crew evolutions and at a distance 
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from the SCC (positioned close to machinery compartments, although the use of a 
widely distributed IFEP system created constraints) to enable its use as a secondary 
Operations Room in emergency. All other equipment and compartments were located 
through zoning considerations. A noticeable difference between the Corvette and frigate 
arrangements is the positioning of one of the FRP section bases at a different deck from 
its corresponding NBCD store, although the adjacency requirement has still been met. 
This was a result of the decision to locate the NBCD store adjacent to the forward 
airlock and cleansing and decontamination station (Figure 5.42), which were located in 
the forward superstructure in order to direct to the weather (forward weather deck); and 
the requirement for all FRPs to be stationed on the DC deck, being the only deck with 
unrestricted access the ship’s length. Another difference with the baseline frigate is the 
fact that not all FRP section bases were located adjacent to main zone boundaries. With 
only two zones and one main zone boundary, such a decision would effectively group 
the two section bases together, therefore, practically eliminating one of them and 
increasing their vulnerability. Instead, the two FRP section bases were separated in a 
forward and aft arrangement. 
 
 
Figure 5.49: Destroyer Category 1 PM Elements 
 
The logic used for the location of the Category 1 related PM spaces in the 
Destroyer design was the same as in the remaining combatants described above. There 
are three main differences worth commenting. First, the side passageway arrangement 
across a substation length of the hull would affect PM 1.4 by providing a larger number 
of alternative routes to reach the affected compartment, therefore, improving DC. 
Second, the aft FRP section base has been placed adjacent to, but one deck below its 
corresponding NBCD store (which in turn is located beside the airlock leading to the 
hangar, Figure 5.43). A final, but significant variation is the placement of the 
Operations Room above a machinery compartment. This arrangement is generally 
undesirable due to the compulsory provision of removal routes for engines, which has 
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led to the incorporation of a generous margin in the Operations Room space 
requirement in order to remove the engine below it with minimal disruptions. This 
complicated arrangement was a result of the 5 zone requirement (each with independent 
power generation) which led to relatively small zones; the zone in which the Operations 
Room is located being only 2 WT sections long. It could be argued that the Operations 
Room could be moved one WT section forward (as in the trimaran frigate variant); 
however, due to the presence of the forward SAM vertical launchers at that WT section 
(visible in Figure 5.45, and in Appendix 8) there was not an adequate provision of 
space. 
 Figure 5.50 and Figure 5.51 below depict collectively the distribution of 
Category 2 (and Category 3) PM related items on the Corvette and Destroyer designs. 
 
 
Figure 5.50: Corvette Category 2 PM Elements 
 
 
Figure 5.51: Destroyer Category 2 PM Elements 
 
By comparing the above two illustrations with Figure 5.10 it becomes clear that 
the arrangement of Category 2 PM related compartments is almost identical for all three 
Corvette, baseline frigate and Destroyer design studies. Workshops and spare gear 
stores have been split in two groups for redundancy, arranged in a forward and aft 
orientation (separated by only two WT sections in the smaller Corvette design). Each 
workshop has been located conveniently to its corresponding spare gear store and to the 
machinery rooms. The Operations Room and SCC have been separated by a reasonable 
distance for redundancy reasons and the naval stores have been located primarily by 
taking into account stability considerations. In addition to the above compartments, 
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Category 3 PM analysis involves all of the items of each major ship system; system 
architecture illustrations are included in Appendix 7. 
 
5.3 Replenishment Ship Design Studies 
 
 In Section 4.2 it was mentioned that the current survivability assessment method 
would be applied to AOR type ships in order to demonstrate the applicability of the 
method on non-combatant ship types. The increased significance of such ships is 
examined in Appendix 2.3, where the need for global military presence (despite 
declining defence budgets and fleet sizes) and new IMO regulations were identified as 
the main motives for many navies to require improved underway replenishment 
capabilities (Bricknell and Vedlog 2007; Andrews and Pawling 2007). 
 Two AOR variants were designed, again using the DBB approach through the 
SURFCON module in Paramarine, Section 2.1.5. To familiarise with designing such a 
ship type, past UCL as well as industry developed designs were studied (Project 
Management Office JSS 2005a; Project Management Office JSS 2005b; BMT Defence 
Services 2012). Information about specialised equipment such as RAS equipment and 
cranes was taken from (Rolls-Royce 2008; TTS Marine 2010; Flensburger 2012). The 
requirement was for a ship capable of accomplishing the roles of cargo transportation, 
replenishment at sea, aviation support and provision of medical facilities. The aim was 
that two of the AOR ship designs would be part of a task group, consisting of one CVF, 
two AAW Destroyers, four ASW Frigates, with a maximum range of 15,000nm in 
addition to a 30 day period for the conduction of operations. The AOR cargo capacity 
was calculated primarily through the work done by Martin (2001) as well as by 
comparing to existing similar ships. Table 5.6 describes the required cargo capacity 
breakdown and Table 5.7 lists the performance requirements for the two AOR variants. 
 
Table 5.6: AOR Required Cargo Capacity 
AVCAT (m3)  11,600 
Dieso (m3)  7,100 
Dry Stores (m3) 4,850 
Ordnance (m3) 2,600 
Water (m3) 400 
Lube oil (m3) 100 
TEU Minimum 8 
 
 
171 
 
Table 5.7: AOR Performance Requirements Adopted for Design Studies 
Maximum speed 18kts 
Endurance 15,000nm at 15kts 
Stores 42 + 30 days 
Stability 
Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) intact and damage criteria 
assessment (MOD 2000) 
Zoning 2 zones with maximum independence 
 
In addition, Table 5.8 lists the weapons and sensors, as well as the RAS 
infrastructure, incorporated in the AOR designs. Identical equipment was used in both 
variants. 
 
Table 5.8: AOR RAS Infrastructure and Payload  
Port, starboard and astern refuelling 
4 × RAS posts 
1 × Crane 
RAS Infrastructure 
1 × EH-101 Merlin Helicopter + single spot flight deck for EH-
101 Merlin and hangar for four EH-101Merlins 
2 × Raytheon SeaRAM Weapon System 
2 × MSI Seahawk 30mm 
4 × Oto Melara 12.7mm 
4 × NATO Standard Decoy Launching System 
2 × Navigation radars 
1 × Single Face SR STAR Surveillance Radar 
1 × Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System 
2 × Thorn-EMI 'Guardian' Type 675 Jammer  
1 × Medium ship communications system (1 × communications 
mast + 4 × whip antennae) 
1 × Generic Satellite Communications System with 2 antennae 
Weapons and Sensors 
 
The SeaRam Weapon System was preferred to a conventional CIWS (e.g.: 
Raytheon Phalanx CIWS amongst which SeaRAM is based) due to its higher 
effectiveness (Harney 2010). 
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 A summary of the principal particulars of the two AOR variants is included in 
Table 5.9, with GAs in Appendix 8. 
 
Table 5.9: Principal Particulars of the AOR Variants Investigated 
Variant 1 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Param. 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
 
Accommodation 
205.4m (198.8m) × 28.2m (25.5m) × 20.4m (deep draught 12.0m); 
deep trim 0.7m, light trim 1.2m 
CB: 0.616, CP: 0.738, CM: 0.835, CW: 0.861, Circular M: 6.0 
38,450te deep, 23,620te light 
18.3kts 
15,300nm at 15kts, 11,400nm at 18kts 
4 × 5.76MW diesels (cruise and auxiliary), 1 × 0.685MW diesel 
(emergency) driving two 10MW pods and one pump-jet on a 1MW 
HTS motor. 
30 officers, 183 ratings 
Variant 2 
Dimensions 
 
Hullform Param. 
Displacement 
Maximum Speed 
Range 
Power Plant 
 
Accommodation 
205.4m (198.7m) × 28.2m (25.4m) × 20.4m (deep draught 11.9m); 
deep trim 0.6m, light trim 1.6m 
CB: 0.615, CP: 0.737, CM: 0.835, CW: 0.860, Circular M: 6.0 
37,850te deep, 23,360te light 
18.3kts 
15,600nm at 15kts, 11,600nm at 18kts 
4 × 5.76MW diesels (cruise and auxiliary), 1 × 0.685MW diesel 
(emergency) driving two 10MW pods. 
30 officers, 183 ratings 
 
 The complements of both ships were identical and were calculated based on 
work done by Martin (2001). Complement breakdown and accommodation 
requirements are given in Appendix 9.1. 
The two AOR design variants are illustrated in Figure 5.52 and Figure 5.53. 
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Figure 5.52: AOR Variant 1 Ship Design Study 
 
 
Figure 5.53: AOR Variant 2 Ship Design Study 
 
It becomes evident that two naval replenishment ship designs vary in 
configuration, one including a split forward and aft superstructure arrangement with the 
RAS infrastructure located between the two blocks (analogous to the Fort Victoria class 
replenishment oiler); the other including a single aft superstructure block, with the RAS 
infrastructure slightly forward of amidships (comparable to the Wave class tankers). 
These two configurations were chosen as they are the most common in current naval 
auxiliary ships. Therefore, an opportunity to investigate the survivability implications of 
the two choices was presented.  
 The top level functional breakdown of the AOR variants is illustrated in Figure 
5.54 and Figure 5.55. 
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Figure 5.54: AOR Variant 1 Top Level Functional Breakdown 
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Figure 5.55: AOR Variant 2 Top Level Functional Breakdown 
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The most obvious effects of the configurational variations between the two 
design are the split nature of the move functional group (which resulted from the 
decision to apply an IFEP system, similarly to the combatant designs) and the 
Infrastructure functional group, as well as some of the sensors in the fight functional 
group in AOR Variant 1, as opposed to the concentrated nature of those groups in the 
second variant. This gives the impression of AOR Variant 1 being a less vulnerable 
design. A further point of interest is the fact that, unlike in the combatant design studies, 
the Fight group of the replenishment ship designs is represented in three different 
colours, each signifying a lower level Fight sub-group. In red are the ships weapons, 
sensors and related spaces (e.g.: hangars and LCUs); in brown is the ship’s cargo 
(although water tanks are depicted as part of the Infrastructure functional group as they 
have been combined with the ships own water tanks); and purple represents the RAS 
equipment. This colour variation assists in distinguishing that, the fact that all move and 
most Infrastructure related compartments and equipment were pushed aft in AOR 
Variant 2, has resulted in moving the cargo spaces (and RAS equipment) slightly 
forward. However, in Appendix 2.3 it was recognised that it is beneficial to locate the 
stores and tanks in the wide central part of the ship, therefore increasing cargo capacity 
and minimising ballast requirements when operating in light conditions (Andrews and 
Pawling 2007). Therefore, the configuration of AOR Variant 2 has led to a slight 
decrease in cargo capacity (more clearly represented in the GAs, Appendix 8) compared 
to AOR Variant 1 (see Table 5.10), although both designs meet the volume 
requirements listed at Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.10: AOR Achieved Cargo Capacity 
 AOR Variant 1 AOR Variant 2 
AVCAT (m3)  12,800 12,240 
Dieso (m3)  7,800 7,220 
Dry Stores (m3) 5,040 5,040 
Ordnance (m3) 2,670 2,670 
Water (m3) 505 505 
Lube oil (m3) 105 105 
TEU 8 8 
 
A final point worth commenting on is that the observation of Cooper et al 
(2007), that that the main design drivers for such ships are the aviation requirements, 
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the accommodation requirements (i.e. Infrastructure) and cargo storage (although RAS 
rig location is vital for the efficient operation of replenishment ships, their placement is 
not usually a design driver due to the large abundant deck area above the cargo tanks) 
summarised in Figure A3 of Appendix 2.3, is roughly confirmed from the functional 
group description of the above two AOR design variants. 
The two AOR Variants are described with respect to their top level weight 
breakdown in Table A13 and Table A14 of Appendix 9.2. In addition, the margin 
philosophy adopted for these design studies is summarised in Appendix 9.3. 
 The Intellihull object of Paramarine was used to generate the AOR hulls, due to 
its ability to produce auxiliary ship hullforms; the bulbous bow was sized based on 
current similar ships. Both variants were based on identical (8-deck) hulls, the lines plan 
of which is shown in Figure 5.56. 
 
 
Figure 5.56: AOR Lines Plan 
 
 The propulsive powering requirements for AOR Variant 1 were computed 
through the inbuilt Paramarine powering module. It was decided to include a podded 
drive arrangement in the AOR variants. The main reason for this, discussed in Appendix 
2.3, was that the use of podded propulsors requires reduced internal volume, therefore, 
providing more storage and tankage space (Andrews and Pawling 2007). After 
conducting the powering analysis (see Appendix 9.4), the machinery that was selected 
consisted of:- 
- 4 × 5.76MW Wartsila 12V32 diesel gensets (cruise and auxiliary); 
- 1 × 0.685MW Wartsila 4L20 diesel genset (emergency). 
In order to take full advantage of the split move system, visible in Figure 5.54, it was 
chosen to include a secondary forward propulsor in AOR Variant 1. Similarly to Frigate 
Variant 3 and the Corvette design studies, a pump-jet (Schottel 2010a) was the selected 
choice. Therefore, the machinery above drove two stern mounted SSP10 10MW pods 
and one Schottel SPJ 220 Pump-Jet on a 1MW HTS motor. The layout of the above 
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Move related machinery is illustrated in Figure 5.57, with whole major system 
architecture and tree diagrams included in Appendix 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.57: AOR Variant 1 Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
 
The scale and significance of the separation distance between the two sets of 
main machinery, which could have only been achieved through the use of an IFEP 
system, are clear in Figure 5.57. As a result, vulnerability (Appendix 4.2) of the power 
generation sub-system and, therefore, move system is greatly reduced, especially once 
taking into account the secondary propulsive unit. This is located at the forward 
machinery room, along with the forward set of gensets, therefore, providing a highly 
concentrated arrangement of equipment in series. The above IFEP arrangement has also 
allowed the positioning of cargo tanks and stores in the wide central part of the hull 
(Andrews and Pawling 2007), the advantages of which have already been examined 
(Appendix 2.3). The aft main machinery exhausts through a funnel on the starboard 
side, therefore, not interfering with helicopter operations, whereas the forward main 
machinery exhausts through the forward mast. The emergency genset exhausts from the 
stern, again to avoid interference with helicopter operations. Removal routes for all 
engines were taken into account through the inclusion of soft patches in the 
passageways and compartments above each engine. 
 The propulsive powering requirements for AOR Variant 2 were also computed 
through the inbuilt Paramarine powering module (see Appendix 9.4). The machinery 
that was selected consisted of:- 
- 4 × 5.76MW Wartsila 12V32 diesel gensets (cruise and auxiliary); 
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- 1 × 0.685MW Wartsila 4L20 diesel genset (emergency). 
For AOR variant 2, due to the relatively concentrated (towards the aft end) Move 
functional group (Figure 5.55) it was decided to not include a forward propulsor. 
Moreover, the survivability implications of the two different arrangements could be 
investigated and compared after applying the survivability assessment method. 
Therefore, the above machinery drove exclusively two stern mounted SSP10 10MW 
pods. The layout of the above machinery is illustrated in Figure 5.58, and is very similar 
to the move system architecture (see Appendix 7) which was investigated in the 
vulnerability and recoverability assessment methods. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.58: AOR Variant 2 Power and Propulsion Arrangement 
 
The above illustration undoubtedly shows a much more concentrated 
arrangement than that of AOR Variant 1 (Figure 5.57) and justifies the scepticism 
behind the inclusion of a secondary forward propulsor unit. However, as a vulnerability 
reduction measure, the IFEP system has allowed the two sets of main machinery to be 
separated by one WT section, in which a (ships own) dieso tank is located. Equally to 
the first AOR variant, the aft main machinery exhausts through a funnel on the 
starboard side (not interfering with helicopter operations), the forward main machinery 
exhausts through the forward mast and the emergency genset exhausts from the stern. 
Furthermore, consistently with all ship design studies, removal routes for all engines 
were taken into account through the inclusion of soft patches in the passageways and 
compartments above each engine. 
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 Hydrostatic analysis for the two AOR design studies was conducted through the 
inbuilt Paramarine module, as with all other ship designs. Intact stability was assessed 
against both Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) Stability Standards for Surface Ships 
(MOD 2000) and the Code on Intact Stability for all Types of Ships Covered by IMO 
Instruments (IMO 1993), until all criteria were passed. Damage stability for both 
replenishment ship variants was assessed against Defence Standard 02-109 (NES 109) 
damage criteria assessment (MOD 2000). Hydrostatics data are given in Appendix 9.5. 
 The two auxiliary ship variants each contain sixteen WT bulkheads (and 
seventeen WT sections), the arrangement of which is shown in Figure 5.59 and Figure 
5.60. 
 
 
Figure 5.59: AOR Variant 1 WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
 
Figure 5.60: AOR Variant 2 WT Bulkhead Arrangements 
 
As with the combatant designs, bulkhead locations were decided upon by taking 
into account zoning, structural, layout and damage stability related factors. In order to 
maintain structural continuity, bulkheads were located at superstructure steps and ends, 
masts, cargo cranes and RAS high points. 
 Given the non-military role of the auxiliary ship designs it was determined that a 
double zone philosophy is adequate. The zone boundaries are the red WT bulkheads in 
the illustrations above. AOR Variant 1 included seven WT sections in the aft zone and 
ten in the forward zone since the zone boundary was approximately at amidships, which 
suited the split forward and aft superstructure style. Conversely, the fact that the 
forward part of AOR Variant 2 was almost exclusively used for cargo storage, pushing 
most compartments and services to the aft section (Figure 5.55), led to the unusual 
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zoning arrangement illustrated in Figure 5.60. The aft zone includes four WT sections 
and the forward one extends across thirteen WT sections. Each of the two zones contain 
independent power generation units, 2 CWPs, 2 HPACs, 2FPs, independent ATU and 
ventilation, 2 NBCD stores, 2 airlocks for access to and from the citadel/weather and a 
cleansing/decontamination station. The zoning philosophy is clearly depicted in Figure 
5.61 and Figure 5.62. 
 
Machinery Room Arrangement 
 
ATU and Ventilation Arrangement 
 
NBCD Stores 
 
Airlocks 
 
Figure 5.61: AOR Variant 1 Zoning Philosophy 
 
From above it is evident that each zone has one main and one auxiliary 
machinery room. Each machinery room includes a CWP, a HPAC and a FP, while 
MMR1, MMR2 and AMR1 contain power generation units (Figure 5.57). Due to the 
large ship size, the ATU and ventilation compartments of each zone were split into two 
units in an effort to spread this service more efficiently across the ship’s length. These 
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units are located in proximity to spaces such as machinery rooms and accommodation 
areas and well above the waterline, correspondingly to the combatant designs. Another 
similarity with the combatant design studies is the adjacency of NBCD stores and 
airlocks. Airlocks 1 and 3, which are adjacent to cleansing/decontamination stations, 
lead to the aft mooring space and forward weatherdeck respectively. Airlock 2 leads to 
the hangar and airlock 4, to the forward mooring space.  
 
Machinery Room Arrangement 
 
ATU and Ventilation Arrangement 
 
NBCD Stores 
 
Airlocks 
 
Figure 5.62: AOR Variant 2 Zoning Philosophy 
 
AOR Variant 2 included identical equipment in its corresponding machinery 
rooms. A modification compared to the first variant is the fact that the forward zone 
ATU and ventilation arrangements are not split. This is because essentially only two full 
WT sections of that zone are dedicated to compartments and services other than cargo 
stores and tanks (Figure 5.55). Therefore, the necessity to spread the ventilation 
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arrangements in the forward zone was minimised. Other than that, the main difference 
between the zoning arrangements of the two auxiliary ships is the fact that in AOR 2 all 
replicated items (with the exception of airlock 4 and NBCD store 4 which lead to the 
forward mooring space) are concentrated at the aft end of the ship. An outcome that was 
expected given the arrangement of cargo and non-cargo related entities. This would 
probably lead to increased vulnerability, due to the relative concentration of parallel 
equipment. For example, the separation between all machinery rooms which include 
power generation units is only one WT section. As in AOR Variant 1, airlocks 1 and 3, 
which are adjacent to cleansing/decontamination stations, lead to the aft mooring space 
and forward weatherdeck respectively, while airlock 2 leads to the hangar. Due to the 
much larger size of the replenishment ship designs and the requirement for only two 
zones, the general observation was that it was considerably easier to achieve the 
minimum zone requirements compared to the combatant designs. 
 Figure 5.63 and Figure 5.64 illustrate the arrangement of the main items of the 
major Fight systems (Table 4.2) which were modelled in the vulnerability and 
recoverability assessment methods. Equipment which are solely related to each Fight 
system are depicted, with other necessary items which have functions additional to the 
capabilities modelled, such as engines, sensors and centralised command and control 
spaces, not included. Full major systems architecture and tree diagrams are shown in 
Appendix 7. 
 
 
Figure 5.63: AOR Variant 1 Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
From the above image it is evident that, unlike in the combatant design studies, 
each major Fight system has a much larger footprint (as a proportion of the ship’s 
length) and overlapping of different systems occurs to a much larger extent. This gives 
the impression that it is impractical to link Fight system arrangements with the zoning 
philosophy. However, by studying the major system tree diagrams (Appendix 7) one 
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can easily comprehend that (with the exception of the aviation support capability), all 
other major systems include equipment/compartments mainly arranged in a parallel 
pattern, rather than in series as in the combatant designs. That is to say that the major 
system tree diagrams of the replenishment ships are arranged in a horizontal 
configuration to a much greater extent than the combatant major system tree diagrams. 
It is, therefore, advantageous for most systems have large footprints, indicating a large 
separation (and therefore reduced vulnerability, Appendix 4.2) of items in parallel. For 
example, the two CIWS launchers shown in Figure 5.63 (the CIWS having the largest 
footprint) are in parallel; therefore, the large separation distance between them would 
cause that system to be almost invulnerable. Thus, it can be said that in the case of the 
replenishment ship design, the principal aim was to spread each major Fight system to 
as great an extent as possible (and in different zones) rather than to achieve high degrees 
of concentration as in the combatant design studies. The zoning arrangements of AOR 
Variant 1 have allowed separating AVCAT cargo tanks (three tanks in aft zone and nine 
in forward zone) and dieso cargo tanks (three tanks in each zone), as well as dry stores 
and ordnance cargo (approximately 50% in each zone); this is more clearly shown in the 
GA, Appendix 8. On the other hand, the aviation support system was attempted to be 
concentrated as much as reasonably possible, with the large footprint of the flight deck 
plus hangar constraining the minimum length to five WT sections. Importantly, the 
aviation requirement on such ships was identified as a design driver (Cooper et al 2007) 
in Appendix 2.3 and Figure A3. 
 
 
Figure 5.64: AOR Variant 2 Major Fight System Arrangement 
 
The comparison between the major Fight system arrangements of the two 
auxiliary ship designs shows that, although separation of the ability to RAS capabilities 
with respect to zoning has not been achieved, the footprints (and, therefore, separation 
between parallel items) of these major systems are approximately identical. This 
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suggests that zoning is not as critical in such ships, as it is in ship designs where 
equipment concentration is pursued. However, the unorthodox zoning arrangements of 
the second variant, in terms of the relative zone sizes, have as a consequence the hangar 
crossing the zone boundary. Since this was deemed unacceptable, it was decided to 
move the zone boundary one WT section forward in No 1 Deck and 01 Deck, proving 
that the zoning arrangements of this variant are not as efficient as in the first AOR 
design variant. A further dissimilarity is that the RAS posts in AOR Variant 2 are 
located at the middle of the cargo spaces, whereas in the first variant they are located 
just aft of the centre. The AOR Variant 2 arrangement is advantageous in that cargo 
transference routes are minimised, whereas the AOR Variant 1 arrangement is superior 
in that RAS posts are located closer to amidships which is regarded as the ideal 
location. However, the main reason for moving the RAS posts slightly forward in AOR 
Variant 2 was in order to have an adequate deck area between the superstructure and 
RAS equipment (i.e. aft of amidships) to locate heavy items (such as the cargo crane 
and containers) in order to reduce trim (and, therefore, ballast requirements) at the deep 
condition (see Appendix 9.5). An important similarity between the two variants is the 
positioning of the ordnance (and dry stores) cargo directly below the RAS posts (see 
GAs in Appendix 8). This was done to minimise required routes for RAS operations 
with hazardous materials (Andrews and Pawling 2007; Scott 2010), as suggested in 
Appendix 2.3. Figure 5.63 and Figure 5.64 also illustrate the arrangement of RAS 
equipment and compartments in the two AOR variants. The major variance between the 
two arrangements concerns the location of the RAS control space (RASco) 
compartment. In AOR Variant 1 this is situated at the aft end of the forward 
superstructure, therefore, providing good visibility towards the RAS equipment. 
However, RAS operations could be supervised from any other area of the amidships 
weatherdeck, reducing the importance of that compartment. In AOR Variant 2, RASco 
is located between the two sets of RAS posts, also providing good visibility. However, 
it is also located forward of the single superstructure block, therefore, providing 
visibility to the bow. This means that the RASco of the second variant could be used as 
a secondary bridge in emergency situations, reducing the vulnerability of an otherwise 
unduplicated service. 
 Both designs were based on an identical, 8 deck hull. One of the decks (No 2 
Deck) is the access, or DC deck. In both designs the DC deck includes a roughly 
centreline passageway. Figure 5.65 and Figure 5.66 elucidate the access arrangement of 
the two AOR variants.  
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DC Decks Access 
 
DC Decks Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.65: AOR Variant 1 Access Philosophy 
 
DC Deck Access 
 
DC Deck Access and Vertical Access 
  
Figure 5.66: AOR Variant 2 Access Philosophy 
 
Although it was attempted to accommodate a centreline main passageway 
(resulting to reduced volume and easier access (Ferreiro and Stonehouse 1994)), from 
the above two figures it is evident that numerous irregularities had to be incorporated. 
The main reasons for this were so that the access arrangements complied with certain 
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layout related constraints, such as the requirement for a large (almost through-going) 
medical centre, as well as the requirement for RFA crew cabins to include portholes 
(encouraging a side passageway arrangement). Furthermore, the access arrangements of 
the through deck were further constrained by the fact that they should integrate with the 
corresponding arrangements in the higher (superstructure) decks, which mainly 
contained accommodation spaces. These aspects (which are clearer in the GA, 
Appendix 8) led to an alternation between centreline and side passageway (to a much 
greater extent than in the combatant designs). This also affected the vertical access 
arrangements, with each WT section including two vertical accesses, one at either side 
of the centreline passageway and at the forward and aft end of each WT section 
respectively, or one adjacent to either side passageway and at the forward and aft end of 
each WT section respectively, depending on the longitudinal access style. This 
inconsistent access arrangement, present in both AOR design variants, could prove 
problematic during DC efforts. It also highlights the increasing difficulty of designing 
access arrangements with increasing ship size and possibly ascertains that a double side 
passageway system becomes more efficient for larger ships. 
 The following figures explore the distribution of compartments and equipment 
relevant to the recoverability related PMs in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. The first 
two illustrations (Figure 5.67 and Figure 5.68) examine the arrangements of 
compartments and equipment related to Category 1 PM analysis in AOR Variant 1 and 
AOR Variant 2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.67: AOR Variant 1 Category 1 PM Elements 
 
From Figure 5.67 it is evident that all redundant items are split between the 
forward and aft superstructure blocks, therefore, providing low levels of vulnerability 
(Appendix 4.2). For example the two FRPs (note that the same number of FRP section 
bases, positioned conveniently to NBCD stores, as in the combatant design studies was 
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selected, as suggested in Appendix 4.3 and Figure A36) are stationed at the extremities 
of the hull, therefore, minimising the probability of both FRPs being affected by a hit. 
However, being far from amidships (the ideal location in terms of minimising 
transference time and facilitating access to both zones ), their locations are rather 
inefficient in that the probability for DC crews to travel long distances (and operate 
many WT doors) to reach the affected section would increase, therefore, producing 
large values for PMs 1.1 and 1.2. Another similarity between the AOR designs and the 
combatant designs is the large distance between the Operations Room and the SCC, the 
roles of which could be interchanged in emergency situations, and the adjacency 
between the bridge and the Operations Room to improve communication. However, in 
the auxiliary designs it was decided that the Operations Room would be located high in 
the superstructure (02 Deck), increasing its vulnerability to abovewater attacks but 
decreasing it to underwater attacks. This decision was taken principally due to the 
largely civilian crew, usually managing the ship from the bridge. Had the Operations 
Room been located deep in the hull, at a distance from the bridge, there is a possibility 
that it would be understaffed. In addition, given the minor military role of the vessel, the 
increase in abovewater threat vulnerability of this arrangement was deemed of minor 
importance, compared to the argument above. 
 
 
Figure 5.68: AOR Variant 2 Category 1 PM Elements 
 
By studying Figure 5.68 one can easily conclude that the main difference 
between the two auxiliary ship variants is the extensive concentration of compartments 
and equipment at the aft end in AOR Variant 2. (This, for example, has led to the 
inclusion of only three ATU and ventilation units, contradictorily to the four units in the 
first AOR design variant). This concentration of redundant (i.e. parallel) items should 
result to an increase in overall system vulnerability. However, the fact that the forward 
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FRP section base is located more efficiently (i.e. proximate to amidships) should 
introduce some advantages in crew DCFF efforts (PMs 1.1 and 1.2). In addition, 
encompassing only one superstructure block, the number of internal decks in most WT 
section of AOR Variant 2 is less than in the first variant, therefore, improving PM 1.3. 
Namely, one would expect that overall AOR Variant 2 should ease DCFF crew efforts, 
although, a constant threat would probably lead to a greater number of items/systems 
being affects and needing recovery. The logic behind the location and arrangement of 
all other equipment and compartments is similar to that in AOR Variant 1 and in 
consistency with the zoning arrangements described above. 
 Similarly, Figure 5.69 and Figure 5.70 examine the arrangements of 
compartments and equipment related to Category 2 (and Category 3) PM analysis in 
AOR Variant 1 and AOR Variant 2 respectively 
 
 
Figure 5.69: AOR Variant 1 Category 2 PM Elements 
 
 
Figure 5.70: AOR Variant 2 Category 2 PM Elements 
 
There are two major aspects worth commenting on regarding the distribution of 
Category 2 (and 3) PM analysis. First, AOR Variant 1 adopts a split stores and 
workshops philosophy, including duplicated naval stores, in contrast to the combatant 
design variants. This is because the larger size of the auxiliary ship designs dictate 
larger naval stores (the parametric relationship used for naval stores required weight and 
space scaled with hull gross volume (UCL 2010b)) and the distance between the two 
superstructure blocks where most compartments and systems are located is relatively 
large; therefore, it was reasoned advantageous to select a split configuration. It follows 
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that the first auxiliary ship variant has two groups of workshops, spare gear stores and 
naval stores, each positioned adjacently to a main machinery room, therefore, tying in 
with the zoning arrangements. The presence of the second naval stores compartment 
necessitates alterations in the Category 2 PMs (PM 2.3, Table 4.4, Section 4.3.2) and 
Category 3 PMs (PM 3.3, Table 4.5, Section 4.3.3), which are specified in Section 
6.5.3. The second major aspect is that in AOR Variant 2, none of the above stores and 
workshops are split. There is only one workshop, spare gear store and naval store, all 
located adjacently and reasonably close to the two main machinery rooms. It is clear 
that this configuration was chosen as, given the compact arrangement of most non-cargo 
related spaces at the ship designs aft end, there was not much reason behind the 
selection of a split configuration. This arrangement would also require modifications to 
a number of Category 2 and 3 PMs (PM 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, Table 4.4, Section 4.3.2 
and PM 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, Table 4.5, Section 4.3.3). This non split arrangement may 
increase the vulnerability of the three compartments but should also lead to a 
susceptibility reduction. As with all previous design studies, category 3 PM analysis 
also involves all of the components of each major ship system, with system architecture 
illustrations included in Appendix 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
Chapter 6: Results of Applying Proposed Survivability Assessment Approach 
 
 This section presents the full set of results which were obtained after applying 
the survivability assessment method detailed in Chapter 4 to the ship design studies 
described in Chapter 5. Results (including various sensitivity tests) are initially 
presented separately for each survivability constituent, followed by total survivability 
results. Finally, a brief section on ship costing is included, providing costing 
information of the ships designed. 
 
6.1 Susceptibility Assessment Results 
 
 The procedure described in Section 4.1 was followed in order to obtain 
susceptibility results for all ship design studies. 
 
6.1.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
 The scenario selected was that of a naval ship being attacked by four radar 
homing (at 15GHz) sea-skimming ASMs (Figure 4.1). At this stage, the probability of 
each ship being detected and identified, P(di), was assumed equal to unity. In order to 
calculate decoy effectiveness (i.e., the probability that the missile locks on the ship, 
P(l)) the three frigate design variants were run in the SPECTRE RCS prediction 
software, since the attacking missiles were assumed to be radar homing. The RCS 
estimations for the three frigate designs are shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Azimuth Plots of RCS (dBsm) Showing Peak Returns for the Three Frigate 
Variants 
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This illustration above gives RCS at an elevation of 0o and frequency of 15GHz. 
The relationship given in Figure 4.2 and Equations 3 and 4 (see Section 4.1) was then 
used to calculate P(l). The ship RCS value used in the equations is equal to average ship 
RCS. Note that RCS values at 90o (starboard), 180o (stern), 270o (port) and 360o (bow) 
± 4o were neglected due to the exceptionally large and, therefore, misleading, RCS 
returns. These are quite clear in Figure 6.1. As mentioned in Section 4.1 the chaff RCS 
used in Equations 3 and 4 was assumed to be 2,000m2 between 10-20GHz (Friedman 
2006). 
The CSEE method (McDonald 2010) was then used in order to estimate 
defensive system (hard-kill) effectiveness (i.e., the probability of the ship being hit by at 
least one ASM, P(h)). The timeline of events, from the launch of the first ASM until the 
last one hits the ship, is presented in Figure 6.2 and Table A33, using the weapon 
system data shown in Table A31 (see Appendix 10.1). Since all frigates had identical 
payload (Table 5.1), their event timelines were identical. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Combat System Reaction Timeline for the Three Frigate Variants 
 
From Figure 6.2 it is clear that each frigate variant had enough time to fire four 
defensive missiles against the four attacking ASMs. For simplicity, the defensive 
missiles were assumed to have a probability of kill, P(k), equal to 0.73 (McDonald 
2010) (although, as explained in Appendix 4.1, P(k) varies with the angle between the 
attacking and defensive missiles). In addition, a simplified and unclassified jammer with 
a P(k) of 0.25 (McDonald 2010) was assumed. It was chosen not to calculate jammer 
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effectiveness using a separated method (as was done with decoy effectiveness) in order 
to avoid unnecessarily complications (reflecting the multifaceted mechanism 
characterising jammers) for the level of detail of the chosen ship design studies; a 
constant jammer effectiveness value for all designs was presumed adequate. Given that 
each pair of defensive missiles targets the same attacking missile, it follows that the first 
two attacking missiles were each targeted by two defensive missiles (as well as the 
jammer), while the last two attacking missiles only had the jammer to overcome. 
Therefore, the P(k) of each attacking missile was calculated using equation 6; the results 
are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
 P(k) Overall = 1 – (1– P(k) Defensive Missile) × (1 – P(k) Jammer) (6) 
 
Table 6.1: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Three Frigate Variants 
 P(k) Defensive Missile P(k) Jammer P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASM 1 0.927 0.250 0.945 
Attacking ASM 2 0.927 0.250 0.945 
Attacking ASM 3 0 0.250 0.250 
Attacking ASM 4 0 0.250 0.250 
 
From the data given above it is relatively straightforward to calculate the three 
susceptibility related probabilities mentioned in Section 4.1, the probability of the ship 
being detected and identified, P(di), the probability that the missile locks on the ship, 
P(l), and the probability of the ship being hit by at least one ASM P(h). These, as well 
as each frigates total susceptibility (being equal to the product of the three above 
probabilities and yielding the probability that a ship was successfully detected, 
identified, targeted and hit by the adversary) are given in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Susceptibility Results for the Three Frigate Variants 
 Frigate Variant 1 Frigate Variant 2 Frigate Variant 3 
Average RCS (m2) 1,011.7 1,045.9 928.8 
P(di) (%) 100 100 100 
P(l) (%) 25.3 26.2 23.2 
P(h) (%) 94.4 94.4 94.4 
P(susc.) (%) 23.9 24.7 21.9 
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The main points worth mentioning are that all three variants have almost 
identical RCS values (also clear from Figure 6.1) leading to very similar P(l). (Note that 
the RCS results are generally lower than those of existing comparable current frigates 
(typically having an RCS of approximately 10,000m2) due to factors such as the 
perfectly smooth sides outputted by the Paramarine CAD software (before a design is 
imputed in SPECTRE) and the very little microgeometry included due to the minimum 
(preliminary design stage) level of detail. However, since a comparison is being made 
between concept ship designs, as long as the above variables are kept constant, the end 
results should be representative. Moreover, the fact that P(di) has been assumed equal to 
1 for all ship designs and P(h) is equal for all frigate variants due to their identical 
payload (and, therefore, defensive systems) has led to all frigate variants outputting very 
similar susceptibility results. This is evident in Figure 6.3 which shows total 
susceptibility results (i.e. the last row of Table 6.2) normalised with respect to the 
baseline frigate (hence the susceptibility value of Frigate Variant 1 in Figure 6.3 is equal 
to 1). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Normalised Plot of Susceptibility for the Three Frigate Variants 
 
 The above results indicate the relative total ship susceptibility, not the 
susceptibility characteristics of each of the designs. However, as summarised in Section 
3.3.2 and 4.1 the factors affecting the lengthwise hit probability on a ship are not limited 
to ship and threat characteristics, but are affected by environmental conditions, ship 
194 
 
motions and manoeuvring and by variations in weapon performance (MOD 2001). 
Therefore, rather than using an RCS prediction software to obtain a (dubious) 
lengthwise hit probability distribution, it was assumed to follow a normal distribution 
with a mean equal to half of the ship’s overall length and a standard deviation equal to a 
sixth of the ship’s overall length (Section 4.1), as advised by the Maritime Integrated 
Survivability team of Dstl (Thornton et al 2012). These distributions are shown in 
Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution for the Three Frigate Variants 
 
The data points shown in Figure 6.4 represent the hit probability of the centroid 
of each WT section of each frigate design variant and aggregate to 100% for each ship. 
 
6.1.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 For the comparative survivability investigation of the Corvette, baseline frigate 
and Destroyer, the identical threat scenario to that for the three frigate variants was 
assumed. Once again, P(di) was equalled to 1; P(l) was calculate by obtaining RCS data 
from SPECTRE, substituting the average ship RCS  in Equations 3 and 4 and assuming 
a decoy RCS of 2,000 m2 at 15GHz. The SPECTRE generated RCS data (at an 
elevation of 0o and frequency of 15GHz) for the three combatant designs are shown in 
Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5: Azimuth Plots of RCS (dBsm) Showing Peak Returns for the Corvette, 
Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 The CSEE method was then utilized in order to estimate defensive system 
effectiveness and obtain P(h) values. Both the Corvette design and the baseline frigate 
design had identical AAW systems (MBDA MICA PDMS) to counter the threat (Table 
5.4). Therefore, by using the data displayed in Table A31, an identical combat system 
reaction timeline as for the frigate design variants, illustrated in Figure 6.2 and Table 
A33, was obtained, with both ships having enough time to fire four defensive missiles 
against the attacking missiles. 
Since the Destroyer design had a different, more advanced AAW capability 
(Table 5.4), the CSEE method was reapplied in order to calculate the corresponding 
P(h) value. The weapon system data shown in Table A35 was used to produce the 
combat system reaction timeline illustrated in Figure 6.6 and the sequence of events 
shown in Table A36 (see Appendix 10.2) for the scenario of the Destroyer being 
attacked by four ASMs. It is important to note that it was initially assumed that only 
Aster-15 (rather than Aster-30) SAMs would be deployed (together with the Phalanx 
CIWS). 
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Figure 6.6: Combat System Reaction Timeline for the Destroyer 
 
From the above data, the much more capable AAW system of the Destroyer had 
enough time to fire eleven defensive missiles before being hit. As with the frigate 
variants and the Corvette, the defensive missiles were assumed to have a probability of 
kill, P(k), equal to 0.73 (although this is an underestimate, given the increased 
capability) and the jammer a P(k) of 0.25 (McDonald 2010). In addition, the Phalanx 
CIWS P(k) was taken as 0.78 (McDonald 2010). Again, each pair of defensive missiles 
targets the same attacking missile. Therefore, the first attacking missile was targeted by 
four defensive missiles, 2 + 2, (as well as the jammer), the second attacking missile was 
targeted by three defensive missiles, 2 + 1, (as well as the jammer), while the last two 
attacking missile were targeted by two defensive missiles (and the jammer) each. 
Furthermore, the CIWS could only fire one burst, targeting only one of the four 
incoming missiles. The P(k) of each attacking missile is presented in Table 6.3 (while 
the corresponding Corvette and baseline frigate data is presented in Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.3: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Destroyer 
 
P(k) Defensive 
Missile 
P(k) CIWS P(k) 
Jammer 
P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASM 1 0.995 0.780 0.250 0.999 
Attacking ASM 2 0.980 0 0.250 0.985 
Attacking ASM 3 0.927 0 0.250 0.945 
Attacking ASM 4 0.927 0 0.250 0.945 
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From the data above, the total susceptibility results for the three combatants 
were calculated and presented in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: Susceptibility Results for the Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 Corvette Frigate Variant 1 Destroyer 
Average RCS (m2) 910.0 1,011.7 3,924.6 
P(di) (%) 100 100 100 
P(l) (%) 22.8 25.3 98.1 
P(h) (%) 94.4 94.4 12.0 
P(susc.) (%) 21.5 23.9 11.8 
 
Although the Corvette and baseline frigate present similar susceptibility results, 
due to analogous radar signatures (P(l)) and an identical AAW system (P(h)), the 
Destroyer is distinctly less susceptible (see Figure 6.7 displaying total susceptibility 
results normalised with respect to the baseline frigate). 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Normalised Plot of Susceptibility for the Corvette, Frigate Variants and 
Destroyer 
 
The lengthwise hit probability distribution of the Corvette and Destroyer designs 
were assumed to follow a normal distribution with the same characteristics as for the 
three frigate Variants. The Corvette and Destroyer distributions, together with that of 
the baseline frigate design, are shown in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8: Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution for the Corvette, Baseline Frigate 
and Destroyer 
 
The data points in the figure above represent the hit probability of the centroid 
of each WT section of each ship design and sum up to 100% for each ship. 
 
6.1.3 AOR Variants 
 
 For the final comparative survivability investigation, between the two AOR 
variants, the same threat scenario, of the ships being attacked by four radar homing sea-
skimming ASMs, was assumed. P(di) was equalled to 1, while decoy effectiveness, P(l), 
was calculate by obtaining RCS data from SPECTRE and using Equations 3 and 4. The 
results are shown in Figure 6.9. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Azimuth Plots of RCS (dBsm) Showing Peak Returns for the Two AOR 
Variants 
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 The CSEE method was then used in order to estimate defensive system 
effectiveness against the above threat scenario and obtain P(h) values. Both AOR design 
variants incorporated identical weapon systems (Table 5.8), therefore resulting to 
identical event timelines. Data for the incoming missiles (which were identical to the 
ones assumed in the combatant scenarios) as well as the AAW capability of the 
auxiliary ships are given in Table A37. This data was then used in order to obtain the 
sequence of events shown in Figure 6.10 and Table A39 (see Appendix 10.3). 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Combat System Reaction Timeline for the Two AOR Variants 
 
The above data yields that the AOR design variants, with the relatively weak, 
purely self-defensive (given the limited military role of the vessels) AAW capability, 
had enough time to fire three SeaRAM missiles to the four attacking ASMs. The 
defensive SeaRAM missiles were assumed to have a probability of kill, P(k), equal to 
0.72 (McDonald 2010) and the jammer was given a P(k) of 0.25 (McDonald 2010), as 
in the combatant cases. Each pair of defensive missiles targets the same attacking 
missile, therefore, the first attacking missile was targeted by two defensive missiles (as 
well as the jammer), the third attacking missile was targeted by only one defensive 
missile (and the jammer), while the last two attacking missiles had only to overpower 
the jammer. The P(k) results of each attacking missile are presented in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Two AOR Variants 
 P(k) Defensive Missile P(k) Jammer P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASM 1 0.922 0.250 0.941 
Attacking ASM 2 0.720 0.250 0.790 
Attacking ASM 3 0 0.250 0.250 
Attacking ASM 4 0 0.250 0.250 
 
The above data was then processed in a similar manner to the previous 
comparative survivability investigations in order to obtain total susceptibility results for 
the AOR variants, Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Susceptibility Results for the Two AOR Variants 
 AOR Variant 1 AOR Variant 2 
Average RCS (m2) 11,248.5 3,069.6 
P(di) (%) 100 100 
P(l) (%) 100 76.7 
P(h) (%) 95.4 95.4 
P(susc.) (%) 95.4 73.2 
 
 From above it is evident that both AOR variants output similar susceptibility 
characteristics. Furthermore, they are much more susceptible than the combatant 
designs, given a constant threat (mainly due to increased signatures, but also due to a 
less capable AAW system when compared to the Destroyer design). However, a large 
difference is observed between the RCSs of the two variants (deducing that the launch 
of decoys with an RCS of 2,000m2 from the first variant is of no use and therefore, P(l) 
is equal to 1) which could change the similar susceptibility characteristics observation 
previously mentioned, given improved decoy systems. Figure 6.11 shows total 
susceptibility results for the two AOR design variants. The results are normalised with 
respect to the worst performing design (i.e. AOR Variant 1, Table 6.6), rather than a 
baseline design, the reasoning behind which is explained in Section 7.2.4. 
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Figure 6.11: Normalised Plot of Susceptibility for the Two AOR Variants 
 
 The lengthwise hit probability distributions of the AOR design variants (see 
Figure 6.12) were assumed to follow a similar, normal distribution, pattern as in the 
combatant design studies.  
 
 
Figure 6.12: Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution for the Two AOR Variants 
 
6.2 Susceptibility Assessment Sensitivity Studies 
 
 Four sensitivity studies were carried out in the susceptibility part of the 
survivability assessment method presenting some interesting results:- 
- Selected external features on certain design variants were altered in order to 
investigate the effects on RCS; 
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- The defensive missile targeting pattern in the CSEE was altered; 
- The effect of changing the SAM type of the Destroyers PAAMS ADMS was 
studied; 
- The lengthwise probability hit distribution on the frigate variants was modified. 
 
6.2.1 External Features 
 
Certain external features of Frigate Variant 1 and Frigate Variant 3 were altered 
in order to examine their effect on the RCS signature. The first (microgeometry related) 
feature was the rotation of the RAS high points in the baseline frigate (located at 
approximately amidships, port and starboard, Figure 5.1) by 7o on the x-axis. This is 
clearly illustrated in Figure 6.13, where the before configuration is shown in clear light 
blue and the after, in opaque purple. 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Baseline Frigate Microgeometry Signature Reduction Feature 
 
This minor alteration led to a significant decrease in RCS, illustrated in the 
before and after plots of RCS showing peak returns, Figure 6.14. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Before and After Azimuth Plots of RCS (dBsm) Showing Peak Returns 
for the Baseline Frigate 
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Following this find, all RAS high points were inclined by the same angle in all 
combatant design studies. 
The second (shaping related) feature varied was the application of a 7o flare on 
the structure connecting the third frigate variants main hull to its two side hulls, 
highlighted (in red) in Figure 6.15. 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Cross-connecting Structure in Trimaran Frigate Variant 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.16, where the before configuration is shown in 
clear light blue and the after, in opaque purple. For each of the four locations 
highlighted above, there are two sections where flare was applied, one on the side hull 
itself and the other on the box structure. 
 
Figure 6.16: Trimaran Frigate Variant Shaping Signature Reduction Feature 
 
The incorporation of this feature also led to an impressive RCS reduction 
(Figure 6.17). However, it also caused a slight reduction in the design’s fluid GMt due 
to a portion of the side hull being removed, visible in Figure 6.16. This stability loss 
could be relatively easily regained by moving the side hulls further outboard. This is an 
advantage of the trimaran configuration due to powering and stability considerations 
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being decoupled (Andrews and Zhang 1995; Andrews 2004). The result of the above 
feature is illustrated in Figure 6.17, where the eight additional RCS peaks arising from 
the two sections of each of the four cross-connecting structures before the flare was 
applied are clearly visible. 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Before and After Azimuth Plots of RCS (dBsm) Showing Peak Returns 
for the Trimaran Frigate Variant 
 
The effect of these alterations on the probability that the attacking missile avoids 
the decoys launched and locks on the targeted ship (P(l), calculated through Equations 3 
and 4) was to reduce it from 66.7% and 100% for Frigate Variants 1 and 3 respectively, 
to the current 25.3% and 23.2% (Table 6.2); i.e. an improvement of approximately 60% 
and 75% respectively, as illustrated in Figure 6.18. 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Before and After P(l) Values for Frigate Variants 1 and 3 
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6.2.2 Defensive Missile Targeting Pattern 
 
 In Section 6.1 it was mentioned that while applying the CSEE method to the 
ship design studies, each pair of defensive missiles launched by the targeted ship could 
only home in on the same attacking ASM, resulting in the data given in Table 6.1, Table 
6.3 and Table 6.5. A further sensitivity test was carried out where the above assumption 
was dropped, therefore, allowing each defensive missile to independently target an 
attacking missile. In the cases of the three frigate variant and Corvette designs where 
four defensive missiles were launched, it was assumed that each defensive missile 
targeted one of the four attacking missiles; therefore, resulting in equal P(k) values for 
all attacking missiles, shown in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Three Frigate Variants and 
Corvette (Sensitivity Test) 
 P(k) Defensive Missile P(k) Jammer P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASMs 0.730 0.250 0.798 
 
For the Destroyer, which launched eleven Aster-15 missiles, it was assumed that 
the first three attacking missiles were targeted by three defensive missiles and the last 
attacking missile by two defensive SAMs, Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Destroyer (Sensitivity Test) 
 
P(k) Defensive 
Missile 
P(k) CIWS P(k) 
Jammer 
P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASM 1 0.980 0.780 0.250 0.997 
Attacking ASM 2 0.980 0 0.250 0.985 
Attacking ASM 3 0.980 0 0.250 0.985 
Attacking ASM 4 0.927 0 0.250 0.945 
 
Finally, in the scenario of the AOR design variants being attacked by four 
ASMs, the three SeaRAM missiles that were launched each targeted one of the 
attacking missiles, therefore, the last attacking missile was only countered by the 
jammer, Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9: Probabilities of Kill of Attacking ASMs for the Two AOR Variants 
(Sensitivity Test) 
 P(k) Defensive Missile P(k) Jammer P(k) Overall 
Attacking ASM 1, 2 and 3 0.720 0.250 0.790 
Attacking ASM 4 0 0.250 0.250 
 
The effect of the above alterations was to decrease the probability of the ship 
being hit by at least one ASM, P(h), in all cases examined. More specifically, P(h) for 
the frigate variants and Corvette design was reduced to 59.5%, for the Destroyer design 
to 8.5% and for the AOR design variants to 87.7%. The magnitude of the enhancement 
in performance is depicted in Figure 6.19. 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Before and After P(h) Values for all Ship Designs 
 
The largest effect in the above sensitivity study was observed in the frigate 
variants and Corvette design, where the P(h) decreased to 59.9%, an improvement of 
almost 40%. The performance of the Destroyer improved by approximately 30%, but 
for the AOR variants, the above assumption did not have a significant outcome. 
 
6.2.3 Defensive Missile Type 
 
 Table 5.4 conveys that the PAAMS ADMS of the Destroyer design is able to 
contain a combination of both Aster-15 and Aster-30 missiles. However, while applying 
the CSEE method to the Destroyer (Section 6.1.2) it was assumed that the ship only 
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defended itself with Aster-15 missiles. It was, therefore, decided to examine the effects 
of changing the missiles to the more capable Aster-30, against the same threat scenario 
(four sea-skimming ASMs targeting the ship). Performance data for the Aster-30 
missile is identical to that for the Aster-15 shown in Table A35, with the exception of an 
increase in maximum range against sea-skimming ASMs to 30,000m, minimum range 
to 3,000m and velocity to 1,530m/s. The threat, as well as the Phalanx CIWS 
characteristics, are consistent with the initial scenario and are summarised in Table A35. 
From this data, it is evident that the Destroyers MFR horizon (Table A34) is lesser than 
the Aster-30s maximum range against sea-skimming ASMs. It was decided to apply the 
CSEE method taking both, the Destroyer’s radar horizon and the SAMs maximum 
range, as the limiting factors. The sequences of events for both cases are listed in Table 
A40 and Table A41 of Appendix 10.4 and the combat system reaction timelines are 
illustrated in Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21. 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Combat System Reaction Timeline for the Destroyer (Aster-30, Maximum 
Range limited) 
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Figure 6.21: Combat System Reaction Timeline for the Destroyer (Aster-30, MFR 
Horizon limited) 
 
It is observed that if Aster-30 missiles were used rather than Aster-15s, the 
attacked ship would be able to launch one additional defending missile (i.e. twelve in 
total); if the limiting factor was the maximum range of the AAW system against sea-
skinning threats, this figure would increase to eighteen missiles. By assuming the same 
defensive missile targeting pattern and defensive missile, CIWS and jammer P(k) as 
before (Section 6.1.2), the probability of the ship being hit by at least one ASM, P(h), is 
decreased to 11.1% and 1.2% respectively. The comparative magnitude of this 
improvement is shown in Figure 6.22. 
 
 
Figure 6.22: Destroyer P(h) Comparison for Aster-15 and Aster-30 
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Although theoretically the use of Aster-30 missiles could vastly improve 
performance, by approximately 90%, practically, given the limiting, against sea-
skimming targets, radar horizon, the performance of both missile types is virtually 
constant. 
 
6.2.4 Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution 
 
 The final susceptibility related sensitivity study was to assume a linear 
lengthwise probability hit distribution on the frigate design variants (rather than the 
normal distribution shown in Figure 6.4). This distribution is shown in Figure 6.23. 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Linear Lengthwise Probability Hit Distributions for the Frigate Design 
Studies 
 
As before, the data points shown above represent the hit probability of the 
centroid of each WT section of each ship design study and aggregate to 100% for each 
ship. The effects of changing the lengthwise probability hit distribution from normal to 
linear is further investigated in Sections 6.4 and 6.6.  
 
6.3 Vulnerability Assessment Results 
 
 The procedure described in Section 4.2 was followed in order to obtain 
vulnerability results for all ship design studies. QinetiQ’s SURVIVE Lite (Pugh 2006; 
Turner et al 2006) vulnerability assessment software for concept stage design was used 
for all comparative survivability studies, therefore, the first step was to develop 
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SURVIVE Lite models for all ship design studies. Certain features were kept constant 
in all SURVIVE Lite models produced for this research:- 
- The hull thickness was set equal to 10mm; 
- The superstructure thickness was set as 4mm; 
- The hull, superstructure, decks, WT bulkhead and passageway material was set 
as Mild Steel (Grade A) 40A; 
- The frame spacing was equalled to 0.7m; 
- Deck thickness was assumed to be 10mm and all decks were fire insulated; 
- WT bulkhead thickness was set as 6mm and all bulkheads were fire insulated; 
- Longitudinal partition (i.e. passageway) thickness was assumed 3mm without 
fire insulation; 
- Main zone boundaries were also main fire boundaries; 
With the exception of manually establishing main zone boundaries as main fire 
boundaries, all above settings are the default SURVIVE Lite v2.3.3 settings. It should 
be noted that in the two AOR variants, in addition to the main zone boundaries (i.e. WT 
bulkhead JK in Figure 5.59 and WT bulkhead MN in Figure 5.60 respectively), WT 
bulkheads EF and MN in AOR Variant 1 and WT bulkhead KL in AOR Variant 2 (i.e. 
the WT bulkheads separating the main cargo spaces from the remaining spaces (see 
Figure 5.54 and Figure 5.55) were also set as main fire boundaries. 
The next step was to cross-model all the required equipment items and 
compartments from the Paramarine ship design models (GAs of which are included in 
Appendix 8) to the SURVIVE Lite ship models. The equipment and compartments 
modelled included all those belonging to the major ship systems to be studied (Table 4.1 
and Table 4.2) as well as the recoverability related items listed in Section 4.2. System 
tree diagrams and system architecture illustrations for all ships are included in 
Appendix 7. In addition, the SURVIVE Lite equipment category to which each 
modelled equipment and compartment (belonging to the major ship systems 
investigated) was set, is given in Table A1, Appendix 6. The SURVIVE Lite equipment 
category (as well as the repair category) of recoverability related equipment and 
compartments is listed in Table 4.11. 
Before running the models, the following threat characteristics were inputted, 
consistent in all ship design runs:- 
- Threat Type: Missile; 
- Charge Weight: 165kg; 
- Fragment Pattern: Medium; 
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- Attack Direction: Side Grid; 
- Vector Direction, Azimuth: 90o (port) and 270o (starboard); 
- Vector Direction, Elevation: 0o (sea-skimming). 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, hit grids were applied to each WT section of each ship (for 
both port and starboard sides) separately, as illustrated in Figure 4.4 for Frigate Variant 
1. The lengthwise spacing between hit locations was approximately 2m and in the z 
(depth) direction each deck of each ship included one row of hit locations. 
 
6.3.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
After running the missile hit simulations for the three frigate variant designs, the 
results listed in Table A42, Table A43 and Table A44 (see Appendix 11.1) were 
obtained. The vulnerability of each major system given an ASM hit at a WT section was 
then multiplied by the probability that that WT section was hit. Namely, the 
vulnerabilities in Appendix 11.1 were multiplied with the corresponding WT section 
susceptibility given in Figure 6.4, as outlined in Section 4.2. The sum of the above 
product was taken for each system in order to obtain the total major ship system 
vulnerabilities for the three frigate designs, shown in Figure 6.24. 
 
 
Figure 6.24: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for the Frigate Design Studies 
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 The system vulnerabilities presented in Figure 6.24 were normalised with 
respect to the baseline (Frigate Variant 1) and weighted given the weightings in Table 
4.1. The sum of the normalised and weighted system vulnerabilities were taken for each 
ship design, and again normalised with respect to the baseline (hence Frigate Variant 1 
has a vulnerability of 1), outputting the results illustrated in Figure 6.25. 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Three Frigate Variants 
 
From above it is clear that although the first two variants present similar 
survivability levels, the trimaran frigate design is more than 50% less vulnerable than 
both its counterparts. This is largely due to its invulnerable move system (Figure 6.24), 
which was given an incomparably larger weighting than the other modelled systems 
(Table 4.1). 
 
6.3.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 As with the frigate variant design studies, the Corvette and Destroyer designs 
were run in SURVIVE Lite, simulating the identical threat scenario. The vulnerability 
results obtained are presented in Table A45 and Table A46 (see Appendix 11.2). This 
data was combined with corresponding WT section susceptibility data, given in Figure 
6.8, as outlined in Section 4.2. Total major ship system vulnerabilities for the combatant 
designs were then estimated in a similar manner to the frigate variants. The system 
vulnerability results, together with the corresponding results of the baseline frigate, are 
presented in Figure 6.26. 
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Figure 6.26: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for the Corvette, Baseline Frigate 
and Destroyer Design Studies 
 
 After normalising the above vulnerability results with respect to the baseline 
frigate and weighting given the weightings in Table 4.1 (following an identical 
procedure to the vulnerability assessment of the frigate variants), the results illustrated 
in Figure 6.27 were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 6.27: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Corvette, Frigate Variants and 
Destroyer 
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Figure 6.27 shows that the Destroyer is the least vulnerable ship, not 
unexpectedly since it is the largest of the three ship designs. However, a remarkable 
observation is that the smaller Corvette design is less vulnerable than the baseline 
frigate. This is entirely due to its invulnerable move system (Figure 6.26), which was 
given a much larger weighting than all other major systems (Table 4.1) as is discussed 
in Section 7.2.2. 
 
6.3.3 AOR Variants 
 
 The final SURVIVE Lite ASM simulation runs were carried out for the two 
AOR variants. The vulnerability results outputted are presented in Table A47 and Table 
A48 (see Appendix 11.3). These system vulnerability data given an ASM hit at a WT 
section were multiplied by the probability of hit of that WT section, Figure 6.12. The 
sum for each system was taken, as in the previous cases, and the total major ship system 
vulnerability results shown in Figure 6.28 were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 6.28: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for the AOR Design Studies 
 
 The above system vulnerability results were normalised with respect to the 
corresponding vulnerabilities of the worst performing design (i.e. the move system 
vulnerability was normalised with respect to AOR Variant 2, RAS related capabilities 
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and aviation support were normalised with respect to AOR Variant1 and the CIWS, 
which was invulnerable in both designs, was given a value of zero). As with 
susceptibility assessment, in the case of the AOR design studies normalisations were 
performed with respect to the worst performing design, rather than a baseline, the 
reasoning behind which is explained in Section 7.2.4. The normalised vulnerabilities 
values were then weighted given the weightings in Table 4.2 and summed as before in 
order to obtain the results illustrated in Figure 6.29. Yet again, the total vulnerability 
results were normalised with respect to the worst performing design, i.e. AOR Variant 
1, hence the total vulnerability value of that variant is equal to 1. 
 
 
Figure 6.29: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Two AOR Variants 
 
The overall observations from the vulnerability data above are that the 
vulnerabilities of the systems modelled in the AOR designs (Figure 6.28) are generally 
considerably lower than the vulnerabilities of the systems modelled in the combatant 
designs (Figure 6.24 and Figure 6.26), probably as a result of the much greater size of 
the auxiliary ships (although different systems were modelled, therefore, a direct 
comparison cannot be made); in addition an improvement of more than 40% in terms of 
vulnerability reduction was observed in the second AOR variant, due to enhanced 
performance in RAS related capabilities and aviation support. 
 As mentioned in Section 4.2, SURVIVE Lite was also used to investigate the 
vulnerability (to the same threat) of certain features required for recovery. This data, 
being more relevant to the recoverability part of the survivability assessment method, is 
presented in the PM matrices in Section 6.5. 
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6.4 Vulnerability Assessment Sensitivity Studies 
 
 Three main sensitivity studies were carried out for the vulnerability part of the 
survivability assessment method:- 
- The application of different system weighting schemes was examined; 
- The effect on system vulnerability, given a different lengthwise probability hit 
distribution on the frigate variants was investigated; 
- The consequence of varying the angle of ASM attack (rather than merely 
considering broadside attacks at 0o elevation) was studied. 
 
6.4.1 System Weighting Schemes 
 
 In order to examine the sensitivity of the vulnerability assessment method to the 
weighting scheme applied, a number of RN officers working at Dstl were interviewed 
(Mant 2012; Hood 2012; Day 2012; Sutcliffe 2012; Boughton 2012; Koheeallee 2012; 
O’Brien 2012; Kadinopoulos 2012). They were asked to fill in a form (see Appendix 
12) suggesting alternative weighting schemes. In contrast to the original (scenario 
independent) weighting scheme (Table 4.1) provided by 1st Lt. Fonseca, the interviewed 
officers were asked to provide a weighting scheme for three different scenarios. These 
are summarised in Table 6.10. (It should be noted that this sensitivity test was only 
carried out for the three frigate design variants). 
 
Table 6.10: Scenarios for System Weighting Schemes of the Frigate Design Studies 
Scenario 1 
Threats present 
Location 
Air and submarine 
Blue water 
Scenario 2 
Threats present 
Location 
Air, shore based missiles and gun batteries 
Littoral 
Scenario 3 
Threats present 
Location 
Air and surface (missile firing) 
Littoral 
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As with the original weighting scheme, the naval officers were asked to weigh 
each ship system between 0-10, ten being the most important. In addition, the 
interviewed officers were not exposed to previous weighting schemes so that their 
responses remain unaffected. The weighting schemes suggested by the interviewed 
officers are shown in Table 6.11. 
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It is important to mention that Lt. Cdr. Boughton proposed that the duplicated aft 
and forward SAM systems should have different weightings given that they provide the 
same function (Boughton 2012). However, since the decision of which of the two 
systems would be given higher priority depends on purely operational factors, the two 
weightings given by that officer were averaged; thus the decimal fraction form of the 
relevant weightings. This would have the same effect as interchanging the higher 
priority SAM system, obtaining the vulnerability results for both cases and averaging. 
Lt. Koheeallees (2012) remark that: “These weightings are based on self-protection and 
survival of own ship. If the role of own ship is also to provide force protection (over 
naval assets or land), weightings could be different. In fight section, consider adding 
external communications and surveillance systems”, is noteworthy. The above 
weighting schemes were plotted in a line graph (Figure 6.30) in order to compare the 
different weighting scheme philosophies of the interviewed officers. 
 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Figure 6.30: System Weighting Scheme Philosophies for the Sensitivity Tests on 
Frigate Vulnerability 
 
Broad patterns can be observed in Figure 6.30, something unsurprising since all 
officers (with the exception of 1st Lt. Fonseca) served in the same navy and, therefore, 
underwent similar training. However, each officer reflects on his own experiences and 
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knowledge, accounting for the differences in the schemes above. In addition, the 
different weighting scheme philosophies between the RN officers and 1st Lt. Fonseca 
are evident since the latter officer provided a scenario independent scheme. The 
weighting schemes in Table 6.11 were applied to the data provided in Figure 6.24 in an 
identical manner as described in Sections 4.2 and 6.3; the output results are presented in 
Figure 6.31, Figure 6.32 and Figure 6.33 for the three scenarios respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.31: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Three Frigate Variants 
(Sensitivity Test, Scenario 1) 
 
 
Figure 6.32: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Three Frigate Variants 
(Sensitivity Test, Scenario 2) 
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Figure 6.33: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Three Frigate Variants 
(Sensitivity Test, Scenario 3) 
 
The main observation from the three illustrations above is that vulnerability is to 
a significantly greater extent dependant on (i.e. sensitive to) the design itself, rather than 
the scenario or the weighting scheme applied. Another point of interest is the substantial 
difference in the total vulnerability results for the trimaran frigate design using 1st Lt. 
Fonseca’s weighting scheme and those of all RN officers. This is largely caused by the 
relative weighting given to the move system. A final remarkable result is that, although 
Frigate Variant 2 is the worst performing in all cases, the margin by which it fails in the 
first scenario is increased compared to the other two scenarios, principally due to the 
location of its aviation facilities. 
 
6.4.2 Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution 
 
The next sensitivity study was related to the lengthwise probability hit 
distribution. As described in Section 6.2.4, a linear lengthwise probability hit 
distribution (rather than the normal distribution shown in Figure 6.4 which was used in 
all above vulnerability data processing) was assumed. This linear lengthwise probability 
hit distribution (Figure 6.23) was applied to the data given in Table A42, Table A43 and 
Table A44 in the manner outlined in Sections 4.2 and 6.3. The vulnerability of each 
major system given an ASM hit at a WT section was multiplied by the probability that 
the given WT section was hit and by taking the sum of these results, the total 
vulnerability for each system was obtained. This sensitivity study was also only applied 
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to the three frigate design variants. The effect of changing the lengthwise hit probability 
pattern from a normal to a linear distribution is shown in Figure 6.34, Figure 6.35 and 
Figure 6.36. 
 
 
Figure 6.34: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for Frigate Variant 1 (Varying 
Lengthwise Hit Distribution) 
 
 
Figure 6.35: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for Frigate Variant 2 (Varying 
Lengthwise Hit Distribution) 
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Figure 6.36: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for Frigate Variant 3 (Varying 
Lengthwise Hit Distribution) 
 
Evidently, the selected pattern of the lengthwise hit distribution of the ASM on 
the ship has a large effect on the vulnerability of the modelled major ship systems to the 
ASM. Some systems present vulnerability fluctuations of 50% or more. After 
normalising the data above with respect to the baseline (Frigate Variant 1), weighing 
given the weightings in Figure 4.1 and summing the outcomes, the total vulnerability 
results presented in Figure 6.37 were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 6.37: Normalised Plot of Vulnerability for the Three Frigate Variants (Varying 
Lengthwise Hit Distribution) 
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Surprisingly, despite the large vulnerability variances previously observed the 
normalised total vulnerability results illustrated in Figure 6.37 are virtually unaffected 
by the choice of the lengthwise pattern of ASM hit probabilities. 
 
6.4.3 ASM Attack Angle 
 
 All vulnerability data presented above were obtained by simulating broadside 
missile attacks, with an elevation of 0o, in SURVIVE Lite. It was deemed appropriate to 
perform a brief investigation on the effect of varying the angle of attack. This 
investigation was carried out on the SURVIVE Lite model of the Destroyer design, 
simulating the effect of the same ASM with an 165kg warhead and a medium fragment 
pattern on the same ship systems listed in Table 4.1. However, in order to reduce 
computation and data processing time, it was decided to apply a single hit grid across 
the entire dimension of the design, rather than applying separate hit grids on each WT 
section (Figure 4.4) as was the norm in all previous investigations. The angles of attack 
considered, as well as the system vulnerability outputs, are summarised in Table A49 
(see Appendix 11.4) and Figure 6.38. The first number in the legend of Figure 6.38 is 
the ASM attack azimuth (0o/360o representing the stern and 90o the port side) and the 
second number is the ASM attack elevation, both in degrees. 
 
 
Figure 6.38: Total Major Ship System Vulnerability for the Destroyer (Varying Missile 
Attack Angle) 
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Although an overall pattern is observed in Figure 6.38, all systems investigated 
present vulnerability fluctuations of more than 50% depending on the angle of ASM 
attack. This suggests that in survivability assessment it is important to not only examine 
different hit locations (of a specific weapon), but also different threat trajectories. (Note 
that this sensitivity study was conducted on the Destroyer rather than Frigate Variant 1 
since it was carried out during a four week placement at Dstl, during which access only 
to the Destroyer SURVIVE Lite model was available). 
 
6.5 Recoverability Assessment Results 
 
 The procedure detailed in Section 4.3 was followed in order to obtain 
recoverability results for all ship design studies. The Paramarine models of all ships 
were completed and the SURVIVE Lite models were run as described in Section 6.3 in 
order to obtain the PM results presented in this section. 
 
6.5.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
 The recoverability performance matrices for the three frigate designs are 
presented in Table 6.12, Table 6.13 and Table 6.14. The matrices are identical to Table 
4.6. The weightings (in red) are the ones presented in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 
(PM weightings for each PM Category) and Table 4.7 (group weightings). The 
numerals in black are the raw PM data given an ASM hit at each WT section (averaged 
port and starboard hit), while the numerals in blue are equal to the same raw PM data 
multiplied by the probability that the corresponding WT section is hit (i.e. Figure 6.4), 
as outlined in Section 4.3.4. All normalisation have been conducted with respect to 
Frigate Variant 1, consequently all values in the two columns with ‘normalised wrt 
baseline’ data are equal to 1 in Table 6.12. 
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The above total scores for each ship design were normalised with respect to the 
baseline total score (hence Frigate Variant 1 has a recoverability performance of 1) in 
order to obtain the total recoverability performance results shown in Figure 6.39. The 
higher the score, the worse the performance and, therefore, in effect the difficulty of 
recoverability in a given design is shown by the relative magnitude. 
 
 
Figure 6.39: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants 
 
The main observation from Figure 6.39 is that the two monohulls portray very 
similar recoverability characteristics. Conversely, the trimaran frigate design appears to 
be approximately 40% more recoverable than its two counterparts. This is further 
discussed in Section 7.3.1. 
 
6.5.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 The identical procedure was followed with the intention of investigating the 
recoverability performance of the Corvette and Destroyer designs. The recoverability 
performance matrices for the two additional combatant designs are presented in Table 
6.15 and Table 6.16. As before, all normalisation have been conducted with respect to 
Frigate Variant 1, Table 6.12. 
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In Table 6.15 and Table 6.16 the weighting values of PMs 1.8-1.10 (i.e. the 
NBCD store related PMs) are absent. This is due to the different number of NBCD 
stores each combatant contained. As summarised in Section 5.2 the baseline frigate 
included four NBCD stores (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.9), the Corvette contained two 
(Figure 5.42 and Figure 5.48) and the Destroyer five (Figure 5.43 and Figure 5.49). It 
was decided that the total weighting of all NBCD stores suggested by 1st Lt. Fonseca 
(Table 4.3), i.e. 4, would be divided between the quantity of NBCD stores. Table 6.17 
shows the weighting scheme adopted for the NBCD stores for the Corvette, baseline 
frigate (same as before) and Destroyer design studies. 
 
Table 6.17: NBCD Store Weighting Scheme for the Corvette, Baseline Frigate and 
Destroyer 
 
PM 
Weighting 
Corvette Frigate Variant 1 Destroyer 
1.8 NBCD stores - aft FRP section base 2 1 0.8 
1.9 NBCD stores - fwd FRP section base 2 1 0.8 
1.10 Remaining NBCD stores 0 2 2.4 
Total 4 4 4 
 
After normalising the total recoverability scores of the Corvette and Destroyer 
designs with respect to the baseline total score, the results shown in Figure 6.40 were 
obtained. 
 
 
Figure 6.40: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Corvette, Frigate 
Variants and Destroyer 
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From Figure 6.40 it can be deduced that recoverability performance is more 
sensitive to hullform configuration than to ship size. In addition, one could assume that 
recoverability performance worsens with decreasing ship size, which could be expected. 
However, the fact that the Destroyer design performs marginally worse than the 
baseline frigate suggests that the above statement requires further exploration, which is 
addressed in Section 7.3.2. 
 
6.5.3 AOR Variants 
 
 Lastly, the procedure previously described was reproduced in order to 
investigate the recoverability performance of the two replenishment ship designs. The 
corresponding recoverability performance matrices are shown in Table 6.18 and Table 
6.19 and are identical to Table 4.8. A different weighting scheme to the above 
combatant design studies (detailed in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) was applied. 
However, this was necessary for consistency reasons since the weighting scheme 
proposed for the AORs major systems (Table 4.9) was given by a different officer, Lt. 
Cdr. (rtd.) Day. It was, therefore, deemed necessary that the PM weighting scheme 
should also be proposed by the same officer. Note that PM and group normalisation 
have been performed with respect to the corresponding value of the worst performing 
design variant. As with susceptibility and vulnerability assessment, in the case of the 
AOR design studies, normalisations were performed with respect to the worst 
performing design, rather than a baseline, the reasoning behind which is explained in 
Section 7.2.4. 
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By inspecting the two PM matrices above it became evident that certain 
modifications were required in order to apply the overall recoverability method to the 
AOR design studies. Firstly, the presence of two naval stores in AOR Variant 1 (Figure 
5.69) necessitated the alteration of two PMs and the creation of two new PMs; namely 
PMs 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 (aft naval stores and fwd naval stores respectively) and PMs 3.3.1 
and 3.3.2 (access measure from aft naval stores and access measure from fwd naval 
stores respectively). The weightings of the previous PMs 2.3 and 3.3 (both of which 
were equal to 2, see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) were equally split between the new PMs, 
with all four PMs having weightings of unity each. 
Secondly, AOR Variant 2 included a single workshop, spare gear store and 
naval store (Figure 5.70), in contrast to the duplicated above compartments in the first 
variant. It was assumed that, given the identical requirements of both ship designs, the 
total workshops and stores in both variants would contain identical systems, equipment 
and material (and, therefore, the total weight and volume of these compartments was 
equal in both design studies). It was therefore, decided that for AOR Variant 2, PMs 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2, PMs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 (mentioned above) as well as PM pairs 2.2 and 2.1, 
2.4 and 2.5, 3.4 and 3.6 and finally 3.5 and3.7 (i.e. all workshops, spare gear stores and 
naval stores related PMs, see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) would be given the same value 
(which would be equal to the PM values for the single workshop, spare gear store and 
naval store respectively, calculated as described in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). After 
normalising the total scores of the AOR variant (Table 6.18 and Table 6.19) with 
respect to the worst performing design, the total recoverability performance results 
shown in Figure 6.41 were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 6.41: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Two AOR Variants 
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From above it is evident that both AOR design variants present near identical 
recoverability characteristics despite the different configurations adopted. 
 
6.6 Recoverability Assessment Sensitivity Studies 
 
 Sensitivity studies were also carried out in the recoverability part of the 
survivability assessment method. Three sensitivity studies were conducted:- 
- The application of different weighting schemes was examined; 
- The effect on recoverability, given a different lengthwise probability hit 
distribution on the frigate variants was investigated; 
- The effect of decoupling the proposed recoverability assessment approach from 
SURVIVE Lite was explored. 
 
6.6.1 Weighting Schemes 
 
The initial investigation, as in the vulnerability assessment approach (Section 
6.4.1), was on the sensitivity of the recoverability assessment method to the weighting 
scheme applied. The same RN officers listed in Table 6.11 were interviewed and asked 
to fill in a form (Appendix 12) suggesting alternative weighting schemes (Mant 2012; 
Hood 2012; Sutcliffe 2012; Boughton 2012; Koheeallee 2012; O’Brien 2012; 
Kadinopoulos 2012). Consistently, the naval officers were asked to weigh each PM 
between 0-10, ten being the most important and they were not exposed to previous 
weighting schemes so as to not affect their responses. Their proposed weighting 
schemes, including the ones suggested by 1st Lt. Fonseca and Lt. Cdr. (rtd.) Day which 
have already been reported (Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5), are presented in Table 
6.20, Table 6.21 and Table 6.22. Unlike the system weighting schemes in the 
vulnerability assessment part of the method (Table 6.11) the PM weighting schemes are 
scenario independent. This sensitivity test was only carried out to the three frigate 
design variants. 
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It is worth mentioning some of the remarks made by the above officers on the 
Category 1 (immediate DCFF) PMs whilst filling in the weighting scheme form. 1st Lt. 
Fonseca (2011) commented that DC equipment is usually distributed through the ship 
(mainly on the DC deck, in proximity to the FRPPs), whereas NBCD stores merely 
contain maintenance material for the DC equipment. Hence the high weighting 
proposed by this officer for PM 1.16 and PM 1.17 and the low weightings given to 
NBCD store related PMs (PMs 1.8-1.10). Besides, he recommended the addition of 
Category 1 PMs describing the status of fixed firefighting systems, detection equipment, 
communications and the sickbay (for personnel recovery) after successful attack. Lt. 
Cdr. (rtd.) Mant (2012) suggested the addition of a Category 1 PM reflecting on the 
condition of smoke curtains (to prevent spread of smoke) after attack. Lt. Cdr. Hood 
(2012) recommended Category 1 PMs related to training as well as situational 
awareness and command and control (although it can be argued that command and 
control is incorporated in PMs 1.13-1.15). Moreover he gave a very low weighting to 
PM 1.15, Operations Room, since DCFF is associated with an automatic response, 
therefore, theoretically does not require substantial input from the CO. Lt. Cdr. 
Boughton (2012) mentioned that the addition of a Weapon Section Base Category 1 PM 
would be beneficial, therefore, linking the external and internal battles. He also 
proposed that the duplicated forward and aft FRPPs, as well as their corresponding 
NBCD stores, should have different weightings given that they provide the same 
function. However, since the decision of which of the two section bases and stores 
would be given higher priority depends on the CO and the operational circumstances, 
the two weightings given by that officer were averaged; thus the decimal fraction form 
of the relevant weightings. This would have the same effect as interchanging the higher 
priority FRPP and corresponding NBCD store, obtaining the recoverability results for 
both cases and averaging. Finally, Lt. Koheeallee (2012) suggested a Category 1 PM on 
the state of internal communications after the hit. 
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Regarding the Category 2 (major system recovery) PMs, there was some 
uncertainty as to what the naval and spare gear stores contained. According to 1st Lt 
Fonseca (2011) and Lt. Cdr. Hood (2012) the naval stores contained raw material, 
whereas the spare gear stores included spare parts. For this reason, given that most 
equipment and systems in modern frigates are electronic, raw material is of decreased 
worth, therefore, 1st Lt. Fonseca proposed a diminutive weighting for PM 2.3, in 
contrast to the relatively high weightings of PMs 2.4-2.5. However, Lt. Cdr. Hood did 
not agree with the above argument, therefore, suggesting almost equal weightings for 
both naval and spare gear store related PMs. 1st Lt. Fonseca further justified the large 
weightings for PMs 2.4-2.5 since there is no spares duplication. Moreover, he reasoned 
that most repair activities are performed on site; therefore, rationalising the relatively 
small weighting of the workshop related PMs. Lt. Cdr. Hood also proposed the addition 
of Category 2 PMs reflecting on then availability of people and their skills, necessary 
for system repair and recovery. Once again, Lt. Cdr. Boughton (2012) proposed the 
addition of a Weapon Section Base Category 2 PM. Furthermore, Lt. Koheeallee (2012) 
suggested that an updated bridge Category 2 PM is beneficial. 
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Regarding the Category 3 (individual major system recovery) PMs, form Table 
6.22 it is clear that the officers ranked the importance of access from the workshops and 
stores in a corresponding order to their importance for major system recovery (Table 
6.21). In addition, they generally agreed that access to the damaged WT section is more 
important than access of damaged equipment and compartments from the stores and 
workshops and that to have a system functioning due to redundant equipment (PM 3.1) 
is of greater significant than to have all, including redundant, equipment of a system 
functioning (PM 3.2). The PM weighting schemes were plotted in a line graph (Figure 
6.42) in order to compare the different weighting scheme philosophies of the 
interviewed officers. 
 
 
Category 1 
 
Category 2 
 
Category 3 
 
Figure 6.42: Performance Measures Weighting Scheme Philosophies for the Sensitivity 
Tests 
 
Some very broad patterns may be distinguished, although, the fact that each 
officer reflects on his own experiences and knowledge and is specialised in a different 
area, has led to significant variations in certain PMs. It is observed that the PM 
weighting schemes are more diverse than the major system weighting schemes proposed 
by the same officers, presented in Figure 6.30. This could be due to the fact that the 
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major system weighting schemes are scenario dependant and, therefore, probably rely to 
a significant extent on the response that the officers have been trained to execute in such 
situations (which should be similar, given that most of them served in the same navy 
and underwent similar training). The PM weighting schemes also rely on procedures to 
which the officers have been trained, however, the internal threat is much more visible 
and direct than the external threat, therefore, possibly the interviewed staff input 
elements of their own response to the internal battle, judged on the picture of it that they 
have created. 
 The weighting schemes in Table 6.20, Table 6.21 and Table 6.22 were 
substituted in the column headed ‘Weighting’ in Table 6.12, Table 6.13 and Table 6.14. 
In addition, for consistency reasons, the values in the ‘Group Weighting’ column were 
substituted by the major system weighting schemes proposed by the corresponding 
officers, Table 6.11, therefore, obtaining recoverability performance scores for the three 
scenarios summarised in Table 6.10. However, Table 6.11 includes weightings for the 
move and Fight groups, but not for the float and recovery support groups (refer to Table 
4.7). Therefore, the naval officers were also asked to propose weightings for the two 
remaining groups, which are presented in Table 6.23. 
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All officers gave the maximum weighting, 10, to the float group, for all 
scenarios. Moreover, Cdr. Sutcliffe (2012) and Lt. Cdr. O’Brien (2012) proposed a 
smaller recovery support group weighting for Scenario 2 and for Scenarios 2 and 3 
respectively. This probably reflects on the littoral location of the threats (Table 6.10), 
providing the ships with the opportunity to withdraw and proceed towards onshore 
repair bases rather than carrying out the repair and recovery activities on board during 
the scenario’s evolutions. The threat in Scenario 2 is shore based, therefore, cannot 
pursue the ship if it withdraws. However, Lt. Cdr. Kadinopoulos (2012) proposed a 
lower weighting for the recovery support group in the first (blue water) scenario, 
possibly implying that repair and recovery is increasingly difficult far from base, 
therefore, the crew should focus efforts in other mission areas. 
 Once the weighting scheme corresponding to each officer and scenario was 
substituted in the PM matrices, the data was processed in an identical manner as 
described in Section 4.3 and 6.5. The results illustrated in Figure 6.43, Figure 6.44 and 
Figure 6.45 were produced for the three scenarios respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.43: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants (Sensitivity Test, Scenario 1) 
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Figure 6.44: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants (Sensitivity Test, Scenario 2) 
 
 
Figure 6.45: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants (Sensitivity Test, Scenario 3) 
 
As in the study of the sensitivity of the vulnerability weighting scheme, the main 
observation from the three investigations above is that recoverability is dependent to a 
significantly greater extent on the characteristics of the ship design itself, rather than the 
scenario or the weighting scheme applied. Furthermore, despite the scenario 
independence of the weighting scheme provided by 1st Lt. Fonseca, the results outputted 
are consistent with those that applied the RN officers’ proposed weighting schemes. 
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6.6.2 Lengthwise Probability Hit Distribution 
 
 Similarly to the vulnerability assessment approach sensitivity studies (Section 
6.4.2), the next investigation regarding the recoverability approach concerned the 
examination of the sensitivity of the results with respect to the lengthwise probability hit 
distribution. This was done by using the linear lengthwise probability hit distribution, 
illustrated in Figure 6.23, in place of the normal distribution (Figure 6.4). This data was 
therefore substituted in Table 6.12, Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 and the procedure 
summarised in Sections 4.3 and 6.5 was followed. That is, raw PM data, given an ASM 
hit at each WT section (averaged port and starboard hit), was multiplied by the 
probability that the corresponding WT section is hit and after a series of normalisations, 
weightings and summations, the results illustrated in Figure 6.46 were obtained. This 
sensitivity study was also applied only to the frigate design variants. 
 
 
Figure 6.46: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants (Varying Lengthwise Hit Distribution) 
 
From above it is evident that the lengthwise probability hit distribution does not 
significantly affect the recoverability performance of the frigate designs. The only point 
worth mentioning is that, with a linear distribution, the second variant improves its 
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performance by approximately 7%, although the trimaran variant still presents the most 
promising results by a significant margin (approximately 70% better). 
 
6.6.3 SURVIVE Lite Decoupling 
 
 As detailed in Section 4.3, the SURVIVE Lite ship design models were used in 
order to indicate if a specified item (corresponding to a PM) had been affected by a 
specific hit; if it had, the PM would be given a value based on the assumed number of 
man-hours to repair that specific equipment, otherwise it would be equal to zero. One 
could argue that through this procedure vulnerability is incorporated in the 
recoverability assessment method (and, therefore, double-counted) rather than 
measuring recoverability independently. (Although, as indicated in Section 4.3, no 
vulnerability percentages were used in the recoverability assessment method since, in 
order to carry out recoverability assessment, vulnerability (and susceptibility) is 
required to be equal to unity.) For this reason, it was decided to repeat the recoverability 
assessment procedure for the three frigate design variants, this time assuming that an 
ASM hit at any WT section of the ship would affect all equipment and compartments 
modelled (with the exception of underwater equipment, i.e. propellers, rudders and hull 
mounted sonars, which were assumed to be unaffected by the abovewater threat 
studied). This then decoupled the recoverability method from the SURVIVE Lite 
vulnerability assessment software. Other than the above alteration, an identical 
procedure to that described in Sections 4.3 and 6.5 was followed in order to produce the 
PM matrices shown in Table 6.24, Table 6.25 and Table 6.26. As before, the weightings 
(in red) are the ones proposed by 1st Lt. Fonseca for combatant type ships. The 
numerals in black are the raw PM data given an ASM hit at each WT section (assuming 
all items are affected), while the numerals in blue give the same raw PM data multiplied 
by the probability that the corresponding WT section is hit. All normalisation have been 
conducted with respect to Frigate Variant 1. 
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After the total score for each ship design was normalised with respect to the 
baseline total score, the total recoverability performance results shown in Figure 6.47 
were obtained. 
  
 
Figure 6.47: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Recoverability for the Three Frigate 
Variants (Assuming All Items Affected By Every Hit) 
 
Interestingly, this modification caused a 100% reduction in the recoverability 
performance of the trimaran frigate design, whereas the first two variants are very 
similar. Therefore, Frigate Variant 3 is now the worst performing design by 
approximately 20%. Given that all three variants have identical systems and near 
identical system architectures (Appendix 7), the main cause for the trimaran resulting in 
worse results than the two monohulls is associated with the location of its stores and 
workshops in relation to the move system. However, the procedure followed above 
raises some scepticism linked to the assumption that a given threat would affect (and, 
therefore, recovery would be dependent on) the same items in two different designs. 
 
6.7 Total Survivability Assessment Results 
 
 As mentioned in Section 4.4, it was decided to combine the results of the three 
survivability constituents in the form of star plots. The total survivability star plot for 
the three frigate design studies is illustrated in Figure 6.48. The data presented below 
are identical to the survivability constituent results presented in Figure 6.3, Figure 6.25 
and Figure 6.39 and are, therefore, normalised with respect to the baseline frigate. Each 
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star (triangle in this case) represents a specific ship design and the smaller the area of 
the triangle, the more survivable against an ASM threat that ship design is. 
 
 
Figure 6.48: Normalised Star Plot of Survivability for the Three Frigate Design 
Variants 
 
Similarly, Figure 6.49 is the total survivability star plot of the Corvette and 
Destroyer design studies, including Frigate Variant 1 against which the results (Figure 
6.7, Figure 6.27 and Figure 6.40) were normalised.  
 
 
Figure 6.49: Normalised Star Plot of Survivability for the Corvette, Baseline Frigate 
and Destroyer 
 
Finally, the total survivability star plot of the two auxiliary ship designs is 
illustrated in Figure 6.50. As already pointed out, the survivability results of these two 
design studies (Figure 6.11, Figure 6.29 and Figure 6.41) have been normalised with 
respect to the worst performing, rather than a baseline design. 
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Figure 6.50: Normalised Star Plot of Survivability for the  Two AOR Variants 
 
 Moreover, it was decided to investigate the applicability of PM matrices for total 
survivability assessment. The procedure followed, detailed in Section 4.4, is similar to 
that for the recoverability assessment method, although total ship susceptibility and 
equipment vulnerability data were combined. This procedure was only carried out for 
the three frigate variant designs, and the results are illustrated in Figure 6.51. In Figure 
6.51, the higher the score, the worse the performance, consequently, the difficulty of a 
given design to survive a given threat is measured; furthermore, all results have been 
normalised with respect to the baseline frigate as was the norm. 
 
 
Figure 6.51: Normalised Plot of Difficulty of Survivability for the Three Frigate Design 
Variants 
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Although the results revealed above are in agreement with the frigate designs’ 
total survivability star plot in Figure 6.48, the appropriateness of such a procedure to 
estimate total ship survivability is questionable. Not only because of the multiplications 
involved between the survivability constituents connoting statistical independence (refer 
to Sections 3.3.5 and 4.4) which is not the case in the star plots, but also the PM 
matrices were specifically designed to examine recoverability, rather than total 
survivability. 
 
6.8 Ship Costing Results 
 
Cost analysis for the three frigate variants was undertaken in order to give an 
indication as to how survivability gains could be measured against ship cost. A brief 
discussion on ship costing is given in Section 2.2. Since it was beyond the scope of this 
research to create a new or modify a current naval ship costing method, it was decided 
to follow the procedure and use the parametric relationships and costing data given by 
UCL (2010a; 2010b). 
 
6.8.1 Unit Procurement Cost 
 
The parametric naval ship UPC relationships used are specific to the 4th ship of a 
class of twelve, designed to RN standards in 2008 prices and are in accordance with the 
UCL weight and space classification system (UCL 2010b). It should be noted that all 
cost analyses were carried out using 2008 prices (and, therefore, the results presented 
are in 2008 prices). The equation used in order to calculate the cost of a weight group, 
CgrpA, (with the exception of specific items, i.e. engines, electric motors and payload 
items) was (UCL 2010b): 
 
 CgrpA = 1.15 × MCgrpA × WgrpA + HR × LRgrpA × WgrpA (7) 
 
1.15 is the purchasing overhead factor used, MCgrpA is the material and equipment cost 
in £/te, WgrpA is the mass of the weight group, HR is the hourly labour rate in £/hr 
(assumed as £0.05016k/hr for UK shipyards) and LRgrpA is the required labour in man-
hours/te for that group (UCL 2010b). Detailed cost data for all weight groups and 
specific items are presented in the Appendices A13.1 for all three frigate designs. It 
should be noted that where cost data for specific items was inaccessible, data for similar 
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equipment was used. In addition, if the data obtained was not in 2008 levels, it was 
converted using RPI annual inflation data provided by (ONS 2012). After calculating 
the cost of each weight group, the cost margins listed in Table A57 (see Appendix 13.1) 
were applied. The UPCs of the three frigate variants were calculated as approximately 
£294M, £300M and £308M respectively (with detailed results presented in Appendix 
13.1). Figure 6.52 below illustrates the proportion of each weight group on the UPC of 
the three frigate design studies. 
 
Frigate Variant 1 
 
Frigate Variant 2 
 
Frigate Variant 3 
 
 
Figure 6.52: UPC Proportions for the Three Frigate Variants 
 
From the data and results presented above, the general observation is that UPC 
is not greatly affected (at least, to a much lesser extent than survivability performance) 
by ship configuration. 
 
6.8.2 Through Life Cost 
 
A number of TLC related costs were calculated for the three frigate designs.  
Annual fuel consumption was calculated by assuming an annual operational 
period of 200 days and the simplified operational profile illustrated in Figure A107 (see 
Appendix 13.2), similar to that used by Dirksen (1996). The total annual fuel 
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consumption for the three frigates was calculated as approximately 6,290te, 6,590te and 
6,500te respectively. MDO prices were forecasted by plotting historical data from 
(MOT 2013) (and using £ to $ exchange rates from (X-Rates 2012; BGFRS 2013)) and 
fitting an exponential trendline (see Figure A108 in Appendix 13.2). The resulting 
exponential relationship used to forecast MDO prices was: 
 
 MDO Price (Year), in £/te = 4 × 10-88 × e0.1032 × Year (8) 
 
Although the equation above contains vast uncertainties, it is believed that it is more 
than sufficient for the comparative study being undertaken. Further research on future 
fuel prices is beyond the scope of this project. Moreover, a discount rate, r, of 6% was 
assumed (Dirksen 1996), where the discount factor is defined by Dirksen (1996) as “the 
increase in value of money, above inflation, over time, i.e. if the cost of a system or 
equipment is fixed it will effectively cost less if it is paid for later than sooner due to the 
fact that the cash can be invested and earn interest in the interim”. Therefore, the present 
value, PV, of the future costs, F, (at year n after 2008, assumed year of start of 
construction) was calculated through the following relationship (Dirksen 1996; UCL 
2010b): 
 
 PV = F ÷ (1 + r)n (9) 
 
Detailed tables of forecasted fuel costs for the three frigate variants predicted using 
Equations 8 and 9 are presented in Appendix 13.2. 
 Crew costs were estimated by assuming the simplified salaries presented Table 
A61 of Appendix 13.2. Given the complement of each ship design (Table A2, Table A3 
and Table A4 in Appendix 9.1) annual crew costs for the three frigate variants were 
estimated at £3.18M, £3.23M and £3.49M respectively. Rather than using a relationship 
similar to Equation 8, an annual inflation of 4% was assumed for crew costs. The 
present value was then calculated using Equation 9, with through life crew costs for the 
three frigates presented in Appendix 13.2. 
 The costs of consumables were forecasted using the data in Table A62 of 
Appendix 13.2. As with crew costs, the total annual consumable costs were calculated 
for each frigate design given the frigate complement (£0.53M, £0.54M and £0.58M 
respectively), inflated annually by 4% and discounted using Equation 9. Detailed results 
are presented in the Appendix 13.2. 
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 In order to calculate the annual maintenance costs, the data presented in Table 
A63 of Appendix 13.2 was utilised. This then led to an annual maintenance cost of 
£4.40M, £4.40M and £4.42M for each frigate variant respectively. After inflating and 
discounting the annual maintenance costs in a similar manner as described above, the 
through life maintenance costs presented in Appendix 13.2 were obtained. 
 The final TLC element is related to the costs associated with refits. It was 
assumed that major refits occurred every eight years with minor refits between major 
ones (UCL 2010b). Table A64 of Appendix 13.2 lists assumed cost data for refits. The 
hourly labour rate used was the same as in the UPC estimation section, i.e. 
£0.05016k/hr for UK shipyards (UCL 2010b). After applying the above relationships, 
the costs of major refits were estimated at £52.12M, £53.02M and £54.26M and minor 
refits at £18.71M, £19.01M and £19.43M for the three frigate designs respectively. By 
assuming that the vessel construction will take place over a period of 3 years with trials 
and commissioning completed in the 4th year (Dirksen 1996), the dates of planned refits 
were estimated and the associated costs were inflated and discounted accordingly, in the 
manner described above. Detailed forecasted refit associated costs are presented in 
Appendix 13.2. 
 The total TLCs for the three frigates were than calculated by assuming a service 
life of 30 years. Annual cost expenditure for the three frigate designs is presented in 
Figure 6.53 (and in Appendix 13.2). Although UPC is not part of TLC, UPC values (of 
the 4th vessel in a class of twelve, as calculated above) are included in Figure 6.53. It 
was assumed that 30% of the total UPC is paid in each of the first 3 years with the 
remaining 10% paid by the end of the 4th year (Dirksen 1996). 
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Figure 6.53: Annual Costs for the Three Frigate Variants 
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TLC can also be separated into maintenance costs (consumables, maintenance 
and refits costs) and cost of ownership (fuel and crew costs) and compared to UPC, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.54. 
 
Frigate Variant 1 
 
Frigate Variant 2 
 
Frigate Variant 3 
 
 
Figure 6.54: TLC Proportions for the Three Frigate Variants including UPC 
 
From the above data and analysis it follows that the TLC for the three frigate 
variants is equal to £519.44M, £532.28M and £540.45M respectively. Once again, the 
general observation is that ship cost (in this case TLC) is not as sensitive as 
survivability performance to variations in ship configuration.  
 
6.8.3 Whole Life Cost 
 
 The final and most meaningful cost to be estimated is the whole life cost. This is 
calculated by combining the UPC, TLC, FOC costs and ship disposal costs of a class. 
First, it was assumed that the frigate class consisted of twelve ships in total and the UPC 
previously calculated was representative of the fourth vessel (UCL 2010b). Due to the 
shipyard learning curve, it is recognised that longer production runs may lead to 
reduced UPCs due to reasons such as increases of economies of scale brought about by 
increasing the amount of materials and number of equipment items purchased and 
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improvements in production planning and processes in the shipyard as they become 
familiar with the design (UCL 2010b). The following relationship was used to estimate 
the UPC of each of the twelve vessels (UCL 2010b): 
 
 UPCshipn = UPCship4 × 1.16 × shipn-0.105 (10) 
 
Furthermore, the TLC of all vessels was assumed constant, i.e. no learning curve 
was assumed. FOC costs, or design and construction services, were assumed to be equal 
to 20% of the UPC of the 4th vessel for a naval ship (UCL 2010b). This is a one-off cost 
including elements such as office setup, design, drawings, recruitment and 
administrative costs (UCL 2010b). Moreover, by assuming that all ships will be 
recycled within the UK when decommissioned (33 years after construction begins, 
Figure 6.53), a disposal cost of £0.68M per ship was assumed (UCL 2010b). This value 
was inflated by applying the assumed annual 4% inflation and discounted annually by 
6% as above, in order to get the present value of the disposal cost at the year of 
decommissioning. Finally, it was assumed that all twelve ships of the class (of each of 
the three frigate variants) were constructed and disposed of in the same years. This is 
clearly unlikely; however, it was assumed during this comparative study for 
simplification purposes and does not alter the essential WLC comparison. Figure 6.55 
illustrates the relative proportions of all WLC elements mentioned above (detailed 
results are presented in Appendix 13.3). 
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Frigate Variant 1 
 
Frigate Variant 2 
 
Frigate Variant 3 
 
 
Figure 6.55: WLC Proportions for the Three Frigate Variants (for a Class of Twelve) 
 
From above, the WLCs were estimated at £9,740M, £9,970M and £10,160M for 
each frigate variant class respectively. From the above results it is observed that WLC is 
not greatly affected by ship configuration. This was expected since WLC is almost 
entirely dependent on UPC and TLC, for which the same observations were made. This 
is additional confirmation that ship configuration has a greater influence on 
survivability as opposed to ship costs. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
 The first five sections of this chapter discuss the analysis of the results reported 
in Chapter 6. The results were produced by applying the developed survivability 
assessment method (Chapter 4) to the ship design studies summarised in Chapter 5, as 
well as through the costing study undertaken. The final section of this chapter links the 
developed method to the research background (see Chapters 2 and 3). This is done to 
address whether the research aim (Chapter 1) has been met, to assess the extent to which 
that aim has been achieved and also to identify areas requiring further work. 
 
7.1 Susceptibility Assessment Results Analysis 
 
7.1.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
The susceptibility results produced for the three frigate variants are essentially 
the same since all ship designs had similar RCSs and identical defensive systems to 
counter the same postulated threat. The minor differences in the susceptibility results 
are solely caused by the small variations in RCS (and therefore, P(l)). These differences 
are minor since similar RCS reduction techniques were used during the design phase of 
the frigate variants; namely, the application of a 7o slope to all superstructure sides and 
certain equipment and the placing of as much likely microgeometry as possible behind 
bulwarks. The small differences in the RCS values observed between the three frigate 
variants were caused by the variations in hull, superstructure and upperdeck 
arrangement between the three designs. Further analysis to identify the specific causes 
of these variations was not conducted for a number of reasons. For example, the 
variations are too small (less than 15%) to justify any further work; a large amount of 
work has already been done in RCS reduction techniques and validated through full 
scale tests (see Section 3.3.2), therefore, being beyond the scope of this research; and 
most importantly, the RCS prediction software used, SPECTRE could not be accessed 
daily, since it was operated by the sponsor of this research (Dstl) rather than UCL itself. 
However, certain variations in susceptibility relevant features reported in Section 6.2 
were investigated. These included alterations to microgeometry (7o rotation of the RAS 
high points in Frigate Variant 1) and shaping (application of a 7o flare on specific 
sections of the box structure and side hulls of Frigate Variant 3). The resultant 
improvement in the P(l) values for these designs (60% and 75% respectively) seemed to 
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match indications from adopting currently accepted RCS reduction techniques 
(Appendix 4.1) and justifies the efforts made in signatures reduction of current naval 
ships. In addition, it can be concluded that both hull and superstructure shaping and 
microgeometry management should be employed as extensively as possible. 
It was also demonstrated that susceptibility results were to a large degree 
sensitive to the targeting pattern of the defensive missiles. By assuming that each pair of 
defensive missiles launched by the targeted ship could only home in on one attacking 
ASM, the frigate designs, each launching four defensive missiles, could only target two 
of the four attacking ASMs. If, however, each defensive missile was able to target a 
separate attacking ASM, all four ASMs could be targeted improving the P(h) by almost 
40%. This highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate defensive missile 
targeting pattern, which largely depends on the characteristics of the incoming threat, 
the prediction of which is extremely challenging. 
 
7.1.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 When carrying out the comparative study between the Corvette, baseline frigate 
and Destroyer designs, larger variations in the results were observed. As expected, the 
Corvette design had the smallest RCS (and therefore, P(l)) out of all combatant designs, 
due to its smaller size. However, the difference between the RCS of the Corvette design 
and the three frigate variants was relatively small (between 2% and 15%). Conversely, 
the Destroyer design had the largest RCS by a significant margin, therefore, effectively 
rendering the use of a decoy system against the ASM threat of no use. The large RCS 
increase is not only attributed to its larger size, but also to the different equipment 
selected (e.g.: the two spherical, therefore, poor in terms of RCS, MFR Spectars and the 
larger helicopter) and the increased microgeometry (e.g.: the four additional 12.7mm 
machine guns and two CIWSs) summarised in Table 5.4 of Section 5.2. Again, 
however, further analysis to identify detailed RCS characteristics was not conducted 
mainly since the RCS prediction software, SPECTRE, could not be accessed daily, 
although it would be of interest to detect the specific features (and their effect) that 
cause the approximately quadrupling of the Destroyers RCS, compared to the remaining 
combatants. 
 The second large variation between the Corvette and baseline frigate designs and 
the Destroyer design was related to the P(h). The first two designs, having identical 
AAW system, gave equal results. However, the much more capable AAW system of the 
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Destroyer design led to a substantial improvement decreasing the P(h) by almost 90%. 
This is the largest effect that a single survivability feature has presented out of all 
features investigated in the current project and more than eliminates the effect of the 
larger Destroyer RCS. Therefore, the Destroyer design is approximately two times less 
susceptible than the Corvette and baseline frigate, which present similar susceptibility 
characteristics to each other. 
The Destroyers P(h) characteristics are further improved by approximately 30% 
if each defensive missile is allowed to independently target an attacking missile (rather 
than in pairs). The Destroyer, capable of firing eleven defensive missiles against the 
attacking ASMs, was initially assumed to target the first attacking missile with four 
defensive missiles, the second attacking missile with three defensive missiles and the 
remaining two attacking missiles with two defensive missiles each. By altering this 
pattern to three, three, three and two defensive missiles, the above improvement was 
observed. Finally, a further improvement was observed with the utilisation of longer 
range missiles, also having a larger maximum speed. These missiles, however, were 
limited by the ship design’s radar horizon, therefore, limiting the P(h) improvement to 
approximately 8% (due to the additional defensive missile fired, totalling twelve). If, 
however, the limiting factor was not the radar horizon, the improvement to P(h) would 
be approximately 90% (due to the capability of firing eighteen defensive missiles), 
although this scenario is questionable given the sea-skimming nature of the examined 
threat. 
 
7.1.3 AOR Variants 
 
 The most prominent variation regarding the susceptibility assessment of the two 
AOR variants is the much larger RCS of the first variant (approximately 3.7 times the 
RCS of the second variant) although both designs are similar in size and identical 
susceptibility reduction techniques were used for both. This large difference was caused 
by the two large RCS peaks towards the stern of AOR Variant 1 (not occurring in the 
second variant), at an azimuth of approximately 160o and 200o, as shown in Figure 6.9 
of Section 6.1.3. In order to identify the causes of these large peaks the designs were 
resent to Dstl and rerun in SPECTRE. Although the further analysis was not conclusive, 
it was observed that the forward RAS rig of AOR Variant 1 gave an unexpectedly high 
RCS when viewed from the above azimuth angles; it was suggested that the two peaks 
were caused by a distributed corner reflector (i.e. two or three facets that form a corner, 
267 
 
but do not share a common edge) which typically causes RCS peaks of the magnitude 
and width observed (Patient 2013). Therefore, corrective design action could possibly 
eliminate this occurrence. However, the overall effect of the large RCS difference 
between the two variants on the P(l) was not proportional. In a similar manner to the 
Destroyer design, both AOR variants had an RCS close to or more than the 4000m2 
limit (i.e. twice that of the assumed chaff RCS) above which, in accordance with 
Equation 4, a constant P(l) equal to unity, was employed. Therefore, the larger RCS of 
AOR Variant 1 resulted to a worsening of P(l) by some 30%. It follows that signature 
management loses its importance with ships of increasing signatures, unless decoy 
systems of much greater effectiveness can be utilised. 
 It is of interest that the AOR design variants (which included identical defensive 
systems and, therefore, P(h) values) gave P(h)s similar to the frigate variants and 
Corvette design, although the AOR designs had less capable AAW systems. In fact, the 
auxiliary ship designs were capable of firing only three defensive missiles against the 
four attacking ASMs, one less than the frigate variants and Corvette design. The 
similarity between the two P(h) values is observed solely due to the defensive missile 
targeting pattern adopted. The Corvette and frigate designs and the AOR designs were 
assumed to only target two of the attacking ASMs with their defensive missiles, as 
explained in Section 6.1. However, by allowing each defensive missile to independently 
target an attacking ASM, the Corvette and frigate variants would be capable of targeting 
all four attacking missiles, with the impressive 40% increase in effectiveness. 
Conversely, the AOR designs, launching only three defensive missiles could only target 
a maximum of three of the total four attacking ASMs. Although the P(h) value for the 
AOR designs was slightly improved by approximately 8%, the 40% improvement in the 
combatants could not be matched. 
 When comparing the auxiliary ship designs with the combatant designs it is 
easily observed that the AORs are (at least three times) more susceptible to a sea-
skimming ASM threat mainly due to their greater signatures than the combatants. 
 
7.1.4 General Observations on Susceptibility Assessment 
 
 One of the main differences between susceptibility assessment and vulnerability 
and recoverability assessment is that for the former, given the large variety of threats 
currently existent, a single method is not sufficient. A large number of tools are required 
in order to assess the susceptibility of a design to as many likely threats as possible. In 
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contrast, a single tool to assess vulnerability, such as QinetiQ’s SURVIVE software 
which can model the different current weapon mechanisms, and to assess recoverability 
should be adequate. However, in order to demonstrate the developed survivability 
assessment method, a specific scenario was chosen, that of four sea-skinning ASM 
against a ship design. A number of unclassified techniques were combined in order to 
simulate this scenario. Certain relationships, data and assumptions employed in this part 
of the method (summarised in Section 4.1 and 6.1), are considered to be oversimplistic. 
In addition to the assumptions mentioned in the above sections, it is useful to catalogue 
a number of points regarding the susceptibility assessment method. These were revealed 
from discussions with susceptibility experts at Dstl:- 
- The ASM detection range is affected by the type of sensor and threat; 
- The range of detection of a sea-skimming ASM is not equal to the maximum 
range of the defensive missile (which is usually relevant for larger targets at high 
altitudes, such as aircrafts); 
- The speed profile and, therefore, manoeuvrability of the defensive missile varies 
with time and flight altitude; 
- The defensive missile performance depends on the flight angle relative to the 
ASM (see Figure A15 and Figure A16 in Appendix 4.1); 
- Jammers are not very useful as attacking missiles can home onto them; however, 
it is possible to launch the jammer away from ship via rocket/parachute; 
- Different soft-kill techniques exist for different targets; 
- The relationship between ship and decoy RCS is not linear (as assumed in 
Figure 4.2 and Equations 3 and 4 of Section 4.1). It is possible to manoeuver the 
ship in order to present the lowest RCS possible; so manoeuvrability (including 
speed and acceleration) of the ship plays an important role in susceptibility; 
- Decoys are usually of similar and/or larger RCS than that the ship; 
- Susceptibility is personnel dependent (as analysed in the next paragraph). For 
example an auxiliary ship would have less specialized people to deal with threat 
situations and deploy defensive measures; 
- Chaff effectiveness depends on ASM sensor frequency. 
It is therefore evident that not only a large variety of threats currently exists, but each of 
these involves a large number of variables, highlighting the challenges in susceptibility 
assessment. Numerous such assessment methods already exist; however, since they 
largely rely on classified weapon data, they are not able to be readily accessed. Thus the 
method outlined in Section 4.1 was selected and judged sufficient for the purposes of 
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this research (since it was beyond the scope of this research to develop a new and 
improved susceptibility assessment method; rather, it was primarily about an integrated 
survivability approach at preliminary ship design). 
 Furthermore, it is evident that the susceptibility assessment method applied 
examines the susceptibility of the ship design, without, however, investigating 
situational awareness, which forms an important part of susceptibility performance. One 
of the outcomes of the above statement was the assumption of P(di) equalling 1 for all 
ship design studies. The probability of a ship being detected and identified largely 
depends on situational awareness and operational factors (rather than the ship design 
itself). It could be argued that the ship with lower signature would be more difficult to 
detect, therefore, it is possible that the susceptibility trend shown on the normalised 
susceptibility graphs (Figure 6.3, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.11 in Section 6.1) would 
increase. 
Situational awareness can be split into two sub-categories:- 
- Ship situational awareness, being affected by such factors as sensor type, height 
and wavelength; 
- Human situational awareness, depending upon the ship command’s response to 
the situation, other human factors, manning, experience, length of watch, 
doctrine and training (including simulations and exercises used for training), 
scenario, aims and rules of engagement (e.g.: the target has to be identified 
before engaging it, so usually no action is carried out until hostile act occurs, 
such as with Fast Inshore Attack Crafts which may not pose an obvious threat). 
It could be argued that the susceptibility method adopted accounts for ship situational 
awareness. However, this is not the case with human situational awareness. This is 
particularly important with asymmetric threats and it may be argued that such threats 
are not captured by the ASM attack scenario. Asymmetric threats usually occur in 
littoral (as opposed to blue) waters where the cluttered picture and the reduced reaction 
times, as well as the minimum range of certain sensors, leading to a greater reliance on 
lookouts, increase the importance of human situational awareness. (It might also be 
argued that in such threat situation, developing vulnerability reduction, such as armour 
plating, and recoverability enhancement features is more effective than, for example, 
improving sensor technology). Nevertheless, human performance, including human 
situational awareness, is difficult to quantify. However, it is important to note that the 
developed survivability assessment method does not assess human performance related 
aspects (which are assumed to be constant) but the ship design itself and how the choice 
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of configuration has affected survivability. However, it could be argued that improving 
the ship design in regard to other aspects of human factors might improve the 
susceptibility aspect of survivability (Andrews et al 2008). 
 At this point it is useful to attempt and define the scale on the y-axis of the 
normalised susceptibility charts (Figure 6.3, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.11 in Section 6.1). 
In the case of susceptibility assessment this is relatively easy, with zero being defined as 
the ship being assessed not being hit by a specified threat (i.e. one or more of the 
following probabilities: P(di), P(l) and P(h), have a value equal to zero). Unity can then 
be defined as the susceptibility performance of a baseline design. The definition of unity 
could be changed straightforwardly to: the ship being assessed is definitely hit by a 
specified threat (i.e. P(di), P(l) and P(h) are all equal to one), which would signify the 
worst possible case for susceptibility. 
 A general conclusion on susceptibility can be made that the large sensitivities (to 
relatively small changes) observed in the susceptibility part of the survivability 
assessment method, combined with the many simplistic assumptions made and the large 
variety of current threats which have to be accounted for, justify the considerable 
investigation in this topic. This research then justifies work carried out in this first 
survivability constituent and thus the need for an accurate susceptibility assessment 
method. Nevertheless, through the combination and use of simplified and unclassified 
susceptibility assessment tools, the design studies examined produced considerable (and 
traceable) results. This shows that such susceptibility assessment investigations are of 
significant worth during the preliminary ship design stages in order to not only select 
the most promising out of competing alternative designs, but also to tune the selected 
design in terms of susceptibility performance. 
 
7.2 Vulnerability Assessment Results Analysis 
 
In this section a summary of the analysis of the main results is presented, 
followed by some general observations resulting from the application of the 
vulnerability assessment approach to the seven ship design studies; a full results 
analysis is included in Appendix 14. This is done since the vulnerability assessment 
tool, SURVIVE Lite, was operated at UCL (unlike the RCS prediction tool, SPECTRE), 
allowing a large number of simulations and analysis; in addition, numerous ship 
systems were modelled (in contrast to a single system, i.e. the whole ship, modelled in 
susceptibility assessment). The above two reasons led to a vast amount of data and 
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related analysis, most of which confirm already acknowledged vulnerability reduction 
design drivers. 
 
7.2.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
 Out of the six major systems modelled in the frigate design studies (for which 
reference should be made to the system architecture and tree diagrams included in 
Appendix 7 and detailed vulnerability results in the tables and charts of Section 6.3 and 
6.4 and Appendix 11), Frigate Variant 1 was least vulnerable in two (forward SAM 
system and helicopter system), Frigate Variant 2 in one (naval gun system) and the 
third, trimaran variant, performed best in the remaining three (move system, ASM 
system and aft SAM system). 
The design feature that had the largest impact on the vulnerability performance 
of the three frigate designs was almost certainly the degree of duplication and separation 
of identical sub-systems. For example, the move system of Frigate Variant 3 was 
invulnerable to the ASM threat investigated due to the split forward and aft propulsor 
configuration. The move system of the remaining two designs was vulnerable when the 
(two) HTS motors and/or (two) propeller shaft were affected. Although these items 
were duplicated, they were not reasonably separated as they were located in the same 
WT section. In addition, the power sub-system (containing all of the engines in parallel) 
was not vulnerable in any attack case investigated for any of the three frigate variants. 
This highlights the advantages of adopting an IFEP system with large distances between 
the power generation units. The benefits of redundancy and separation are also clear 
when considering that most ship systems modelled were most vulnerable when 
unduplicated (i.e. in-series) items were hit. For example, in all three frigate variants the 
naval gun system was vulnerable when items such as the magazine, gun power room, 
gunbay & guntrunk and 155mm gun were hit; the ASM system was vulnerable when 
the ASM launchers, LPCR (Local Power and Control Room) and Operations Room 
were hit; the aft and forward SAM systems were vulnerable when the VLSs and LCRs 
were hit. Furthermore, in two of the three frigate design studies (Frigate Variants 2 and 
3) the helicopter system is the most vulnerable of the system modelled largely because 
it contains the most in-series (unduplicated equipment) 
 A vulnerability reduction advantage of trimaran configurations is the fact that 
the side hulls shield certain items which are located at the amidships portion of the hull. 
For example, items such as the Operations Room and the helo weapons lift were found 
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to be less vulnerable in the trimaran frigate. This in turn had an impact on the 
vulnerability of ship systems which included these items in series, such as the ASM 
system and helicopter system. In addition, the effect on vulnerability of improving the 
system layout was perceived. For example, the large beam of the trimaran ship allowed 
for a wide weatherdeck. This in turn made possible the arrangement of the ASM 
launchers in a port-starboard configuration (as opposed to the forward-aft configuration 
in the first two variants) which dramatically reduced their vulnerability (assuming only 
broadside attack). 
 It was observed that equipment located deep in the hull was less vulnerable to 
the given, abovewater, threat (i.e. the sea-skimming ASM). This was particularly 
noticeable in the trimaran variant which had the deepest draught. The reduced 
vulnerability of certain items (such as the forward magazine and sonar instrument room, 
and the aft (helo) magazine and AVCAT tank) had an impact on the overall 
vulnerability of the naval gun system and helicopter system of that design. However, 
these effects are probably adverse when considering underwater attacks. Nevertheless, 
trimarans are also more vulnerable at the narrow forward and aft extremities of the hull. 
This was apparent in ship systems which included items at the extremities, such as the 
naval gun system (magazine, gun power room, gunbay & guntrunk and 155mm gun) 
and the aft SAM system (VLSs and LCR). 
 After carrying out the sensitivity tests on the lengthwise probability hit 
distribution, (i.e. changing it from a normal to a linear distribution), it was observed that 
assessment of system vulnerability is highly dependent on this assumption. Specifically, 
ship systems with the majority of their items at the extremities of the hull became 
significantly more vulnerable, while the opposite was true for systems with the bulk of 
their related items located close to amidships. As is clear in Appendix 14, in some cases 
the vulnerability of a system was altered by more than 50% after changing the 
lengthwise probability hit distribution. 
 After normalising the system vulnerabilities and applying the weightings 
proposed by 1st Lt. Fonseca, the least overall vulnerable ship was found to be the 
trimaran variant followed by the baseline and the second variant. The trimaran variant 
presented an approximately 60% decrease in overall vulnerability compared to the 
baseline design. After carrying out the sensitivity tests on the applied major system 
weighting scheme, by using the weighting schemes proposed by the RN officers at Dstl 
for the three scenarios summarised in Section 6.4.1, the main conclusion was that ship 
vulnerability is more sensitive to the overall ship design features than to the weighting 
273 
 
scheme or the operational scenario. The relatively small operational scenario related 
overall vulnerability variations are explained in Appendix 14. It is important to note that 
Frigate Variant 3 presented an improvement compared to the baseline frigate ranging 
from 28% to 42% (when considering all scenarios and the corresponding weighting 
schemed proposed by the RN staff) as opposed to the approximately 60% improvement 
observed with 1st Lt. Fonseca’s weighting scheme. This is attributed to the much higher 
weightings given to the Fight major systems by the RN officers (compared to the 
weightings proposed by 1st Lt. Fonseca). Therefore, the significance of the effect of the 
invulnerable move system of the trimaran variant was reduced. 
 
7.2.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 Out of the six major systems modelled in the ship size and level of combat 
system and ship performance capability varied combatants (for which reference should 
be made to the system architecture and tree diagrams included in Appendix 7 and 
detailed vulnerability results in the tables and charts of Section 6.3 and 6.4 and 
Appendix 11), the Corvette design was least vulnerable in two (move system and aft 
SAM system) and most vulnerable in the remaining, Frigate Variant 1 was not the least 
vulnerable in any and the Destroyer design performed best in the remaining four (naval 
gun system, ASM system, forward SAM system and helicopter system). 
In this case there were two major design features that influenced the 
vulnerability of the ship design studies; the degree of duplication and separation of 
similar sub-systems, and the overall ship size. The effects of the former were similar to 
those reported in the frigate variant comparative study. The move system of the 
Corvette design was invulnerable to the ASM threat investigated due to the split 
forward and aft propulsor configuration. In addition, the move systems of the baseline 
frigate and Destroyer were vulnerable when the duplicated but non-separated HTS 
motors and/or propeller shaft were hit. The power sub-system was not vulnerable in any 
attack case due to the widely separated IFEP system selected. The naval gun system was 
most vulnerable in all three designs when in-series, unduplicated, items, such as the 
magazine, gun power room/LCR, gunbay & guntrunk, and gun were affected. The 
vulnerability of the Destroyers naval gun system was significantly reduced due to the 
presence of an additional sensor separated by a considerable distance (the Destroyer 
naval gun sensors included separated forward and aft MFRs and a GPEOD which was 
located at the forward mast together with the forward MFR; conversely, the Corvette 
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and frigate designs included only a surveillance radar and GPEOD, both located on the 
forward mast). Similarly, the ASM system was most vulnerable when unduplicated 
items in series, such as the Operations Room, LPCR and launchers, were affected; as 
were the forward and aft SAM systems when the VLSs and LCRs were affected. 
However, the Destroyer design adopted a different, more capable (forward and aft) 
SAM system, with a different system tree diagram. For it, the LCRs are not in series but 
in parallel to the Operations Room, significantly reducing the vulnerability of the SAM 
control sub-system. However, the SAM systems of the Corvette and baseline frigate 
could operate with six sensors in total (forward and aft navigation radar, forward and aft 
IRST, surveillance radar and ESM/ECM module), while the Destroyer’s SAM system 
could only operates with the two MFRs. This had a slight adverse effect on the 
Destroyer (forward and aft) SAM system vulnerability. Finally, in all three designs, the 
helicopter system was also most vulnerable when items such as the AVCAT tank, 
magazine, weapon lift, sonobuoy store, helicopter and flight deck, Operations Room 
and sonar instrument room, all of which are in series, were hit. 
 Increases in ship size led to a decreased system vulnerability in two regards. 
First, the larger volumetric size of the WT sections of larger ship designs can more 
easily contain, but also diffuse, the blast and fragmentation damage caused by the 
exploding ASM warhead. To this could be attributed the improved vulnerability 
performance of the Destroyer designs move system (compared to the identical such 
system in the baseline frigate) as well as improvements in the naval gun system, aft 
SAM system and helicopter system. The second advantage of larger designs arises from 
the fact that the number of WT sections in a design is proportional to the ship’s length. 
Moreover, the footprint of identical/similar ship systems (in terms of WT sections 
containing items belonging to that ship system) was found to be almost unaffected by 
ship size. These two reasons lead to an increase in the proportion of ship’s length which 
if hit affects a ship system (i.e. an increase in the vulnerability footprint of the system in 
terms of percentage of the overall length). Therefore, given that the ship is hit (i.e. 
susceptibility = 100%), a system in a smaller ship would have a larger probability of 
being affected by the constant hit than a similar system in a larger ship. The above was 
observed to affect the vulnerability of systems such as the naval gun system, ASM 
system, forward SAM system and helicopter system, leading to improved performance 
in the Destroyer and decreased performance in the Corvette design. 
Although in the comparative study between the size varied combatants 
sensitivity studies regarding the lengthwise probability hit distribution were not 
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conducted, it should be noted that the ASM system is the most vulnerable of the six ship 
systems modelled in all three types of combatants. This is due to the concentration of 
the vulnerable equipment items amidships (therefore, most likely to be hit given the 
normal distribution). The effects of this assumption are thus once again profound, with 
more examples detailed in Appendix 14. A brief sensitivity test was, however, carried 
out on the Destroyer design to examine the effect of changing the elevation and azimuth 
angles of the attacking missile impact vector. In all system cases, vulnerability result 
fluctuations of over 50% were observed, indicating that hit location and weapon 
trajectory have a significant impact on system vulnerability. 
 After normalising the system vulnerabilities and applying the weightings 
proposed by 1st Lt. Fonseca, the least overall vulnerable ship design was the larger 
Destroyer (approximately 30% less than the baseline frigate). Despite the fact that the 
smaller Corvette design was the worst performing in four of the six major systems, it 
was overall less vulnerable than the baseline frigate, performing almost identically to 
the Destroyer design. This was a direct result of the considerably higher weighting 
applied to the move system (compared to the five Fight systems), which was 
invulnerable in the Corvette, as analysed above. If a weighting of 2, rather than 9, was 
used for the move system (i.e. in agreement with the weightings proposed by 1st Lt. 
Fonseca for the Fight systems, Table 4.1 in Section 4.2), the Destroyer design would 
continue to be approximately 30% less vulnerable than the baseline frigate, but the 
Corvette design would now be the most vulnerable ship design, by approximately 20% 
compared to Frigate Variant 1. This contradicts the conclusions made in Section 7.2.1 
regarding the relative insensitivity of the frigate variants overall vulnerability to the 
weighting scheme used. 
 
7.2.3 AOR Variants 
 
 Out of the seven major systems/capabilities modelled in the two AOR variants 
(for which reference should be made to the system architecture and tree diagrams 
included in Appendix 7 and detailed vulnerability results in the tables and charts of 
Section 6.3 and Appendix 11), the first variant was least vulnerable in one (move 
system) and the second variant performed best in five (all RAS related capabilities and 
aviation support). The CIWS of both designs was assessed to be invulnerable. 
 It was once again observed that adopting a philosophy of duplication and 
separation has a great effect on vulnerability performance. As before, the move system 
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of AOR Variant 1 is invulnerable owing to the vastly separated MMRs and propulsor 
units (realised by the adoption of an IFEP system). A forward propulsor unit was not 
included in the second variant, resulting in a vulnerable move system when the in-series 
and unduplicated pod drive room was affected. Furthermore, AOR Variant 2 presented 
the opportunity to duplicate the ship handling sub-system included in all RAS capability 
system tree diagrams. In AOR Variant 1 only the bridge can be used for ship handling; 
in the second variant, the presence of a single aft superstructure block led to the RAS 
control space (RASco) having an unobstructed view towards the ship’s bow, therefore, 
being able to duplicate (and separate) the functions of the bridge. This in turn led to the 
invulnerability of the RAS liquid capabilities and significant reduction in the 
vulnerability of the RAS solid capabilities in AOR Variant 2. In addition, the split 
forward and aft nature of the AVCAT/dieso cargo tanks (and pumps), contrasting the 
grouping of dry stores and ordnance cargo spaces (and lifts) adjacently, had a significant 
impact on the vulnerability of the RAS capabilities in both ship designs. Finally the 
CIWS was invulnerable in both designs due to the duplication of the SeaRAM 
launchers, each including an independent sensors and control room. 
 The auxiliary ship design comparative study also highlighted the vulnerability 
reduction effects of protecting critical items by less critical spaces. This was realised 
through the almost two times more vulnerable aviation support system of AOR Variant 
1. The absence of a forward superstructure block in AOR Variant 2 led a significant 
increase in the size of the (single) aft superstructure, which contained most items related 
to the aviation support system in both designs. The larger superstructure size (through 
the inclusion of, for example, accommodation spaces) resulted to the shielding of 
critical items belonging to this system. 
Furthermore, the decreased vulnerability to abovewater threats to items located 
deep in the hull was again observed. More specifically, stores below No 6 Deck (i.e. 
ordnance stores) were invulnerable to the ASM threat simulated. It is also interesting to 
note that the auxiliary ship designs output considerably smaller system vulnerability 
values than the combatants, often not exceeding 2%. This is possibly due to their 
significantly larger size (although different systems with different architectures and tree 
diagrams were modelled in the two ship types). 
 As in the previous comparative studies, the assumed normal lengthwise 
probability hit distribution has affected the vulnerability of the modeled systems, with 
systems located at the extremities (e.g. the move system) presenting considerably lower 
vulnerability values than amidships systems (e.g. RAS capabilities). After normalising 
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the system vulnerabilities and applying the weightings proposed by Lt. Cdr. (rtd.) Day, 
AOR Variant 2 proved to be approximately 40% less vulnerable, predominantly due to 
the entirely invulnerable ability to RAS AVCAT and ability to RAS dieso, both of 
which were given maximum weighting. 
 
7.2.4 General Observations on Vulnerability Assessment 
 
 In contrast to the susceptibility assessment method applied (with the exception 
of the RCS prediction tool), the vulnerability assessment method developed was based 
on the current established and accepted UK MOD vulnerability assessment software for 
concept stage ship designs, SURVIVE Lite (see Section 3.3.3). Also, in contrast to the 
susceptibility assessment method, SURVIVE Lite is able to simulate the damage effects 
of a large number of different weapons, with different characteristics (as summarised in 
Section 3.3.3); although the very specific case of a particular sea-skinning ASM was 
only examined in this research. Amongst the advantages given by the developed method 
is that the results can be easily backtracked in order to examine what caused each ship 
design to have its vulnerability characteristics and apply corrective actions. 
 However, a number of simplistic assumptions were made during the application 
of the method. These are in addition to the ones summarised in Section 4.2 and 6.3. For 
example:- 
- The system tree diagrams developed (Appendix 7) imply that all weapon 
systems operate identically with any of the sensors in their sensor sub-system 
(although, clearly, the performance of certain weapon systems will be degraded 
depending on the available sensors); 
- All engines fitted in the ship are assumed to be able to individually operate the 
ship in a fully capable manner (although clearly the loss of a more powerful 
engine will affect the ship in a different manner to the loss of a less powerful 
engine, and the loss of any engine could result to certain capability loss 
regarding not only propulsion but also operation of combat systems); 
- Cargo stores in the AOR designs were modelled in parallel although in reality 
the loss of cargo spaces would lead to a loss in cargo capacity and, therefore, 
capability). 
Such assumptions could be corrected in SURVIVE Lite by the inclusion of further 
system tree diagrams, each implying a different level of capability. This would, 
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however, dramatically increase results processing and analysis time which is probably 
counterproductive in the concept phase of ship design. 
 There are also the issues regarding the use of appropriate weighting schemes 
which rely on human judgement rather than simulation. Certain of the design studies 
investigated were highly sensitive to the (subjective) weighting scheme used; although 
patterns in the weighting schemes proposed by different naval officers were observed, 
large results variations were still observed. Furthermore, certain of the officers 
interviewed made comments which are related to the operational scenario. For example, 
the duplicated (SAM, in the combatants) systems should each be given different 
weightings and that weighting schemes (and the selected systems to be modelled) are 
highly dependent on the ship’s role as well as the operational scenario. This highlights 
the connection of ship overall vulnerability to human factors, such as how the 
operational situation is perceived by the ship’s crew, which is largely defined by 
situational awareness. Developing system weighting schemes is an area where further 
research is necessary and the application of methods such as the Delphi Method 
mentioned in Section 3.3.4 might prove beneficial in using a single weighting scheme 
for each operational scenario investigated. 
 As with the susceptibility method developed, it is useful to attempt and define 
the scale of a design’s vulnerability on the y-axis of normalised vulnerability charts 
(Figure 6.25, Figure 6.27 and Figure 6.29 in Section 6.3). This is relatively easy in 
vulnerability assessment, with zero being defined on the basis that all of the systems 
modeled in the ship being assessed not being vulnerable to the threat (ASM in this 
instance) given a hit at any location of the ship. The value of unity is defined as the 
vulnerability performance of a baseline design. The definition of unity could easily be 
changed to: all of the modeled systems in the ship being assessed are 100% vulnerable 
to the threat (ASM in this instance) given a hit at any location of the ship, (i.e. worst 
possible case). As already mentioned, in the case of the AOR variants, normalisations 
have been conducted against the worst performing ship design rather than an arbitrary 
baseline. This means that the score of unity is defined as the vulnerability performance 
of the worst performing design. This was done since both AOR designs included 
invulnerable (i.e. 0% vulnerable) systems. Thus, dividing (during the normalisation 
process) by zero is avoided since this would lead to impossible values. All other studies 
were normalized with respect to the corresponding baseline frigate values, which did 
not include any 0% vulnerable systems. This, however, was fortuitous possibly 
indicating that normalisation should always be made with respect to the worst 
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performing of the designs being compared. It could be argued that this would also give 
a more meaningful definition to the value of unity on the y-axis of the normalised 
vulnerability charts and simplify presentation and comparison of results between 
alternative designs. For consistency, the AOR studies’ total susceptibility and 
recoverability results were also normalised with respect to the worst performing design. 
In an alternative approach, experts could develop a set of minimum acceptable system 
vulnerability standards for each ship type and for a given threat (possibly based on the 
vulnerability performance of current ships), with new alternative designs being assessed 
against these standards. This latter approach would be analogous to traditional damage 
stability assessment. 
 A number of conclusions can be deduced from the vulnerability assessment 
results. Trimarans generally provide reduced vulnerability due to the protection 
provided by the side hulls, although they are more vulnerable at the narrow forward and 
aft ends; equipment located deep in the hull is less vulnerable to abovewater attack; 
increasing size tends to reduce vulnerability, duplication of identical systems greatly 
reduces vulnerability, provided that the redundant systems are reasonably separated; 
improved system architecture/layout (provided, for example, through the large box 
structure and associated DC deck and weatherdeck wide beam of a trimaran) decreases 
vulnerability and the protection of certain high value items by secondary compartments 
affects system vulnerability. However, system vulnerability results are largely 
dependent, not only on the trajectory of the attacking threat (a missile in all cases in this 
research), which can easily be simulated in SURVIVE Lite, but also on the 
(susceptibility related) assumed lengthwise hit probability distribution. The latter 
depends on a large variety of factors, such as ship and threat characteristics, 
environmental conditions, ship motions and manoeuvring and variations in weapon 
performance as outlined in Section 3.3.2. This can be seen to inhibit the development of 
a realistic prediction tool. It is relevant that although there have been efforts to link 
susceptibility and vulnerability assessment methods in order to calculate likely hit 
locations (Turner et al 2006; Martin 2007) (see Section 3.3.2), the official MOD 
maritime mission simulation programme (MISSION) does not utilise them. Rather, it 
simply assumes a normal lengthwise hit probability distribution. As mentioned in 
Section 7.1.4, further research is necessary in the area of susceptibility assessment, also 
because it has such an effect on the next survivability constituent, vulnerability. 
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7.3 Recoverability Assessment Results Analysis 
 
7.3.1 Frigate Variants (Including Baseline) 
 
Main Results 
 
 Out of the eight PM groups (immediate DCFF or Float PMs (Category 1) shown 
in Table 4.3, major system recovery or recovery support PMs (Category 2) listed in 
Table 4.4 and the six individual major system, one Move and five Fight systems, 
recovery PMs (Category 3) summarised in Table 4.5; see Section 4.3) Frigate Variant 3 
performed best in seven (float category, recovery support category and move, naval 
gun, ASM, aft SAM and forward SAM system recovery), while Frigate Variant 1 
performed best in the helicopter system recovery category. These results can clearly be 
seen in the PM matrices presented in Section 6.5.1. 
In the float category, the first two frigate variants performed almost identically, 
while the trimaran variant performed approximately 30% better. Some of the most 
noteworthy results include the fact that the third variant performed significantly worst in 
PM 1.1 and 1.2, due to the fact that, being a larger ship design than its counterparts, the 
FRPs had to travel longer distances and operate more WT doors in order to reach the 
affected section of the ship. In PM 1.4 Frigate Variant 2 performed best by a large 
margin due to the two passing decks presenting a greater number of alternative routes to 
the DC crew, followed by Frigate Variant 3, which included double, side passageways 
in the box structure (with single centreline passageways aft and forward) and finally the 
baseline (Variant 1), with its single centreline passageway presenting no alternative 
routes. Although in PM 1.3 the baseline frigate performed marginally better, due to the 
less number of decks in the hull, easing access, this was partially counterbalanced by 
the fact that the baseline had a full length superstructure, in contrast to the other two 
designs. Frigate Variant 3 performed much better in PMs 1.6 and 1.7 due to the fact that 
the firepumps in all variants were located deep in the hull. (As mentioned in Section 
7.2.1, the deeper draught of the trimaran offered more protection from abovewater 
threats to items located at the lower decks, such as firepumps, therefore, minimising the 
probability that these items will be affected after an attack and increasing post hit 
availability). The aft FRP section base in Frigate Variants 2 and 3 is located one WT 
section aft than the corresponding item in the baseline frigate, therefore, the assumed 
normal lengthwise probability hit distribution, minimising the probability of that FRP 
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section base being affected after a hit, leads to the significant improvement in PM 1.16. 
However, this also means that this FRP section base is less efficiently positioned (closer 
to the ships extremities) therefore, partially contributing to the decreased performance in 
PMs 1.1 and 1.2 for the last two frigate variants.  
In PM 1.10 the baseline frigate performs significantly better than the other two 
variants, purely due to the fact that, conversely to Frigate Variants 2 and 3, the two 
remaining NBCD stores of the baseline are positioned one at each extremity of the ship, 
therefore, minimising the probability that they are affected after a given hit. In all 
remaining PMs, the two monohull variants performed almost identically, due to their 
similar layout, whereas the trimaran variant performed better, in some cases presenting 
more than 80% improved performance. This is attributed to the fact that, as analysed in 
Section 7.2.1, the vulnerability reduction features of the trimaran led to less items being 
affected by a given threat resulting in an increased availability of DCFF required items 
(such as ATU and ventilation, NBCD stores, power generation unit, SCC, Operations 
Room and FRPP, which were all quantified through their respective PMs) which are 
needed after the assumed, unvarying, attack. The general conclusion is that the two 
monohulls perform almost identically; although the trimaran variant performs worse in 
most access related PMs due to its larger size, this is more than counterbalanced by the 
increased availability of items necessary for DCFF after a given attack, due to the 
trimaran’s increased inherent vulnerability reduction features. The relative difference 
between the performances of the three frigate designs also depends upon the weighting 
scheme employed. 
In the recovery support PM group the two monohull frigates performed almost 
identically in all PMs, whereas the trimaran variant displayed an overall improved 
performance by approximately 40%. Only in (low-weighted) PM 2.3 did the trimaran 
perform worse than the first two frigate variants, due to its naval stores being located 
closer to amidships (as opposed to the far aft positioned naval stores in Frigate Variants 
2 and 3), therefore, increasing the probability that these stores are affected and 
unavailable after a hit. In all other PMs (related to workshops, spare gear stores, SCC 
and Operations Room) the trimaran variant performed up to approximately 60% better, 
despite the very similar arrangement of the above compartments in all three variants. 
This is attributed to the increased post attack availability of these items due to the 
inherent trimaran vulnerability reduction features, as analysed in Section 7.2.1. 
 In the move system recovery PM group, once again the almost identical system 
layout in the two monohulls leads to an almost identical performance in all PMs. 
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Conversely, Frigate Variant 3 illustrated an improved performance by more than 60%. 
Approximately half of this improvement is attributed to the fact that, by adopting a split 
forward and aft propulsion system, the high-weighted PM 3.1.1 outputted a value of 
zero as a result of the move system being invulnerable to any single ASM attack 
(therefore, requiring zero man-hours for the move system to be functioning post-attack). 
The remainder of the 60% improvement is attributed to the improved performance in all 
other PMs of this group. This was a direct result of a given constant threat, affecting 
fewer items in the less vulnerable trimaran; therefore, fewer items need to be accessed 
and recovered post-hit. 
 When considering the naval gun system recovery PM group, a near identical 
performance is observed in the two monohulls, again due to the almost identical system 
layout; Frigate Variant 3 displays an almost 30% improvement. The improvement is 
less than that of the move system recovery PM group due to the fact that high-weighted 
PM 3.1.2 outputted a similar value in all frigate variants. This was expected since the 
naval gun system layout (regarding the in-series and therefore most vulnerable items, 
such as the magazine, gunbay & guntrunk, gun power room and 155mm gun) in the 
trimaran frigate was similar to that of the monohull variants, leading to similar overall 
vulnerability values. However, the increased protection and, therefore, post-hit 
availability, of duplicated system items, such as the engines contained in the power sub-
system, led overall to less items being affected post-hit, as clearly shown by PM 3.2.2. 
Therefore, overall fewer items needed accessing and repair works, reflected on the 
improved PM values of the remainder PMs in the trimaran for this PM group. 
 In the ASM system recovery PM group, the baseline frigate is the worst 
performing, with the second variant outputting approximately 13% better results and the 
third variant resulting to a more than 30% improvement. Most in-series, i.e. more 
vulnerable, equipment items of this system, such as the launchers and LPCR, are 
located amidships for Frigate Variants 1 and 3, and at the aft end in the second variant. 
The assumed normal lengthwise hit distribution (meaning that the in-series equipment 
in Frigate Variant 2 have a lesser chance of being hit) leads to the second variant having 
a larger availability of such items post-hit, reflected on the almost 30% improvement in 
PM 3.1.3 (in contrast to the approximately 10% improvement displayed in the trimaran 
variant, solely due to the improved system layout and inherent trimaran vulnerability 
reduction features). Once again, however, the least vulnerable trimaran leads to overall 
fewer items being affected and in need of access and repair works, therefore, showing 
improvements between 25% and 50% in all remaining PMs of this group. Conversely, 
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the second variant produces very similar results to the baseline in the remaining PMs. 
This can be interpreted as the advantages presented being purely related to the location 
of the most vulnerable system items, rather than improvements in the ship’s overall 
configuration which leads to greater post-hit availability of equipment. 
 A similar conclusion may be ascertained when comparing the PM values for the 
aft SAM system recovery PM group. The in-series most vulnerable equipment, such as 
the VLS launchers and LCR, are located one WT section closer to the aft extremity of 
the ship in Frigate Variant 2 compared to the baseline. This leads to PM 3.1.4 having a 
30% improved performance than the baseline, while all other PMs output near identical 
results; this limits the overall improvement to approximately 10%. On the contrary, the 
trimaran variant outputs an almost 70% improved performance. Approximately half of 
this improvement is attributed to the almost 90% improvement in PM 3.1.4, which was 
mainly due to the positioning of the above vulnerable equipment closer to the aft 
extremity of the ship design, therefore decreasing the hit probability and increasing the 
post-hit availability of these items. The remaining improvement is attributed to the 
previously mentioned overall trimaran vulnerability reduction enhancements, captured 
by the improved performance in all other PMs, between approximately 40% and 75%. 
 When considering the forward SAM system recovery PM group, the similar 
system layout between the two monohull frigates has led to almost identical 
performance in all PMs of this group. Once again, the trimaran outperforms the two 
monohulls in all PMs, leading to an overall improvement by approximately 50% 
(although the system layout is comparable to that of the two monohull frigates). This is 
again attributed to the fact that the inherent vulnerability reduction features of the 
trimaran lead to overall less items in need of access and repair, given a constant threat. 
 Finally, in the helicopter system recovery PM group, the baseline is the best 
performing, with Frigate Variant 3 producing a 12% deterioration and Frigate Variant 2 
almost 70%. The above results are clearly related to the aft positioning of the majority 
of the baseline’s helicopter facilities (such as the in-series AVCAT tank, magazine and 
weapon lift, sonobuoy store, helicopter and flight deck), compared to the amidships 
positioned helicopter facilities in the other two variants. The assumed normal 
lengthwise probability hit distribution leads to a smaller probability of these items being 
affected by a constant threat, therefore, increasing the post-hit availability and 
decreasing the number of man-hours required to put the system back to action in the 
baseline frigate. This is clearly shown in PM 3.1.6 where the second and third variants 
output approximately 130% and 60% worse results respectively. This worsened 
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helicopter system layout, as well as the similar workshops and stores layout between the 
first two frigate variants, has led to all other PMs outputting worse values for Frigate 
Variant 2 compared to the baseline. However, the improved trimaran configuration 
previously mentioned has led to overall less system items being affected (when 
including duplicated system items, such as the engines contained in the power sub-
system), leading to an improved PM 3.2.6 performance for Frigate Variant 3 as well as 
for some of the access PMs (PMs 3.4.6 and 3.5.6). 
 After normalising the PM group data and applying the weightings proposed by 
1st Lt. Fonseca, as expected, the most recoverable ship was found to be the trimaran 
variant. It performed approximately 40% better than the baseline due to the overall 
improved performance in seven out of the eight PM groups. The recoverability 
characteristics of the second variant were virtually identical to the baseline, the 
approximately 5% worsening being attributed almost entirely to the less recoverable 
helicopter system.  
 
Sensitivity Study Results 
 
A sensitivity study to the lengthwise probability hit distribution was carried out 
by assuming a linear distribution across the length of the ship designs. The effect of this 
change to overall recoverability was not considerable, with the trimaran variant still 
outputting approximately 40% improved results. However, the effect of this change to 
certain PM groups was profound. The largest effect occurred to the helicopter system 
recovery PM group of the second variant, which now performed identically to that of 
the baseline. This led the second variant to output the second best recoverability 
performance, outperforming the baseline by a negligible 1%. 
 Sensitivity studies were also carried out on the applied weighting scheme by 
using the weighting schemes proposed by the RN officers at Dstl for the three scenarios 
summarised in Section 6.4.1. As in the similar sensitivity study on the vulnerability 
assessment method, the main conclusion was that ship recoverability is more sensitive 
to the ship design than to the weighting scheme or the operational scenario. In fact, the 
output was much less sensitive to the weighting scheme than was the vulnerability 
output, possibly due to the increased number of variables (i.e. PMs) relevant to the 
recoverability assessment method. In all cases examined, the second frigate variant 
performed worse than the baseline by approximately 7% to 16% and the trimaran 
variant performed better by approximately 35% and 43%. The decreased performance 
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of Frigate Variant 2 in scenario 1 was once again displayed (however, to a lesser extent 
than in the vulnerability assessment section). This was a result of the comparatively 
large weighting given to the helicopter system by all RN officers for that scenario, due 
to the presence of a submarine threat (not present in the other two scenarios), 
highlighting once again the poor performance of the amidships helicopter system of that 
design variant. 
 The final sensitivity test carried out involved the decoupling of the 
recoverability assessment method from the vulnerability assessment SURVIVE Lite 
software. As explained in Section 6.6.3, this was done by assuming that an ASM hit at 
any WT section of the ship would affect all equipment and compartments modelled, and 
repopulating the PM matrices. This procedure led to some remarkable results. Certain 
patterns were observed and are briefly summarised. In the float category (Category 1), 
PMs 1.1-1.4 output identical values as before, since they are not related to any items 
being affected by the threat. All other float category, as well as recovery support 
(Category 2), PMs output identical, or near identical values (any negligible differences 
are attributed to slight differences in system layouts, such as the underwater exhaust of 
the forward auxiliary engine of the trimaran frigate design eliminating the abovewater 
vulnerability of an uptake). This was due to the (near) identical equipment and systems 
included in the three frigate designs, therefore, cancelling the advantages previously 
observed in the trimaran variant. For the same reasons, PMs 3.1 and 3.2 for all 
individual major system recovery PM groups output identical or near identical values, 
again cancelling the advantages previously observed, principally in the trimaran variant. 
The only major differences are observed when investigating the access related Category 
3 PMs. When considering Frigate Variant 2, the fact that the aft spare gear stores and 
workshops are positioned one WT section aft compared to the baseline have led to all 
related PMs performing slightly worse. The far aft positioning of the ASM system 
launchers and LPCR (as opposed to the baselines amidships) has worsened the access 
PMs of this system from the forward spare gear stores and workshops. However, this aft 
system layout improved the performance of PM 3.8.3, due to the assumed normal 
lengthwise probability hit distribution. The adverse occurred in the respective PM of the 
helicopter system due to the amidships location of the majority of the helicopter 
facilities (as opposed to the baselines aft). However, access from the forward workshops 
and spare gear stores greatly improved, but access from the aft located naval stores 
worsened. All other access related Category 3 PMs output similar values due to the 
similarities presented in the two ship designs. When considering Frigate Variant 3, the 
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amidships-forward located naval store (as opposed to the aft naval store in the baseline) 
improved the performance of the related PMs of the forward positioned naval gun and 
forward SAM systems and amidships posited ASM systems; conversely, the equivalent 
PMs for the aft positioned aft SAM system and amidships positioned helicopter system 
worsened. Furthermore, all Category 3 PMs related to all spare gear stores and 
workshops performed worse for all major systems (excluding the move system which 
will be analysed later). This was clearly due to all the above stores and workshops being 
positioned less efficiently (i.e. closer to the ships extremities) in the trimaran, therefore, 
worsening access. 
The split nature of the move system produced the most noteworthy results. In 
the baseline frigate (as well as the second variant) the naval stores, aft spare gear store 
and aft workshops were all located close to the aft end of the ship, where the propulsion 
machinery was located. In the trimaran variant with the split forward-aft steering and 
propulsion sub-system this is no longer the case, therefore, greatly worsening the results 
of PMs 3.3.1-3.5.1. However, the access PMs related to the forward spare gear stores 
and workshops were slightly improved due to the location of certain machinery in 
proximity. The overall conclusion is that, although a duplicated and separated system 
presents vulnerability related advantages, it inhibits recoverability (of the total system), 
due to the increased complexities relevant to accessing the dispersed system items. The 
above analysis led the trimaran to output an approximately 50% worse performing 
move system recovery PM group, which is almost entirely responsible for the trimaran 
frigate now being the least recoverable design, outputting results approximately 20% 
worse than the baseline. The two monohull designs output almost identical 
recoverability performance due to the near identical equipment, systems and ship 
configuration. It is clear that the above procedure gives a good description of the 
efficiency of the location of the various stores and workshops required for repair works 
relative to the equipment distribution of the modelled ship systems. This was also 
captured by the recoverability assessment method as performed previously; however, 
the efficiency of the location of these compartments was often overpowered by factors 
such as the number of system items requiring repair (and, therefore, access) after a 
constant threat. By assuming that an ASM hit at any WT section of the ship would 
affect all equipment and compartments modelled, in effect, the constant threat 
assumption is no longer valid. This is because for the same amount of damage on 
different ship designs, a different threat is required. This, therefore, creates a major 
inconsistency in the above method and questions its validity. However, the fact that this 
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inconsistency can only be overcome when involving vulnerability assessment software 
in a recoverability assessment method raises scepticism about the boundary between 
vulnerability and recoverability and if they should be separately considered. 
 
7.3.2 Corvette, Baseline Frigate and Destroyer 
 
 Out of the eight PM groups (immediate DCFF or Float PMs (Category 1) shown 
in Table 4.3, major system recovery or recovery support PMs (Category 2) listed in 
Table 4.4 and the six individual major system, one Move and five Fight systems, 
recovery PMs (Category 3) summarised in Table 4.5; see Section 4.3) the Destroyer 
design performed best in six (float category and naval gun, ASM, aft SAM, fwd SAM 
and helicopter system recovery) while the baseline frigate performed best in the 
remaining two (recovery support category and move system recovery). These results 
can clearly be seen in the PM matrices presented in Section 6.5.2. 
In the float category, the Destroyer design performed marginally better (by 4%) 
than the baseline frigate, while the Corvette performed approximately 13% worse. Some 
of the most noteworthy results include that in PMs 1.1-1.3, the Corvette performed best, 
followed by the frigate and finally the Destroyer design. This is clearly due to the 
smaller ship designs involving reduced distances travelled and WT doors operated by 
DC crews, as well as generally less decks in each WT section. The Destroyer with its 
double side passageways outperformed the other two combatants in PM 1.4, while the 
Corvette with, the single and narrower than the baseline frigate centreline passageway, 
presented the worst result. It is interesting to note that when regarding equipment and 
compartments split in accordance to zoning, such as ATU and Ventilation (PM 1.5), 
firepumps (PM 1.6) and power generation units (PM 1.11), the Destroyer, with the 
greater number of (and therefore, smaller in size) zones, outputs the worst results. This 
signifies that the zones of this ship design are smaller than the ideal, therefore, the 
probability that one of the above items is affected after the corresponding zone is hit, 
would increase (i.e., a smaller zone is more vulnerable in the same way that a smaller 
ship is). It is also interesting that in PM 1.11 the Corvette outputs the most promising 
results, possibly due to the same number of engines as in the other two designs (i.e. 
five) spread over only two zones, therefore, significantly increasing availability. 
However, when considering the firepump and power system as a whole (PMs 1.7 and 
1.12), the smaller Corvette performs worst due to possessing the most vulnerable such 
systems, decreasing post-hit availability. Conversely, when considering items not 
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connected to the zoning arrangements, such as the SCC (PM 1.13), the Bridge (PM1.14) 
and the Operations Room (PM 1.15), the Destroyer design significantly outperforms the 
other two combatants due to the least vulnerable, larger Destroyer, leading to an 
increased availability of such items after the assumed, unvarying, attack.  
Due to the different relative weightings of the NBCD stores (mentioned in 
Section 6.5.2) it is difficult to make a comparison of the related PMs. However, as a 
whole, the NBCD store related PMs of the Corvette design outperform the almost 
identically performed PMs of the other two combatants. This is attributed to the location 
of the stores, with the Corvette including only two such stores, both positioned close to 
the extremities (as opposed to the other two ship designs which also include amidships 
positioned NBCD stores). Therefore, given the normal lengthwise probability hit 
distribution, the probability that the stores are affected by a constant hit is decreased and 
post-hit availability increased. For a similar reason, the Destroyer design outperforms 
the other two combatants in the FRP related PMs, 1.16 and 1.17. Similarly to Section 
7.3.1, it is observed that the Destroyer performs worse in most access related PMs, due 
to its larger size, but this is counterbalanced by the increased availability of items 
necessary for DCFF after a given attack, due to the increased inherent vulnerability 
reduction of the larger design. 
In the recovery support PM group, both the Corvette and Destroyer designs 
output more than 30% worse results than the baseline frigate. The Corvette performs 
worse in every PM of that group (with the exception of PM 2.4) unsurprisingly since the 
increased vulnerability of the smaller ship leads to decreased post-hit availability of 
stores, workshops and command and control centres. PM 2.4 performs better due to the 
fact that the Corvette’s aft spare gear store is only affected when the WT section in 
which it is located is hit (whereas the corresponding store in the frigate design is also 
affected when one adjacent WT section is hit), therefore, increasing post-hit availability. 
This occurs possibly since the Corvette’s store is located at the middle of a WT section 
while the frigates store is located adjacent to a WT bulkhead. When considering the 
Destroyer design, as expected due to its larger, less vulnerable, size, it performs 
correspondingly or better in all PMs of this group, apart from PMs 2.1 and 2.4. The 
reason being that the larger aft workshops and aft spare gear stores of the Destroyer 
span the entire length of a WT section and are therefore affected by a hit in that and any 
of the two adjacent WT zones (as opposed to the two WT zone vulnerability footprint of 
the equivalent frigate compartments). Therefore, the probability that these 
compartments are affected by a constant threat increases in the Destroyer design, 
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decreasing post-hit availability. This has almost caused a threefold decrease in the 
performance of PMs 2.1 and 2.4, overpowering the better performance of the remaining 
Destroyer PMs and contributing to the overall decrease of this PM group. 
When considering the move system recovery PM group, once again the baseline 
frigate was the best performing, with the Corvette and Destroyer designs outputting 
approximately 4% and 27% worse results. The split, therefore, invulnerable to any 
single ASM attack forward and aft propulsion system of the Corvette lead to a value of 
zero for the high-weighted PM 3.1.1 (therefore, requiring zero man-hours for the move 
system to be functioning post-attack). However, all other PMs of this group outputted 
worse values since generally more system items (including duplicated equipment) were 
affected in the Corvette and were, therefore, in need of access and repair. Interestingly, 
the Destroyer was the worst performing in this PM group, largely because of its aft 
spare gear stores and workshops being located further from the propulsion machinery 
than in the frigate design, worsening the values outputted for the access related PMs 
3.4.1 and 3.5.1. 
Regarding the remaining (Fight) system recovery PM groups (naval gun, ASM, 
aft SAM, fwd SAM and helicopter system) the conclusions made are consistent. The 
Destroyer performs better by between 1% and 24% and the Corvette worse by between 
10% and 71%, when compared to the baseline frigate. (The margin by which each PM 
group differs from that of the baseline frigate depends on factors such as the number of 
items in need of repair, their location with respect to the stores and workshops and the 
relative weighting of each PM). The similar conclusions are a result of the similar 
system hierarchies and layouts in all three combatant designs and the general tendency 
to increase vulnerability and, therefore, the number of items requiring repair, with 
decreasing ship size. Regarding the Destroyer design, the only results worth further 
commenting on is the over 20% decrease in performance of PMs 3.4.3, 3.5.3, 3.4.6 and 
3.5.6 (see Table 6.16 in Section 6.5.2) compared to the baseline frigate. This occurs due 
to the larger distance between the aft spare gears stores and aft workshops and the 
vulnerable, in-series, items of the ASM and helicopter systems (such as the ASM 
launchers and LPCR, and the AVCAT tank, magazine and weapon lift, sonobuoy store, 
helicopter, flight deck, Operations Room and sonar instrument room). Note that, 
additional to the above stores and workshops related PMs output worse values in the 
Destroyer than in the baseline frigate, however, by a negligible margin and so are not 
commented upon. The above is further justification on the increased access related 
complexity relevant in larger ship designs. However, these effects are balanced and 
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sometimes overpowered by the fact that a larger, less vulnerable ship would require 
fewer items needing access and repair after a constant threat. For this reason, all access 
PMs of the system recovery (Category 3) PM groups of the Corvette perform worse 
than the two other combatant designs, although the distances involved are smaller. 
Regarding the Corvette design, the only result worth further commenting on is the over 
20% increased performance of PM 3.1.4 (see Table 6.16 in Section 6.5.2) compared to 
the baseline frigate (this being the only PM in the Category 3 PM groups where the 
Corvette performs better than the frigate). This is attributed to the in-series, i.e. more 
vulnerable, equipment items of the Corvette aft SAM system, such as the VLS 
launchers and LCR, being located closer towards the designs aft end. The assumed 
lengthwise hit distribution (meaning that the in-series equipment in the Corvette have a 
lesser chance of being hit) leads to the Corvette having a larger availability of such 
items post-hit. However, the worse performance of the Corvette in all other PMs of this 
group is indicative that the above advantages are purely related to the location of the 
most vulnerable system items, rather than improvements in the ship’s overall 
configuration which would lead to greater post-hit availability of equipment. 
From the above analysis one would expect the Destroyer design to output the 
best recoverability performance results, since it performed best in six out of eight PM 
groups. However, this is not the case since after normalising the PM group data and 
applying the weightings proposed by 1st Lt Fonseca, the Destroyer was found to be 
approximately 6% less recoverable than Frigate Variant 1. As evident from Table 4.7 in 
Section 4.3.4, two of the PM groups (the Float PM group and move system recovery 
PM group) involved incomparably higher weightings (10 and 9 respectively) than all 
other PM groups (having a weighting of 1 or 2). In the first of these PM groups both the 
frigate and Destroyer designs outputted comparable results; in the latter group, however, 
the baseline frigate significantly outperformed the Destroyer, primarily due to the access 
PMs related to the aft spare gear stores and workshops, as summarised above. (The PM 
groups where the Destroyer outperformed the baseline frigate involved relatively small 
weightings). Therefore, it is a combination of access complexities encountered in larger 
ship designs during repair tasks and the weighting scheme selected that led to the above 
result. It could be deduced that there is an optimum combatant size where the damage 
caused by a threat (therefore, the amount of items requiring repair) combined with 
access implications would lead to the most recoverable ship. However this design point 
would be extremely difficult if not impossible to find since it would depend on aspects 
such as the weighting scheme employed and the threat considered. As expected the 
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Corvette design was the least recoverable design (21% worse performing than the 
baseline frigate) primarily due to the fact that a constant threat resulted in much greater 
damage in this smaller and more vulnerable ship, therefore, more items required 
accessing and repair works. 
 
7.3.3 AOR Variants 
 
 Out of the nine PM groups (immediate DCFF or Float PMs (Category 1) shown 
in Table 4.3, major system recovery or recovery support PMs (Category 2) listed in 
Table 4.4 and the seven individual major system, one Move and six Fight systems, 
recovery PMs (Category 3) summarised in Table 4.5; see Section 4.3) AOR Variant 1 
performed best in four (float category, recovery support category and ability to RAS 
ordnance and CIWS recovery) while AOR Variant 2 performed best in the remaining 
five (move, ability to RAS AVCAT and dieso, ability to RAS dry stores and aviation 
support system recovery). These results can be clearly seen in the PM matrices 
presented in Section 6.5.3. 
In the float category AOR Variant 1 performed considerably better, by 
approximately 30% compared to its counterpart. Some of the most noteworthy results 
include that in PMs 1.1 and 1.2 AOR Variant 2 performed better. Although the aft FRP 
section bases in both ship designs were collocated (leading to similar values for PMs 1.8 
and 1.16) the absence of systems and compartments other than cargo in the forward 
section of AOR Variant 2 led to the forward FRP section base being located at the 
forward end of the (single) aft superstructure block, therefore, closer to amidships. (In 
AOR Variant 1 the forward FRP section base was located at the far forward end since 
the philosophy was to split the two section bases between the two superstructure blocks 
containing the living and working spaces). The more efficient, closer to amidships, 
location of this section base led to smaller distances travelled and less WT doors 
operated by the FRPs; it also, however, led to much worse performing PMs 1.9 and 1.17 
due to the increased vulnerability and decreased post-hit availability associated with 
items located close to amidships due to the assumed normal lengthwise hit probability 
distribution. The position relative to amidships of the ATU and ventilation 
compartments also led to AOR Variant 2 outperforming the first variant in PM 1.5. 
However, in all other PM of this group, either both auxiliary ship designs performed 
similarly or AOR Variant 1 performed better (in some cases more than 90%). The 
reasoning is similar to that given for PMs 1.9 and 1.17, i.e., due to the absence of 
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forward superstructure in the second variant, the single aft superstructure block had to 
be enlarged and extended towards amidships in order to fit all required systems and 
spaces. This led to equipment necessary for DC, such as firepumps (PMs 1.6 and 1.7), 
power generation units (PMs 1.11 and 1.12), SCC (PM 1.13), bridge (PM 1.14) and 
Operations Room (PM 1.15) being located closer to amidships, therefore, the 
probability of them being hit by the constant threat was increased, decreasing their post-
hit availability. Therefore, if it were to be assumed that the normal distribution used to 
describe the lengthwise hit probability is realistic, the above analysis demonstrated that 
concentration of systems at the extremities of the ship design (as was done in AOR 
Variant 1) decreases their vulnerability and increases their availability during recovery 
and repair efforts.  
In the recovery support PM group AOR Variant 1 performed approximately 
14% better than the second variant, the main reason being the improved performance of 
the SCC and Operations Room related PMs (2.6 and 2.7) summarised above. However, 
a comparison between the stores and workshops related PMs is difficult due to the 
different numbers of these compartments in the two variants (mentioned in Section 
6.5.3). 
When considering the move system recovery PM group, the second variant 
performed best by approximately 9%. The split and therefore, invulnerable to any single 
ASM attack, forward and aft propulsion system of the first variant leads to a value of 
zero for the high-weighted PM 3.1.1 (requiring zero man-hours for the move system to 
be functioning post-attack). However, the total man-hours needed to restore all 
(including duplicated) affected items of the move system is comparable in both designs 
due to the identical hull and vulnerability characteristics (in fact PM 3.2.1 is slightly 
worse for AOR Variant 1 due to additional propulsion equipment, such as the forward 
motor and pumpjet, not included in AOR Variant 2). This led to AOR Variant 2 
significantly outperforming the first variants in all access related PMs of this group. In 
the second variant, all power and propulsion machinery were concentrated at the aft end 
of the ship, as were the unduplicated naval and spare gear stores and workshops, 
therefore, providing easy access. In the second variant, not only was the propulsion 
system split in a forward and aft configuration, but so were the stores and workshops. 
This overcomplicated the access arrangements and more than overpowered the effects 
of the invulnerable move system. Once again, the importance of access to damaged 
equipment is highlighted, but should be treated with caution due to its high dependence 
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on the weighting scheme used. In addition, the increased difficulty related to the 
recovery of duplicated and separated systems was again emphasized. 
In the two RAS liquid capability recovery PM groups, AOR Variant 2 performs 
16% and 19% better, respectively. This is because the duplicated ship handling sub-
system of AOR Variant 2 (consisting of the bridge and RASco) has resulted to an 
invulnerable capability given a single ASM attack, therefore, requiring zero man-hours 
for post-attack capability restoration (PMs 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). All other PMs of this group 
output similar values due to the similar system configurations. 
 The duplicated ship handling sub-system of AOR Variant 2 also had an impact 
in PMs 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 of the two RAS solid capability recovery PM groups, therefore, 
reducing the number of man-hours to restore the capabilities after attack (however, not 
to zero, since, as analysed in Section 7.2.3 these capabilities are not invulnerably to a 
ASM attack). Therefore, the total improvement of AOR variant 2 in the ability to RAS 
dry stores recovery PM group was limited to approximately 5% and the two variants 
performed identically in the ability to RAS ordnance recovery PM group. 
Considering the aviation support system recovery PM group, the second variant 
outperformed AOR Variant 1 by approximately 33%. As summarised in Section 7.2.3 
the vulnerable, in-series, items of this system, such as the flight deck, hangar, ship’s 
own AVCAT tank and all aviation workshops, are protected by additional structure in 
AOR Variant 2, therefore, leading to an improved performance in PM 3.1.6. 
Furthermore, similar to the move system in AOR Variant 2, the aviation support system 
was concentrated towards the aft end in both AOR designs. The concentration of stores 
and workshops required for repair works also towards the aft end of the second 
auxiliary variant (as opposed to the split forward and aft such compartments in AOR 
Variant 1) led to a considerable improvement in the access related PMs, further 
augmenting the performance of AOR Variant 2 in this group. 
Finally, in the CIWS recovery PM group, AOR Variant 1 performed better to a 
level of more than 70% than its counterpart. Both systems were invulnerable to a single 
attack leading to zero values for PMs 3.1.7. However, the forward SeaRAM sub-system 
of the second variant was more vulnerable to fragmentation from the RAS posts and 
crane since it was not shielded by any structure, unlike in AOR Variant 1. This led to a 
larger total system vulnerability (including duplicated items), meaning that more system 
items were affected and needed repair in the second variant. Therefore, PM 3.2.7 of 
AOR Variant 2 performed worse by almost 100%. The fact that more items needed 
repair implied that more items required accessing from the stores and workshops, 
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therefore, dramatically decreasing the performance of all access related PMs of this 
group in AOR Variant 2. This was further amplified since all such stores and workshops 
were located at the ship’s aft end and the most vulnerable CIWS sub-system was 
located at the forward end. Furthermore, access to damaged CIWS related items form 
the aft stores and workshops of AOR Variant 1 was unobstructed. 
After normalising the PM group data and applying the weightings proposed by 
Lt. Cdr. (rtd.) Day it was found that the overall recoverability characteristics of the two 
AOR Variants were almost identical (less than 1% difference), although, as analysed 
above, certain remarkable differences were identified in the individual PM groups. 
However, this could be expected since there was an approximate balance in the number 
of PM groups (and their associated weightings) in which each variant outperformed its 
counterpart. 
 
7.3.4 General Observations on Recoverability Assessment 
 
Unlike the susceptibility and vulnerability assessment methods applied, it was 
necessary to develop a new recoverability assessment method. It was found that the 
recoverability assessment method developed could be relatively straightforwardly 
applied to different ship types encountering different threat scenarios. However, as 
mentioned in Sections 4.3 recoverability assessment is the most demanding and least 
researched area of survivability assessment and requires many assumptions, especially 
when the design is just at the concept definition level. The developed method involved 
various simplifying assumptions, in particular disregarding variations in human 
performance (although, theoretically, this could be addressed by varying the man-hour 
repair times employed, see Table 4.10 in Section 4.3.5). But also for fire (or flooding) 
spread (since it is simply assumed that only and all items in the hit WT section will be 
affected by fire) and the effects of excessive heel and trim (for example, from fire 
fighting). Despite this, the approach adopted can be used in the concept phase to 
investigate the efficiency of the arrangement of DC related items, major ship systems 
and stores and workshops required for repair works. This can be done in terms of 
magnitude of resulting damage and access to damaged items/WT sections. Therefore, 
the efficiency of the layout and system architecture can be improved in a concept stage 
ship design. As with the vulnerability assessment method, the recoverability assessment 
method facilitates results backtracking and provides ample insight into the effectiveness 
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of the recoverability characteristics of each ship design, facilitating the subsequent 
adoption of corrective design actions. 
It is, therefore, evident that the developed method examines recoverability of the 
ship design; however, this is done without regard to situational awareness, which forms 
an important part of recoverability (as well as susceptibility) performance. In Section 
7.1.4 it was noted that human performance, including human situational awareness, is 
difficult to quantify. Moreover, the developed survivability assessment method does not 
assess human performance related aspects (which are assumed to be constant given that 
all ships compared are assumed to have the same crew once a selection between the 
designs was made and brought forward); rather, it assesses the ship design itself and 
how the choice of configuration has affected survivability. Therefore, the proposed 
recoverability assessment method is consistent with the other two components of the 
survivability assessment method. It is interesting to note that when asked to propose 
alternative weighting schemes, certain naval officers recommended the addition of PMs 
regarding unquantifiable entities such as training, situational awareness, availability of 
skills as well as prioritising between duplicated systems (such as FRPPs and NBCD 
stores) which also depend on human and operational factors due to decisions probably 
made by the CO. All these comments serve to highlight the link between human 
performance and naval ship recoverability. 
Similarly to the vulnerability assessment method, there are issues regarding the 
use of appropriate weighting schemes which rely on human input (and are, therefore, 
subjective) rather than some numeric simulation. The impact of the applied weighting 
scheme on certain results was again highlighted, although very broad patterns were 
observed in the weighting schemes proposed by different naval officers. In Section 
6.6.1, various remarks made by the interviewed naval officers were mentioned. It was 
noticed that there were disagreements regarding, for example, the contents and 
significance of NBCD, naval and spare gear stores which affected the weightings given 
by each officer. Dissimilarities were also perceived regarding the perceptions of the 
relative importance of the various compartments (represented by their corresponding 
PMs) on DCFF and the repair routines followed. In addition different naval officers 
proposed the addition of various quantifiable PMs (but possibly not available in 
preliminary ship design), for example, those relating to items such as fixed firefighting 
systems, detection equipment (which would affect ship situational awareness), 
communications, sickbay, smoke curtains and the Weapon Section Base. All this 
signifies that each officer draws on his own experiences, knowledge and specialisation. 
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This means that the development of appropriate weighting schemes, as well as suitable 
PMs, is an area where further research is required. 
An interesting fact regarding the recoverability assessment of the two AOR 
variants is that the liquid and solid cargo tanks were assumed to belong to the fluid 
tanks and light engineering repair categories respectively (Table 4.10 in Section 4.3.5). 
This, however, gives an indication of the damage caused to the compartments 
themselves rather than the cargo and could be interpreted as the cargo tanks being 
empty. It would, therefore, be appropriate to investigate the recoverability 
characteristics of an AOR design with no cargo, as well as when loaded. This could be 
done by assuming that all cargo belongs to the last equipment repair category, i.e. 
humans and stores, assumed irreparable if affected by a hit. 
Again the scale on the y-axis of the normalised recoverability charts (Figure 
6.39, Figure 6.40 and Figure 6.41 in Section 6.5) needs careful definition (see Sections 
7.1.4 and 7.2.4 for susceptibility and vulnerability axis definition respectively). Zero is 
defined as the damages caused by the threat (ASM in this instance) being instantly 
recoverable despite a hit at any location of the ship being assessed. This would mean 
that all PMs would output a value of zero, i.e. either the number of man-hours to repair 
damaged items would be zero (instantly reparable), or no items would be damaged 
(corresponding to a vulnerability of zero, in which case recoverability assessment would 
not follow). However, a value of zero in some cases (PMs 1.1-1.4) is impossible since it 
would imply that the ship design would have a length of zero with, therefore, no WT 
doors and decks, and infinite access routes. Unity is defined as the recoverability 
performance of a baseline design (or the worst performing design in the case of the 
AOR designs; see Section 7.2.4). In contrast to susceptibility and vulnerability 
assessment, the definition of unity could not be changed to something similar to: the 
ship being assessed and its systems are totally unrecoverable (100% irreparable) to the 
threat, as this would imply infinite values in the PMs. For example, PMs quantified by 
man-hours to repair a specific equipment/system would require infinite values for 
irreparability. It becomes evident that defining the scale in recoverability assessment 
becomes increasingly difficult. Modifications to the PM recoverability assessment 
method would be required to achieve a more meaningful scale, indicating that this is an 
area for further research. These issues could be addressed partially through the 
development of a set of minimum acceptable recoverability standards for each ship type 
and for a given threat (possibly based on the recoverability performance of current 
ships), with all future alternative designs being assessed against these standards 
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(analogous, for example, to damage stability assessment), in the same manner as 
outlined in Sections 7.2.4 for vulnerability assessment. 
 Various conclusions were made during the application of the recoverability 
assessment method on the seven ship design studies:- 
- The impact of the number of damaged, unavailable, items which require repair 
and the access arrangements to the damaged areas, on recoverability 
performance was identified (including the effect of ship size on these two 
factors); 
- The contrast between the improved vulnerability but degraded (total system) 
recoverability characteristics of duplicated and separated systems due to arising 
access complexities was observed. (Total system recoverability increases in 
importance when follow-on attacks are expected. This is another factor that 
could influence the weighting scheme since PM 3.1 just focuses on the 
recoverability performance of the system because of any redundancy while PM 
3.2 focuses on the recoverability performance of the total system. The 
significance of the latter would increase if follow-on attacks are expected); 
- The fact that there is an optimum ship size and number of zones per ship. 
In addition, the impact of factors such as the applied weighting scheme and the 
susceptibility related assumed lengthwise hit probability distribution, which has been 
acknowledged as an aspect requiring further work due to its strong influence on all 
survivability constituents, were identified. Finally, the difficulty in distinguishing the 
boundary between vulnerability and recoverability was mentioned and the belief that 
they should be considered separately was questioned. 
 
7.4 Total Survivability Assessment Results Analysis 
 
7.4.1 Total Survivability Star (Triangle) Plots 
 
 The preferred method of presenting total survivability results is through the 
adoption of star plots in order to separate the results of the three constituents rather than 
providing a single (questionable) overall measure. Thus a smaller star (triangle) area for 
one design would indicate a more survivable ship (for a given weighting schemes and 
assumptions). The results illustrated by the star plots in Section 6.7 are those already 
discussed under the three survivability elements so further detailed constituent analysis 
is not required; however, some general survivability observations need to be made.  
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In both sets of comparative studies of the frigate and AOR variants, the 
susceptibility results of the ship designs compared were similar. This was not the case 
with the size varied combatants comparative study, where the Destroyer significantly 
outperformed the remaining two combatant designs (due to the much more capable 
AAW system of the Destroyer design, resulting in the largest effect that a single 
survivability feature has presented out of all features investigated in the current project, 
see Section 7.1.2).  
The choice of different hull configuration (such as in the frigate variants) was 
seen to have a much greater impact on vulnerability and recoverability than simply 
changing the ship size (such as in the combatants); although, the results were also 
affected by the choice of the applied weighting scheme, as well as, possibly, the specific 
hull configuration selected (hull configurations other than monohulls and a trimaran 
were not investigated). In addition, the AOR variant comparative study indicated that 
significant vulnerability reduction enhancements may be achieved by altering the 
internal and external configuration of a single hull configuration, despite identical 
dimensions, requirements and performance characteristics. 
Finally the least vulnerable ship design is not necessarily the most recoverable 
one. This arose from recoverability performance not only relying on the magnitude of 
the damage to the ship systems. It also relies on factors such as the access arrangements, 
the distribution of DCFF and repair works related items, the system hierarchies and 
architectures (and the weighting scheme used). In addition, the recoverability 
assessment method investigated total system recoverability, whereas the vulnerability 
assessment method is biased in favour of redundant systems. Therefore, some cases 
(such as the split propulsion system of Frigate Variant 3 and the Corvette design and the 
duplicated ship handling sub-system of AOR Variant 2) can be seen to augment the 
difference in vulnerability performance of different ship designs. However, when the 
magnitude of the damage caused by the same threat significantly differed between the 
designs being compared, this was found to usually dominate the remaining 
recoverability related factors. This was observed in the frigate variant case where the 
considerably less vulnerable trimaran outperformed its two counterparts in 
recoverability, despite the access deficiencies due to its larger size. 
An advantage of presenting the results in this star plot form is the avoidance of 
multiplying the three survivability constituents together, which side steps the issue as to 
whether the three survivability elements are truly statistically independent (see Sections 
3.3.53 and 4.4). Furthermore, with a star plot results presentation, further spokes such as 
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cost, displacement and power can be added; although it can only depict characteristics 
that are currently amenable to quantification (Vasudevan and Rusling 2007). The main 
disadvantage with this presentation is that the scales in the three axes (susceptibility, 
vulnerability and difficulty of recoverability) are not directly comparable (since only the 
definition of the origin, i.e. zero, is constant in all axes, as mentioned in Sections 7.1.4, 
7.2.4 and 7.3.4). For example, if a design has a susceptibility of 0.7 and a vulnerability 
of 0.6, it does not necessarily mean that the design is less vulnerable than it is 
susceptible, only that the improvement in vulnerability between that design and the 
baseline design it is being compared to is larger than the improvement in susceptibility. 
Since it is entirely a competitive approach, it is necessary to comprehend the 
survivability performance of the baseline in order to interpret the survivability 
performance of the designs being compared to the given baseline. This raises issues 
regarding how the diagram should be interpreted, with regards to the significance of the 
enclosed area. An obvious solution would be to equalise the definition of unity in all 
three scales (similar to the definition of zero, i.e. to set one as being equal to 100% 
susceptible, 100% vulnerable and 0% recoverable); however, as discussed in Sections 
7.1.4, 7.2.4 and 7.3.4, this is possible for susceptibility and vulnerability performance, 
but not currently for recoverability performance. A partial solution would be to develop 
standards for each survivability constituent (for each ship type and threat), and set unity 
as being equal to the minimum acceptable relevant standard. 
 
7.4.2 Total Survivability Bar Charts 
 
 The above disadvantage would be avoided if the individual survivability results 
were combined in the manner described in Section 4.4 and output the results illustrated 
in Figure 6.51 of Section 6.7. After following this procedure for the three frigate 
variants, it can be said that the results depicted in the total survivability star plot (Figure 
6.48 in Section 6.7) were confirmed; i.e., overall, Frigate Variant 3 is the most 
survivable design, followed by the baseline and lastly the second variant. In addition 
since this procedure outputs a single survivability value it may be concluded that a 
better relative comparison can be made between the total survivability performances of 
the ship designs being compared. However, the main limitation of this method is that it 
is based on PM matrices which are specifically designed to investigate recoverability 
performance rather than total survivability. Therefore, the validity of the results and the 
relative survivability performance magnitude of each ship design is questionable. For 
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this reason it was decided to apply this method to a limited number of ship design 
studies. Other limitations include the issues with regards to defining the y-axis (see 
Section 7.3.4) and the questionable statistical independence of the three constituents, 
required for a single numerical value. 
 It can be concluded that currently, the use of total survivability star plots is the 
most sensible means of presenting results. However, it is clear that visualisation of 
results and comparison methods are an area for further development. 
 
7.5 Ship Costing Results Analysis 
 
7.5.1 Unit Procurement Cost 
 
 Certain assumptions, such as the material and equipment costs, labour costs, 
purchasing overhead factors, shipyard hourly charge-out rates and the parametric 
relationships used were based on historical (monohull) data and therefore are dubious in 
accounting for new technologies and innovative design features. It can be argued that 
when using specific item costs (as was done for engines, electric motors and payload 
items) more accurate cost estimation should be achieved; however, the lack of data in 
many cases led to estimations based on similar equipment and, therefore, further 
uncertainties. 
One of the major uncertainties of the UPC cost estimation was the design 
contingency margin adopted. All UPC analysis margins were taken from references 
such as Dirksen (1996) and UCL (2010a). However, there was no indication as to what 
was an appropriate contingency margin for an innovative hull configuration, such as a 
trimaran, beyond a general comment regarding the use of larger margins for Advanced 
Marine Vehicles (AMVs). It was, therefore, simply decided to increase this margin by 
1% between each frigate variant designs (see Table A57 in Appendix 13.1). From the 
above comments, the very similar UPCs were to be expected. Thus, Frigate Variant 3 is 
less than 5% more expensive and Frigate Variant 2 approximately 2% more expensive 
than the baseline. 
In all individual weight groups (with the exception of the main propulsion and 
payload groups) the trimaran gave larger costs, followed by the second variant and then 
the baseline. This was also expected since the parametric relationships scaled with 
weight and the ship designs descended in displacement in the same order. The main 
propulsion group for the second variant is slightly more expensive due to the larger 
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generating capacity of that design (see Appendix 9.4) (compared to the identical power 
generation units used in Frigate Variants 1 and 3). The payload group follows a 
converse pattern due to all three ship designs incorporating a constant payload (meaning 
payload equipment costs were identical and installation costs similar) and a 
displacement scaling factor applied to all weight groups (which has an effect of 
decreasing relative costs for heavier ship designs). This raises issues as to if the 
displacement scaling factor should be applied to all or just to specific weight groups 
(such as the hull group in which, due to economies of scale, the purchase of larger steel 
quantities should result to cost benefits from cost per weight reductions). In all three 
frigate design cases studied, the payload group accounted for almost half of the UPC, 
followed by the hull and main propulsion groups, being the only groups responsible for 
more than 10 % of the UPC. This suggests that cost cutting studies should focus on 
these areas. However, the effect this would have on survivability performance is 
unclear. 
 
7.5.2 Through Life Cost 
 
 When estimating TLC, the fact that costs have to be forecasted can only increase 
the uncertainties of the resultant values. The projected discount rate, inflation and fuel 
inflation are likely to be sources of significant error. However, since in the current case 
different ship designs are compared, more emphasis is given to the relative, rather than 
the absolute, cost values, thus, decreasing the importance of the accuracy of the above 
values. However, elements such as the forecasted operational profile could mislead the 
costing outputs due to the different speed-power characteristics of the three frigates. 
Such errors would be enhanced by the fact that the assumed inflation of fuel is larger 
than the assumed discount rate, whereas the opposite is true for the assumed inflation of 
all other TLC elements. 
Projected costs on maintenance and refits are derived though parametric 
relationships which are also based on historical (monohull) data and, therefore, often 
cannot account for new technologies and innovative design features. The fact that these 
parametric relationships scale with the already dubious UPC (and individual weight 
group cost) prediction increases uncertainty. As do the facts that all ships are assumed 
to be constructed in the same timeframe and all ships are assumed to undergo the same 
number of major and minor refits at identical intervals, regardless of the novelty level of 
the design. It is, therefore, not surprising that the TLC estimations of all frigates are 
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very similar (Frigate Variant 3 TLC costs are approximately 4% and Frigate Variant 2 
approximately 2% higher than the baseline). 
In all individual TLC elements (with the exception of the anticipated fuel costs) 
the trimaran outputted the larger costs, followed by the second variant and the baseline. 
Again, this was not surprising since crew and consumable costs are assumed to scale 
with complement (which in turn scaled with displacement) and maintenance and refit 
costs scaled with UPC (which also scaled with displacement). Larger fuel costs were 
projected for the second frigate variant due to the less efficient hull design (see Section 
5.1.2). The largest contributors to TLC were in all cases, and by a large margin, the 
projected fuel and refits costs. Together they were responsible for approximately 66% 
of the total, therefore, suggesting that cost cutting research should focus on these 
costing elements. However, once again the effect of this on survivability is not obvious. 
 
7.5.3 Whole Life Cost 
 
 The WLCs for the three frigate variants were estimated by adding the UPC, 
TLC, FOC costs and disposal costs for an assumed class of twelve frigates. A number of 
simplifying assumptions, such as a shipyard learning curve which would gradually 
decrease UPC, the scaling of FOC costs with UPC, the costs associated with scrapping a 
ship within the UK and the clearly unrealistic assumption of construction and disposal 
of all twelve ships of each class in the same years, were applied. It was found that the 
FOC and disposal costs were negligible compared to the UPC and TLC, therefore, 
leading to very similar WLCs for the three variants (the difference between the baseline 
design and the other two frigate designs was an increase of approximately 2% and 4% 
respectively). It is interesting to note that the discounted TLC accounts for 
approximately 64% of the WLC in all three frigate cases, with UPC accounting for 
approximately 35%. However, cost cutting is usually biased towards UPC, not only 
because the effects of UPC are much more immediate and, therefore, of interest to final 
decision making authorities, but also since the elements of the TLC have to be 
forecasted through a much larger timeframe, spanning through decades, therefore, 
dramatically increasing the uncertainties embraced. Again, however, the parametric 
costing model employed cannot account for the effects of this on survivability 
enhancement features. 
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7.5.4 General Observations on Ship Costing and Survivability Assessment 
 
 The major conclusion from the ship costing study applied to the three frigate 
variants is that the differences in ship related costs are negligible. This observation 
magnifies in importance if it is used to assess the merits of the survivability 
characteristics of the three frigate designs. It would seem that survivability performance 
is more sensitive to the ship (hull, internal and external) configuration than is ship cost. 
The costing method utilised was a parametric method, since such methods are generally 
more applicable to preliminary stage ship designs. As the parametric relationships used 
for all frigate designs were identical, the similarity between the results is not surprising. 
In addition, a vast number of simplifying assumptions and uncertainties were involved 
in the costing models, questioning the validity of the results. 
However, since in western nations naval ship design has been characterised as 
‘cash limited’ during recent decades (Brown 1986a), ship costing is one of the principal 
factors governing the inclusion of survivability (and other) features on ship designs. 
Clearly, the parametric costing model used is not capable of satisfactorily linking 
survivability performance to ship cost and, therefore, assessing the value of 
survivability. Survivability features such as the application of flare/tumblehome, the 
reduction of microgeometry and duplication/separation of equipment (to name a few) 
cannot be captured by the parametric costing model. It is evident that a more detailed 
costing model is needed; however, this might only be possible during the later design 
stages. The perception of the cost of survivability as being very (possibly 
unrealistically) high (National Warship Survivability Committee 2008) might however, 
mean that many survivability enhancement features will have already been withdrawn 
before reaching the later design stages. The need for an improved costing method during 
preliminary ship design and for a better understanding of the cost of survivability is, 
therefore, clear. 
 
7.6 Research Review 
 
This section considers whether the proposed approach in Chapter 4 addresses the 
gaps identified in Chapters 2 and 3 and, therefore, considers if the research aims in 
Chapter 1 were met and suggests a way forward for this research. The Research Review 
is split into nine sub-sections. The first three give background information on the topic, 
therefore, justifying the need for a survivability assessment method linked to 
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architecturally orientated preliminary ship design. The following three sub-sections 
summarise the capabilities of current survivability assessment techniques, identify 
where further work was required and describe how this was tackled. The seventh sub-
section includes a comparison between the proposed approach and MISSION, the 
current MOD programme attempting to integrate all survivability constituents, and leads 
to the eighth sub-section which discusses some of the perceived advantages of the 
proposed approach. The final sub-section gives a list of what are considered the main 
areas for further work in this research. Those areas were identified by comparing the 
work accomplished to the initial research aims as well as by detecting problematic areas 
throughout the course of the project. 
 
7.6.1 The Need for Survivability Quantification 
 
 It is commonly accepted that naval ship design has shifted from the technically 
best to the affordable design (Brown 1986a). The causes of this are a combination of 
various factors such as the above-inflation increase in UPC and the declining defence 
budgets, which have also led to a gradual reduction in the number of ships of most 
western navies. Another commonly accepted fact is that the main operational difference 
between naval and commercial ships is that the former are designed to be deliberately 
placed in harm’s way. Naval ships, therefore, have to survive much tougher conditions, 
requiring additional measures to the ship’s inherent survivability features. Such 
requirements establish the main distinction between naval and commercial vessels, 
contributing to the increased complexity and costs associated to warships. 
The increased knowledge concerning naval ship survivability acquired over 
recent decades has resulted in various documents and publications from major navies, 
including survivability related rules and management strategies to be used as guidance 
by the designer. Such documents usually contained feature-based guidance based on 
historical experience, rather than performance based specifications, due to the difficulty 
in obtaining survivability quantification methods and tools. Thus, survivability features, 
whose performance is difficult to quantify, become hard to justify, presenting an 
apparently attractive area for cost cutting. It has been argued that such attitudes could 
lead to unbalanced and ineffective ship designs (Brown 1993), especially when 
considering the increase in magnitude and variety of threats that warships currently face 
and the decreasing number of warships. 
305 
 
It has been argued that the best way to deal with the problems created by the 
increasing warship costs, declining budgets and requirements of increased capability is 
through innovations in both individual ship designs and the design process. However, 
prescriptive rule-based design inhibits novel and innovative designs (for which no 
historical data exist and are seen to be risky) and design processes; in addition, safety 
rules are always made following an incident. (This is also true in commercial ship 
design, where Table 1 of (Cai et al 2012) lists numerous safety regulations set after 
major incidents). Consequently, the need for methods to quantify survivability (and 
other important ship performance characteristics), which would allow innovations 
(therefore, theoretically enable the achievement of more cost effective designs) and 
justify survivability features is clear. 
 
7.6.2 The Importance of Survivability Assessment in Preliminary Ship Design 
 
 Ship design is an iterative process, often depicted in the form of a design spiral 
(Andrews et al 2012). The role of the naval architect is increasingly demanding given 
the multitude of variables existent within the process (especially in the highly complex 
warship design area), with which the naval architect has to arrive to a balanced solution. 
The challenges faced escalate when considering that prototypes are very rarely built, 
implying that the solution does not have the reassurance of prototype testing before 
FOC construction. One easily understands the need for the exploration and assessment 
of a number of alternative designs at concept stage before proceeding to the later design 
stages. Thus, it is important that survivability is quantified during these early design 
stages through an appropriate assessment method. The existence of a preliminary design 
stage survivability assessment and quantification method would enable appropriate 
survivability measures in the initial iterative design process and offer increased certainty 
and confidence to the designer as well as the customer that the requirement will be met 
(Andrews et al 2012). 
It is widely recognised that the time and resources expended during the concept 
design stages are minimal when regarding the entire project, despite the most major 
decisions and trade off studies which will define the final product being taken at these 
stages. Moreover, the identification and solution of a problem during the early design 
stages is much easier and cheaper than applying delayed corrective actions. Finally, 
addition of novel design features (aiming, for example, to increase capability and/or 
reduce cost) is much simpler to investigate and effectively incorporate during the 
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preliminary design stages. It is, therefore, easily apprehended that the early design 
stages are the most crucial stages which will largely define the final solution, further 
justifying the need for a survivability assessment method able to operate with ship 
designs of minimal design definition. 
 
7.6.3 Survivability Assessment and Architecturally Orientated Design  
 
 Most warships are described as ‘architecture limited’ (Purvis 1974) (see Section 
2.1.4), therefore, a fully integrated and configurationally orientated preliminary design 
process would ease the identification of design drivers and risk areas (therefore, better 
dealing with complexity and increasing confidence), enable the incorporation of 
innovative solutions through increasing the creativity and contribution of the designer 
and facilitate the rapid exploration of various design alternatives. Also, by providing a 
more detailed concept design configurational description it would enable the 
investigation and assessment of various configuration dependant areas, such as ship 
operations, personnel evolutions, structural continuity, topside design and ease of 
production during the early design stages. Furthermore, survivability is also largely 
dependent on the layout/configuration/architecture of the ship, justifying the 
combination of a concept stage survivability assessment method with architecturally 
orientated preliminary design approaches. 
The rapid development in computer technology and CAD systems over the last 
years has aided the production of powerful software fully integrating ship design 
synthesis with architectural factors in the centre and from the early stages of the 
process. One such method is the UCL DBB approach to preliminary ship design in 
which the designer separates the ship’s functions and sub-functions into discrete 
elements (DBBs) and positions them appropriately, putting architectural factors in the 
centre of the process. The DBB approach was implemented through the SURFCON 
module in Paramarine, therefore, facilitating the use of all the naval architectural 
analytical tools available in the commercially established Paramarine CAD software. 
Thus, a fully integrated preliminary design process architecturally centred and 
combined with traditional naval architectural numerical analysis techniques to achieve 
balance is available and the advantages of linking this method to a concept stage 
survivability assessment method clear. 
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7.6.4 Susceptibility Assessment 
 
 Regarding susceptibility assessment methods, a variety of validated tools able to 
assess and quantify the susceptibility performance of a ship design (in related areas such 
as signatures and defensive system effectiveness, and against numerous threats) have 
been identified, and many utilised in actual warship design projects (see Section 3.3.2). 
These tools can be applied on ship designs during different design stages (including 
preliminary). Therefore, most susceptibility assessment techniques can easily be linked 
to preliminary design methods such as the DBB approach and therefore should be 
incorporated in the Naval Architecture design process. It should be noted that since the 
need that was identified above was that of a survivability assessment technique 
investigating ship architecture the effects of human performance were not considered. 
That is to say, alternative ship designs should be assessed rather than alternative crews, 
therefore, assuming crew performance as constant. 
For these reasons, the development of a new susceptibility assessment technique 
was deemed unnecessary. Since most susceptibility assessment techniques rely on 
restricted information and are not easily accessible, it was decided to combine an 
unclassified tool (CSEE) with the outputs given by a signature prediction tool (which 
being classified, was not run at UCL). This was done at the expense of results accuracy; 
however, since the detailed analysis of susceptibility features was beyond the scope of 
this study, the above method was considered acceptable. The method adopted led to a 
straightforward and easily comprehensible quantification of susceptibility and linked 
susceptibility assessment to preliminary architectural ship design, characterised by 
limited detailed design definition. This seemed to work satisfactorily across the range of 
ships studied. 
 
7.6.5 Vulnerability Assessment 
 
 The extensive research in vulnerability assessment over recent decades has led 
to a multitude of relevant tools produced by different nations, able to simulate various 
weapons and predict probabilities of preserving capability (see Section 3.3.3). The 
recognised importance of preliminary ship design has even led to the development of 
such tools specifically aimed to concept design stages. Through the gradual 
development of such tools, it can be claimed that software such as SURVIVE (the 
current UK MOD survivability assessment technique) have reached a mature stage. 
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Such tools can assess various threat types and weapon effects using a single ship model; 
do so in three dimensions, with various levels of detail; use validated algorithms, 
including flexible methods for system definition; are able to simulate cumulative 
damage caused by multiple hits; and able to model novel hullforms. An issue that 
possibly requires supplementary addressing is the further validation of concept stage 
vulnerability assessment tools operating with low levels of design detail (such as 
SURVIVE Lite), especially when investigating the effects of applying different zoning 
philosophies, where the zones are largely defined by the routings and connections 
between different items which are vague at best. Nevertheless, vulnerability assessment 
is already considered part of the iterative ship design process mentioned above. 
Vulnerability assessment software has been used in actual projects in order to manage 
vulnerability throughout the design process (Martin 1998; Reese et al 1998; Thornton et 
al 2007; Schofield et al 2012). 
For the above reasons, and since access to SURVIVE Lite was granted, the 
development of a new vulnerability assessment technique was also deemed unnecessary 
for this project. SURVIVE Lite was used to develop an approach which quantified 
vulnerability (the quantification of which, however, depended on a subjective weighting 
scheme) and linked vulnerability assessment to preliminary architectural ship design, 
characterised by limited detailed design definitions. In addition, the approach facilitated 
the backtracking of the results and identification of undesirable vulnerability features, 
which could then be easily altered given the preliminary nature of the ship designs. 
 
7.6.6 Recoverability Assessment 
 
 In marked contrast to susceptibility and vulnerability assessment, it was not 
possible to identify a suitable recoverability assessment method which quantified 
recoverability and was able to be applied easily, simply and rapidly to preliminary 
design stage ship designs. This can be attributed to various reasons (see Section 3.3.4 
and 4.3) which constitute recoverability assessment considerably more demanding to 
achieve. For example, the reliance on human factors (since recoverability “is mainly an 
operational aspect relying mainly on the sufficient training of the crew although it may 
still pose several requirements to the designer” (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2012)); 
the time dependence (i.e. dynamic nature) of recoverability (in order to model 
secondary damage such as fire and flood progression and crew actions); the inadequate 
data available; and the difficulty in incorporating crew readiness and skill levels. 
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A number of recoverability assessment techniques exist (see Section 3.3.4), 
however, many, such as safety and risk analysis methods, are qualitative. Thus, they are 
subjective, relying on expert judgment, and furthermore, do not take specific ship 
architectural features into account and so are considered to be of limited use. They 
could possibly be useful after preliminary ship design, when deciding on what DC 
equipment to have on board and what procedures to follow. Other methods are focused 
on a particular aspect of recoverability (rather than total ship recoverability), such as fire 
and flood spread or DC crew evolutions/personnel movement. Such techniques often 
rely on simulations, with often lengthy computational times (only worsened by the 
substantial number of scenarios which could be modelled) and require a detailed ship 
design definition not applicable to preliminary ship design. The latter issue also applies 
when total recoverability has to be simulated. The increased dependence on operational 
and human factors for recoverability has led to the development of DC simulation tools. 
These tools capture both the performance of the crew in various DC scenarios and the 
effect of the ship architecture. However, they are also aimed at detailed, if not existing, 
ship designs. 
Since the required capability identified was that of a survivability assessment 
tool aimed at preliminary ship design and specifically investigating the effect of the 
choice of ship configuration on survivability (by linking the method to an 
architecturally orientated preliminary ship design approach) and none of the existing 
recoverability assessment techniques addressed this, the development of a new 
recoverability assessment technique was clearly identified. Simulations might just be 
possible late in preliminary ship design (Casarosa 2011) but an early assessment of 
survivability was considered preferable (for the level of ship definition in the ship 
design studies explored in this research). Furthermore, assessment of recoverability 
requires temporal metrics such as the time taken to repair systems, which would be 
produced by simulation. 
An alternative analytical method was developed in order to generate this data 
(and, therefore, decouple the method from chronological dependence). The new 
recoverability assessment approach developed a number of Performance Measures 
(PMs) and an appropriate weighting scheme in order to attempt to overcome the 
difficulties of recoverability modelling (such as lack of data, human performance and 
time dependence). The PMs are aimed at investigating the post-hit availability of the 
DC system, various major ship systems and the access to damaged items, thus capturing 
the effects of ship architecture. It can be said that, since recovery operations have a 
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storyboard, in ship designs with a low level of detail, the best way to describe this is by 
tying each action into a spatial feature represented by a corresponding PM which in turn 
indicates the performance of the design. The level of detail in the ship designs does not 
allow the detailed investigation of human performance and actions (with which the 
storyboard would be described); in addition, as mentioned, the need that was identified 
was that of a survivability assessment technique investigating ship architecture rather 
than human performance. 
However, since recoverability is more of an operational rather than a design 
aspect, the complete decoupling of human performance from recoverability 
performance is impossible. In the developed method it was incorporated through 
assuming man-hour data for the repair of the various affected items, which in turn 
defined the value of the PMs. Theoretically, human performance could be assessed by 
altering this data; however, the main objective of the developed method is to investigate 
ship architecture, i.e. to assess the survivability performance of alternative ship designs 
rather than alternative crews, therefore, assuming crew performance as constant. 
It could be argued that the developed method has some similarities and could be 
considered an evolution (since factors such as major system recovery and access were 
incorporated) of the suggestion of MOD (2001) that, given the immature stage of 
recoverability assessment, an interim solution would be to incorporate recoverability by 
modelling the vulnerability of the whole DC system, without, however, considering 
progressive damage. 
The proposed approach links recoverability assessment to preliminary 
architectural ship design, characterised by very low detail design definitions. In 
addition, the approach facilitates the backtracking of the results and identification of 
undesirable features, which could then be easily altered given the preliminary nature of 
the ship designs. Finally, the method partially succeeds in quantifying recoverability 
(the quantification of which, however, depends on a subjective weighting scheme). The 
major problem in this regard is the difficulty in defining the recoverability performance 
scale (due to the absence of a minimum recoverability value, see Section 7.3.4), an area 
requiring further research. 
 
7.6.7 Comparison between MISSION and Proposed Approach 
 
At this point, it would be useful to undertake a brief comparison between the 
developed survivability assessment method and MISSION, the current MOD 
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programme attempting to integrate all survivability constituents. The main top-level 
differences between the two methods can be summarised as:- 
- “MISSION is an event simulation tool designed to simulate a maritime mission” 
(White and Allwood 2011; Parry 2012; Parry and White 2012); inputs include 
tasks and movement of blue and red forces and, therefore, it can be considered 
as an operational analysis simulation tool; 
The proposed approach is a design optimization tool, designed to compare ship 
variants (or even ship types) with regards to their survivability performance; it is 
closely linked to CASD software and is designed to incorporate survivability in 
the iterative preliminary ship design process (in a similar manner to, for 
example, powering and stability analysis); 
- MISSION simulates “at a task-force level” (White and Allwood 2011; Parry 
2012; Parry and White 2012); 
The proposed approach looks at single ship designs; 
- MISSION gives a variety of outputs, the most important being the Probability of 
Mission Success; 
The proposed approach outputs survivability performance in terms of the three 
survivability constituents; 
- In MISSION, capabilities (and repair tasks) are prioritized, and crew and 
casualties are modelled and used for recoverability modelling; 
The proposed approach uses scenario dependant weighted PMs for 
recoverability assessment; 
- MISSION, being a Monte-Carlo model, involves the repetition of simulations in 
order to generate statistical results; 
The proposed approach, being a deterministic method/algorithm, outputs the 
same results given constant inputs; therefore, each ship design is investigated 
once; 
- “MISSION uses a time step simulation method” (White and Allwood 2011; 
Parry 2012; Parry and White 2012); 
Proposed approach uses an analytical method. 
Some top-level similarities between MISSION and the proposed approach include:- 
- Both methods are only defensive, i.e. blue forces are unable to target red forces 
but only the weapons attacking the blue forces; 
- Both methods disregard environmental factors; 
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- Both methods use SURVIVE (Lite in the latter case) for vulnerability 
assessment, using a near identical philosophy for system/capability definition; 
- Both methods use external models (which can be replaced/substituted) to input 
susceptibility and vulnerability (and in the case of the proposed survivability 
assessment approach, recoverability) data. 
In addition to the above, there are various lower-level differences and 
similarities between the two approaches. It should also be recognised that both 
approaches are currently in their development phase. The general conclusion is that 
MISSION, being a maritime operational analysis simulation tool, is generally more 
complex and requires much more input detail and computational time. The proposed 
approach solely investigates the survivability characteristics of competing ship designs 
in an attempt to incorporate survivability analysis in the iterative, architecturally 
orientated, preliminary design process. Moreover, the proposed approach, being 
constituted by three external methods to assess the three survivability constituents is 
able to output the relative recoverability (and susceptibility and vulnerability) 
performance of a ship design being assessed. MISSION is not able to do that for 
recoverability performance since it does not output a specific recoverability related 
value (it does, however, for susceptibility and vulnerability since it uses external models 
for their assessment). This also makes it easier to suggest improvements to the ship 
design when using the proposed approach, as negative results (e.g. worst performing 
PMs) can be traced back. 
 
7.6.8 Advantages of the Proposed Approach 
 
 The alternative proposals as to how to combine the results from the three 
survivability constituents in the proposed approach led to the decision to regard them 
separately and present them together in the form of star plots. This process is 
advantageous in that it gives a clear indication of the survivability performance of 
competing designs and avoids the uncertainties involved in the combination of the three 
constituents (see Section 7.4.1). It is believed that the proposed approach would support 
the move from prescriptive, feature-based to performance-based design for survivability 
by providing a supplementary tool for designers to assess survivability and ensure the 
attainment of the required performance from the commencement of the design phase. 
However, the issue regarding the meaningful quantification of recoverability 
performance must first be addressed, through for example, the development by experts 
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of recoverability (and susceptibility and vulnerability) standards for each ship type and 
for a given threat (possibly based on the recoverability performance of current ships), 
with these standards defining the recoverability performance scale (see Section 7.3.4). 
The proposed approach would thus support the establishment of survivability statements 
and detailed requirements/goals during the requirement formulation stage, rather than 
viewing them as further constraints to an already complicated process. 
Furthermore, the survivability assessment approach proposed would assist in 
achieving a balance between the three (equally investigated) survivability components 
and other design features, with consideration to their associated weight, volume and 
cost penalties, therefore, justifying the required survivability enhancement measures 
despite reducing budgets. 
 
7.6.9 Future Work 
 
 A number of issues must be addressed before the proposed survivability 
assessment approach is considered mature:- 
- The issue regarding the meaningful quantification of the recoverability 
performance scale (Figure 6.39, Figure 6.40 and Figure 6.41 in Section 6.5) has 
been flagged up (see Section 7.3.4). This might be addressed through the 
development of recoverability standards which would define a scale, or through 
alterations to the recoverability assessment method; 
- Further investigation is required regarding the use of appropriate weighting 
schemes for a given operational scenario (as well as appropriate equipment 
repair times). The Delphi Method (see Section 3.3.4) is seen as a promising 
technique for converging to a single weighting scheme per scenario and easing 
the concerns regarding the subjectivity of the weighting schemes (and repair 
times) and, therefore, vulnerability and recoverability results. In addition, it 
could be used to suggest alternative major ship systems and PMs that should be 
included in the vulnerability and recoverability assessment sub-methods 
respectively; 
- A major issue requiring further research is the modelling of secondary damage 
through the progression of fire and flooding, as well as the difficulties associated 
with excessive post-damage heel and trim in the recoverability assessment part 
of the method. In the proposed approach demonstrated it was simply assumed 
that fire (the effects of which are often worse than the effects from the weapon 
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detonation) would only affect all those items within the hit WT section (flooding 
was not considered since only abovewater threats were modelled and excessive 
heel and trim were neglected). In addition, fire effects were not accounted for in 
the PMs relating to the immediate actions and effects after attack (i.e. Category 
1 PMs), but only in the PMs relating to recovery operations after secondary 
effects have been dealt with (i.e. Category 2 and 3 PMs). This was assumed in 
order to avoid the use of complex simulation tools. The use of such tools would 
not only require a much higher level of design definition but would also disable 
the decoupling of the recoverability assessment method from time dependence, 
introducing further requirements, such as the modelling of crew evolutions. This 
would then result in a highly complicated simulation tool, similar to ones 
already existing (see Section 3.3.4), which are inappropriate for use in 
preliminary ship design. Of relevance is Cootes’ (2010) remark that “whilst it is 
imperative to implement survivability analysis at the early stages of design, the 
level of detail needs to be kept minimal early on”. Furthermore, the very detailed 
and accurate input data required by advanced fire modelling tools, as well as the 
amount of factors influencing compartment fires and required assumptions 
outlined in (Institution of Structural Engineers 2007), could limit the realism of 
fire analysis even at detailed level. Therefore, a certain level of damage (hit WT 
section) was simply assumed. However, this is an area regarding further 
investigation; 
- The proposed approach could be further developed in order to include the effects 
of multiple and varying threats (as opposed to the current demonstration just 
using radar homing sea-skinning ASMs) as well as protection offered by other 
ships in the task group (as opposed to assuming that each ship design only uses 
its own defensive systems). These developments could be addressed relatively 
easily given the plethora of susceptibility assessment techniques capable of the 
above (they could also be used to improve on the assumption of P(di) = 1 for all 
ship designs) and the ability of SURVIVE Lite to model various threat types and 
cumulative damage; 
- In order to fully regard the developed method as a constituent of the iterative 
architecturally orientated DBB approach to preliminary ship design, it should be 
computer coded, therefore, saving remodelling and method application time. 
- In Section 7.4.1 it was mentioned that the proposed survivability assessment 
approach demonstrated that the choice of hull configuration had a great impact 
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on vulnerability and recoverability performance. This observation requires 
further examination through the application of the proposed approach on 
additional hull configurations (other than the monohull and trimaran 
configurations investigated in this research); 
- The need for an improved costing method during preliminary ship design which 
would be able to capture the cost of survivability enhancement features, as well 
as the importance of a better understanding of the cost of survivability was 
identified in Section 7.5.4. 
A final problematic issue identified during this research (and summarised in 
Section 7.3.1), which is not directly related to the survivability assessment method 
developed but to the subject of naval ship survivability as a whole, is the correct 
identification of the boundary between vulnerability and recoverability, or even whether 
they should be separately considered. There is an inconsistency in the definitions of 
survivability given by various authors (see Appendix 3), where some consider the 
constituents of survivability as being susceptibility and vulnerability (which included 
recoverability) while others regarding recoverability as a separate topic. In addition, 
most authors do not seem to recognise that the susceptibility related lengthwise 
probability hit distribution of a ship (i.e. the location of the hit, an additional topic 
which requires further definition) directly affects the ship’s vulnerability (and, therefore, 
recoverability) performance, while not playing any role in the ship’s total susceptibility 
performance. The proposed survivability assessment approach did incorporate this 
relatively straightforward feature; however, the issues regarding the assessment of 
vulnerability and recoverability remain and need to be resolved. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 The discussion in Chapter 7 details a large amount of issues arising from the 
application of the proposed survivability assessment approach outlined in Chapter 4 to 
the ship design studies described in Chapter 5 in order to output the results presented in 
Chapter 6. Several central matters emerged throughout this research, which are 
summarised in this concluding chapter. In general, the main research aim defined in 
Chapter 1 was met; however, a substantial amount of further work is required in order 
to classify the topic as mature. The major areas for further work are also summarised in 
this chapter. 
 The main aim was defined as: to propose an integrated survivability assessment 
approach and demonstrate it on a range of ship types and hullform configurations during 
the preliminary stages of ship design. It was rapidly identified that the linking of such a 
method to an architecturally orientated preliminary ship design approach, such as the 
DBB approach, would be advantageous for various reasons. Chiefly, attempting to 
assess human performance (upon which aspects of survivability, primarily susceptibility 
and recoverability, are dependant) is difficult, possibly unachievable in the concept 
design stages, with limited ship definition. Therefore, it was decided that the developed 
approach should investigate the effect that configurational choice had on survivability 
performance (ship configuration, i.e. design, as opposed to human, factors, being the 
other main driver of survivability). The advantages of the DBB approach were quickly 
realised during the development of the seven ship design studies on which the proposed 
survivability assessment approach was demonstrated. For example, the ability to 
quickly produce and compare alternative ship designs, locate related spaces efficiently, 
identify drivers and risk areas, encourage novel configurations, account for zoning in 
the early design stages and understand the implications of innovative technologies such 
as IFEP, were clear. It was concluded that a new ship design must be described 
architecturally, in terms of its functional breakdown, and also (traditionally) in terms of 
its weight breakdown, in order for one to be able to justify the selected design. Without 
an architectural description of a ship design, an adequate survivability analysis would 
not be possible. 
 Various susceptibility and vulnerability assessment techniques which are 
applicable to preliminary ship design already exist. These tools have been utilised in 
actual warship design projects in recent decades, contributing to the relative maturity of 
susceptibility and vulnerability assessment. It was, therefore, judged unnecessary to 
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develop new such tools. Due to the sensitivity relevant in the area susceptibility 
(assessment) it was decided to simulate a simplified ASM attack using an unclassified 
existing method with unclassified but representative data, in combination with a 
signature prediction tool operated by the sponsor of this research. Although the method 
and data used included extensive simplifications, various important features were 
highlighted after its application to the ship design studies. For example, the effect of 
signatures through varying ship size, managing microgeometry and shaping were 
confirmed as was the decreasing importance of signature management with increasing 
ship size. The consequences of varying defensive missile targeting pattern and defensive 
missile types were also observed. In fact, it was concluded that the largest effect that a 
single survivability feature presented (out of all features investigated in the current 
project) was the use of a more capable defensive AAW system (in the destroyer design), 
justifying the extensive investments made in susceptibility assessment techniques and 
reduction features. The method adopted led to a straightforward and easily 
comprehensible quantification of susceptibility and linked susceptibility assessment to 
preliminary architectural ship design, characterised by limited detailed design 
definition. This seemed to work satisfactorily across the range of ships studied. 
 For vulnerability assessment, QinetiQ’s SURVIVE Lite, being currently the 
principal concept stage vulnerability assessment code of the UK MOD, was utilised. A 
number of major ship systems were modelled and combined with a weighting scheme in 
order to assess the effects of the above ASM attack scenario. This approach also led to 
valuable data by giving indications of performance enhancements when adopting 
practices such as duplication and separation of identical systems, adoption of IFEP, 
increasing ship size, improving system layout (facilitated in trimaran configurations) 
and shielding critical equipment by other, less critical compartments. In addition, the 
considerable reduction in vulnerability of trimaran configurations through protection 
provided by the side hulls was observed. The dependence of vulnerability on issues 
such as the assumed lengthwise probability hit distribution, the attack trajectory and the 
subjective weighting scheme used, was also observed and those issues require further 
definition. Nevertheless, the developed approach quantified vulnerability and linked 
vulnerability assessment to preliminary architectural ship design, characterised by 
limited detailed design definitions. In addition, the approach allowed the backtracking 
of the results and identification of undesirable vulnerability features, which could then 
be easily altered given the preliminary nature of the ship designs. 
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 A recoverability assessment tool aimed specifically at preliminary ship designs 
and specifically investigating how ship configuration would affect overall naval ship 
recoverability does not seem to exist. It was, therefore, decided that a new recoverability 
assessment method should be developed to investigate such issues at early stage design. 
Since simulations are not appropriate during the early concept design stages and 
recoverability is strongly time dependent, the development of a number of Performance 
Measures (PMs) together with an appropriate (but subjective) weighting scheme was 
selected in order to decouple the method form chronological dependence. The PMs 
investigate the post-hit availability of the DC system, various major ship systems and 
the access to damaged items, thus capturing the effects of ship architecture. In addition, 
as mentioned in Section 7.6.6, since recovery operations have a storyboard, in ship 
designs with a low level of detail the best way to describe this is by tying each action 
into a spatial feature. Spatial features are represented by a corresponding PM which in 
turn indicates the performance of the design. The level of detail in the ship designs did 
not allow the detailed investigation of human performance and actions (with which the 
storyboard would be described). However, the strong operational (as opposed to design) 
aspect of recoverability did not allow the complete decoupling of human performance 
from recoverability performance. Specifically, human performance was incorporated 
through assuming man-hour data for the repair of the various affected items, which in 
turn defined the value of the PMs. The application of the proposed approach led to 
significant observations, such as the dominant effect of post-attack equipment 
availability (and, therefore, the efficiency of the ship layout as well as the assumed 
lengthwise probability hit distribution) on recoverability performance and the decreased 
access efficiency of larger ships, as well as the relative advantages of different access 
philosophies. Moreover, it was identified that there is an optimum ship size (since post-
hit equipment availability increases due to decreasing vulnerability, but access 
efficiency decreases, with ship size) for recoverability performance, as well as an 
optimum number of zones per ship (although zones are largely defined by the routings 
and connections between different items which are unclear during the preliminary ship 
design stages, therefore, requiring further work). The proposed approach links 
recoverability assessment to preliminary architectural ship design, characterised by very 
low detail design definitions. In addition, the approach facilitates the backtracking of the 
results and identification of undesirable features, which could then be easily altered 
given the preliminary nature of the ship designs. However, the method partially 
succeeds in quantifying recoverability, the major problem in this regard being the 
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difficulty in defining the recoverability performance scale (mentioned in Section 7.3.4); 
an area requiring further research. 
 From above, it is clear that the proposed design optimization approach is able to 
identify the principal survivability drivers of various ship types and hullform 
configurations. In addition, it is able to investigate the effect of factors such as ship 
configuration, hull configuration and ship size on survivability performance. Moreover, 
by assessing all three survivability constituents equally, a balance between survivability 
features may confidently be attempted. The fact that the proposed survivability 
assessment approach is linked to an architecturally orientated preliminary design 
approach allows the investigation of alternative designs, as well as specific survivability 
features in the earliest design stages. During these stages, ship designs are amenable to 
modifications, which would be expensive or even unfeasible in the later design stages; it 
is noteworthy that the resources spent during the early ship design stages are minimal 
compared to those spent during the entire project, although the decisions made during 
these design stages largely determine the final solution. Finally, the quantification of 
survivability would justify survivability enhancement features, therefore, discouraging 
cost cutting in this area. Moreover, through the quantification of survivability, the 
proposed approach encourages a more meaningful performance-based (rather than 
prescriptive, feature-based) requirements specification for a ship design project, with 
survivability analysis commencing at the early design stages, making survivability 
assessment an integral part of the design process. 
 A brief costing study was undertaken in an attempt to use ship cost as a measure 
against which survivability measures can be assessed. However, the parametric costing 
method used (applicable to preliminary stage ship designs) was unable to evaluate the 
value of survivability. Survivability features, such as the application of 
flare/tumblehome, the reduction of microgeometry and duplication/separation of 
equipment, were not captured. More detailed costing models are required for such 
analyses; however, they might not be applicable to ship designs of limited design 
definition, potentially leading to the omission of survivability features. The need for a 
better understanding of the cost of survivability, especially during preliminary design, is 
clearly identified. 
 Other main areas requiring further work (which have been detailed in Section 
7.6.9, therefore, are briefly mentioned here) are:- 
- The meaningful quantification of the recoverability performance scale; 
320 
 
- The use of appropriate weighting schemes and equipment repair times as well as 
the modelling of supplementary major ship systems and PMs in the vulnerability 
and recoverability assessment methods; 
- The modelling of secondary damage and excessive post-damage heel and trim in 
the recoverability assessment method; 
- The inclusion of multiple and varying threats and protection offered by other 
ships in the task group in the proposed survivability assessment approach; 
- The computer coding of the proposed survivability assessment approach; 
- The application of the proposed approach on additional hull configurations; 
- The correct identification of the boundary between vulnerability and 
recoverability, as well as a better definition of the lengthwise probability hit 
distribution of a ship. 
Despite the considerable amount of further work required, it is considered that 
this research has contributed to advancing knowledge of what is possible in the early 
stages of the design process of “the most complex, diverse and highly integrated of any 
engineering systems” produced today (Graham 1982). 
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